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Abstract: This article describes the regulatory and enterprise reform in the Chinese airline industry
and its impact on the industry's development. China's transport sector is one of the largest sectors of
the Chinese economy while aviation has been the fastest growing mode. Chinese civil air transport
has grown by an average of 20 percent a year since 1980 - 4.3 times the world average. The article
starts with a description of China's general economic and industrial reform, followed by a description
of reforms in the air transport sector. It then examines the impact of the reform on the growth and
development of China's airline industry. In particular, the following aspects of the industry are
discussed: air traffic growth and route development, market structure, and airline operation and
competition.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As China moves from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, many sectors have
witnessed, for the last 18 years, either policy liberalization or a shift in decision-making power from
central to local government. By 1993 China's economy had become essentially a market economy in
the sense that some two-thirds or more of national output was produced by profit-seeking economic
units. Although rural reforms turned out to be very successful, the industrial reform proved to be
much more difficult. Industry is the largest sector of the Chinese economy, accounting for 50 percent
of total output and 80 percent of exports, and employing more than 100 million workers in 1992.
The core of China's industrial reform has been the reform of thousands of large- and medium-
size state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Most of the existing literature on the SOE reform is based on
cross-section studies of many industries. However, Jefferson and Rawski (1994, p. 50) pointed out in
a comprehensive survey of Chinese enterprise reform: "The problem is complex: the population of
state-owned enterprises is large and diverse; the reforms are partial and uneven; they consist of
measures that permit (rather than mandate) new course of action; and outcomes are ambiguous. A
full analysis must penetrate to the enterprise level and transcend the evidence available from
anecdotes, small samples, and fragile statistical aggregates." This suggests an industry-case-study
approach.
This article describes the regulatory and enterprise reform in the Chinese airline industry and
its impact on the industry's development. China's transport sector is one of the largest sectors of the
Chinese economy while aviation has been the fastest growing mode since the early 1980s. Table 1
shows the composition of non-urban transport activities (passenger kilometers) in recent years. The
average annual growth rate of civil aviation in China was 20.7% during the 1980-94 period - 4.3
times the world average, while the average annual growth rate of all modes of transportation was
9.9% in the same period. Air transport has also become more important in intercity transport: its
proportion of passenger kilometres of all modes has increased from 1.7% in 1980 to 6.4% in 1994.
In 1994 China ranked 8th in the world in terms of total air passenger-kilometers performed, compared
with its 33th place in 1980, while its domestic passenger-kilometers ranked 4th, just behind the U.S.,
Russia and Japan.
Such a high growth rate appears beyond the expectation of Chinese transport planners. For
example, the Development Research Center of the State Council, an economic think tank of the
central government, made the following forecast in 1985: the total tonne-kilometers performed by the
Chinese airlines would reach 5.0-5.5 billion at year 2000, with an average annual growth rate of 13%
(DRCSC, 1988). However, the industry performed 5.8 billion total tonne-kilometers in 1994,
2TABLE 1: Modal Split in Non-Urban Transport in China
(Billion passenger-km)
Rail
Road
Water
Air
Total
1980 1985 1990 1994 Annual Growth
1980-94
138.32 241.61 261.26 363.61 7.1%
72.95 172.49 262.03 422.03 13.4%
12.91 17.86 16.49 18.35 2.5%
3.96 11.67 23.05 55.16 20.7%
228.10 443.70 562.80 859.10 9.9%
Sources: Yearbook (1995).
exceeding the estimate for year 2000.
Besides its tremendous growth, China's airline industry offers an interesting and prominent
example of profound changes in a state industry caused by a historic reform experiment. Taken
together, these two observations suggest that an examination of this industry may be particularly
useful to study China's SOE reform and to further draw implications for the general process of
completing transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy.
My second objective in this article is to better understand the development of China's air
transport and its aviation policy. The airline industry is currently undergoing major structural changes
throughout the world. There is a world wide tendency to deregulate/liberalize the airline industry and
promote competition in both domestic and international markets. Globalization of the industry seems
increasingly likely; experts predict that a small number (5-10) of global carrier networks are to be
formed within the next decade. The rapid growth of China's economy, size of its population, and
geopolitical importance of its location in Asia, all, point that China will likely to play a key role in
shaping the pattern of airline networks in Asia and the linkage with other continents. Despite its
importance little has been written on the Chinese airline industry. This article is a step towards filling
that void.
The present paper focuses mainly on China's domestic airline market; its international
aviation policy and operation will be discussed in a separate paper. The article is organized as
follows. Section II contains a description of China's general economic and industrial reform. Section
III describes reforms in the air transport sector. This is followed, in Section IV, by an examination of
the impact of the reform on the growth and development of the industry. The airline competition in
Claim's domestic markets is also discussed in Section IV. Finally, Section V contains concluding
remarks.
II. INDUSTRIAL REFORM
The economic reform policy was instituted at the Third Plenary Session of the 1lth Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China in December 1978. A "gradual" reform strategy was
adopted (as opposed to the "big-bang" approach applied in some East European countries).
Agriculture was the first area in which China implemented reforms. The results were clear:
agricultural output increased by 67% between 1978 and 1985, and productivity (measured as the
amount of output for a given amount of inputs) increased by nearly 50%, compared with no increase
in productivity over the previous two and half decades (Lin, 1992; McMillan et al., 1989). The
increase in agricultural productivity in turn spurred the growth of rural enterprises, or the Township
Village Enterprises - TVEs, by generating a pool of savings and excess labour (Byrd and Lin, 1990).
Beginning from a small base, TVEs were allowed to grow with few of the restrictions that hobbled
state-run industries and TVEs expanded rapidly. A number of studies have recently been done to
explain the success of TVEs (e.g., Weitzman and Xu, 1994; Chang and Wang, 1994; Li, 1995).
The industrial reform was felt in 1979 and instituted at the Third Plenary Session of the 12th
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China late in 1984. The core of this reform program
was to transform thousands of large- and medium-size SOEs to profit-seeking economic units in a
market economy. A popular official slogan was that "the goal of the SOE reform is to make the
enterprise independent, autonomous and responsible for profits and losses." As such, the reform so
far may be characterized as an evolutionary process of re-assignment of decision rights and residual
claims from the state to the inside members of the enterprise (i.e., the manager and workers). The
argument for shifting the decision rights to the manager of the firm was based on the assumption that
managerial decisions are more efficiently made at the firm level than at the central planner level owing
to information/communication problems. While the theoretical legitimacy of this assumption dates at
least back to Hayek (1945), Chinese economists were mainly based their argument on the observed
poor performance of its central planned system (Zhang, 1996). In particular, the rational for shifting
residual claims to the members of the firm was based on incentive considerations. Although modem
theory of incentives was just recently introduced into China, the pre-reform Chinese experience
seemed sufficient for both Chinese economists and reform-minded political leaders to understand how
essential an incentive system is for economic performance.
State-owned enterprises are the natural focus of any effort to evaluate the progress of China's
industrialreform. Indeed,theSOEreformhasbeenthecentralcomponentof China'soverallreform
packagesincetheearly1980s.ThedominantviewamongChinese economists is that the SOE reform
has not been very successful, at least in terms of profit rate measures (Zhang, 1996). The number of
SOEs running at a loss has been rising, and the amount of loss has been increasing. In 1993, for
instance, the total losses from state-owned industrial enterprises was 45.3 billion yuan (RMB), about
14 times the losses in 1985. Due to the wide scope and huge amount of losses in the state sector, the
government's subsidy to SOEs also swelled, taking a 37% jump from 1986 to 1992. Furthermore, the
SOEs' contribution to the government's revenue have been declining. The ratio of profit plus tax over
sales revenue for the SOEs dropped from 26% in 1980 to 12% in 1992 (Lin, 1996).
Studies by western economists, on the other hand, focus mainly on the effects of reform on
total factor productivity (TFP) growth in Chinese state enterprises. The results have been mixed.
Woo, et al. (1994), for example, found that TFP growth in SOEs was zero at best in the 1984-1988
period. This is in contrast to several other studies (Chert, et al., 1988; Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng,
1992; World Bank, 1992; Gordon and Li, 1995), that found significant improvements in SOEs'
productivity. Their estimates of annual TFP growth in the 1980s range from 2 to 4 percent,
compared with almost zero percent growth prior to the reform.
From the social perspective, the increase in the SOEs' TFP indicates the success of the SOE
reform. But the government, as the owner of the SOEs, does not seem to directly benefit from the
reform. The productivity improvement and the decline of profit rate may be reconciled, however. As
indicated above, the SOE reform can be characterized as a process of re-assignment of decision rights
and residual claims from the state to the members of the enterprise. This improves the incentive of
managers and workers to improve efficiency and pursue profits. On the other hand, managerial
discretion brought by the managerial decentralization may be abused such that managers become
actual residual claimants, although the state is a leagal residual claimant of the enterprise. More
specifically, the SOEs are owned by the state but run by the managers and workers. Due to the
asymmetric information and high monitoring cost, the managers might reduce the profits submitted to
the state by overstating costs and/or under-reporting revenues. Although managers cannot easily
pocket the profits, they have many opportunities to spend the enterprise's money. As a result, we see
an improvement in SOEs' efficiency on the one hand but a decline in profits in official statistics on the
other hand.
The above discussions suggest two directions for deepening China's SOE reform. First,
given the current structure of public ownership, one solution to the managerial discretion problem is
to create a competitive product market. An enterprise's profit level in a fair, competitive product
marketmaybea sufficientinformationindicatorof themanagers'performance.Second,a longer-
termsolutionshouldhavetheresidualclaimandcontrol right be paired as much as possible. This
calls for the privatization of the state enterprises. The Chinese airline industry, building on its earlier
reform measures, appears to move towards these directions.
IH. REFORMS IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
China's airline industry was founded during the early 1950s when the country was established
and needed airlines as a national instrument to carry out its policy for government administration,
trade and tourism. Prior to 1980, the industry was a semi-military organization with the Civil
Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) as a department of air force for most of the years. The
"chain of commend" within CAAC was a four-level administration system: CAAC, six regional civil
aviation bureaus, twenty-three provincial civil aviation bureaus, and seventy-eight civil aviation
stations. CAAC not only acted as a regulator of civil aviation, but also directly managed air transport
services. The lower-level operation units could not make important operational decisions and were
not independent economic entities responsible for their own profits and losses. The industry was
regulated in every aspect of air services provision including market entry, route entry, frequency,
pricing and even passenger eligibility for air travel and was, therefore, a CAAC monopoly.
The Chinese airline reform, which started in the late 1970s, was due primarily to
unsatisfactory performances of the traditional central planned system. First, the airline industry had
been suffering persistent financial losses. From 1953 to 1978, the industry had witnessed fourteen
years of financial losses even after taking account the central government's subsidy to the industry.
Of the fourteen years, the 1968-74 period produced seven consective years of losses totalling 360
million yuan (Shen, 1992).
Second, demand for air services was severely suppressed under the old system and as a result,
the development of the airline industry was stagnant. The air share of domestic intercity traffic
volume remained largely constant at about 1 percent over the 1950-80 period. The main task of air
transportation was for government administration: most passenger travel by air was for administrative
affairs for various levels of governments and large state-owned enterprises rather than doing business.
The lack of commercial demand made the airline market rather small. Moreover, the military
management of airlines and airports created no competition in the market and resulted in inefficient
and low quality services, further stifling demand. In fact, it took 24 years (after 1950) for CAAC to
reach the highest traffic level in the Chinese aviation history (Wang, 1989).
The airline reform may be divided into two stages. The first stage occurred between 1980
6and1986andtheaimwasto bringbackbusinessaspectsto air transportation.Theadministrative
structurewasreformedfirst in 1980andthenagainin 1982whicheffectivelyseparatedcivil aviation
fromtheair force. Beginning1981thecentralgovernmentadoptedthepolicyof "self-responsiblefor
lossesandextra-profitretention"towardstheairlinesector. Thepolicywassimpliedto aone-nine
divisionof airlinerevenuebetweenthestateandCAAC. WithinCAAC, six regionalcivil aviation
bureausbecamebasicunits for recordingprofitsandlossesin 1979. The practicewasfurther
extendedto twenty-threeprovincialcivil aviationbureausayearlater. Furthermore,CAACin 1982
extendedthe profit-retentionsystemto six regionalcivil aviationbureausand gavethemmore
autonomyin makingoperationaldecisions.Duringthisperiod,however,CAACcontinuedto bethe
operaterof all flights,all airportsandtheNationalAir Traffic Service.
The second stage began with the passage of HReport on Civil Aviation Reform Measures and
Implementation" by the State Council in January 1987. The main goal of this reform program is to
separate the regulator from also being the operator and to break the CAAC monopoly. More
specifically, the program included: (i) simplifying the traditional four-level administration system for
air transportation to a two-level system, the CAAC and regional civil aviation bureaus; (ii)
establishing six state-owned trunk airlines based on the partition of regions; (iii) separating airport
operations from airline operations; and (iv) easing market entry (Wang, 1989).
The new program was implemented initially within the Chengdu and Shanghai regional civil
aviation bureausl repectively. As a result, China Southwest Airlines, based in Chengdu, was
established in December 1987. In the following June, China Eastern Airlines, based in Shanghai, was
established. With the success of the Chengdu and Shanghai "test-run," the other four airlines were
established: Air China (based in Beijing) in late 1988, China Northwestern Airlines (based in Xian)
and China Northern Airlines (based in Shenyang) in 1989, and China Southern Airlines (based in
Guangzhou) in 1991. These air carriers are profit-seeking units and are directly responsible for air
services provision. Each decides its flight frequency and sales outlets, selects inputs (e.g., crew
members, flight attendents and their employment and compensation contracts), proposes aircraft
purchase and route entry, and makes other operational decisions.
With the establishment of independent airlines, the main task of CAAC is of regulation and
coordination, such as issuing airline license, approving route entry and exit, pricing, designing
strategic plans for the industry, issuing policies and regulations to maintain safety and to improve
competition and efficiency, and negotiating bilateral air services agreements with foreign countries.
CAAC was no longer the operator of air transportation, and the new role allows it to focus on
designing efficient mechanisms to fulfil its regulatory function in adjusting and regulating the market.
Similarly,themainmandateof regional civil aviation bureaus is administrative, such as coordinating
air traffic control and regional airport development.
As mentioned earlier, airports were operated by CAAC. One component of the second-stage
reform is to separate airport operations from airline operations and decentralize airports. As an
experiment to test the efficacy of the new policy, CAAC approved in October 1988 that the airport in
Xiamen (one of the four Special Economic Development Zones in China) be transfered to the Xiamen
municipal government including all the fixed and working capital of the airport and personnel, and be
run by the local government. Other airports were decentralized gradually over the next several years
while new airports were managed by local governments from inauguration.
Another important reform measure is to ease both market entry and route entry. For the
former, the policy is to encourage local carriers entering the market. The local carriers were set up
by provincial or municipal governments or by large enterprises. These non-CAAC carriers started to
enter the industry in 1986. There are so far more than a dozen local carriers operating mainly on
small regional routes.
As for route entry, CAAC simplified its approval procedure and in general encouraged
carriers to open new routes. Here airlines, in consultation with airports, proposes their new routing
plans and CAAC holds meetings every year to coordinate route entry among airlines. Although
CAAC's approval is required for route entry, most of the airlines' requests seemed to get approved
without much trouble.
IV. AIR TRANSPORT DEVELOPMENT AND COMPETITION
This section examines the impact of the reform on the growth and development of China's
airline industry. In particular, the following aspects of the industry will be discussed: air traffic
growth and route development, market structure, and airline operation and competition. Other aspects
such as airline pricing and costs, revenue and financial performance, civil aviation investment (airport
and aircraft fleet), and air safety will be discussed in another paper.
4.1. Air traffic growth and route development
As indicated earlier, the Chinese airline industry was stagnant in its growth prior to the airline
reform but has grown tremendously since the reform. Tables 2 and 3 report data on, respectively, air
traffic volume and number of routes over the 1950-94 period. Both the total tonne-kilometers and
revenue passenger-kilometers performed in 1994 were about 20 times of those in 1978. The total
number of routes in 1994 was more than four times the number in 1980 (4.0, 4.3 and 4.7 times for
8TABLE 2: Traffic Volume in China's Airline Industry
TYear
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1978
1980
1985
1987
1990
1992
Revenue
Passengers
(million)
0.01
0.05
0.21
0.27
0.22
1.39
2.31
3.43
7.47
13.10
16.60
28.86
Cargo/mail Tonne
767
4711
31788
27163
36891
46555
63815
88866
195059
298758
369721
575269[
Revenue
Passengers-km
.... (million)
9.78
56.85
161.88
248.35
179.24
1538.54
2791.91
3955.52
11671.63
18877.09
23047.98
40612.04
Cargo/mail
Torme-km
(million)
0.82
5.14
26.46
25.10
35.20
60.16
97.05
140.60
415.12
652.36
818.24
1342.40
Total Tonne-km
(milllion)
1.57
10.12
40.45
...... 46.62
48.22
171.81
298.66
429.35
1271.02
2028.33
2499.50
4284.56
1994 40.39 829434 55158.02 1857.66 5841.22
Sources: Transport (1985-95).
TABLE 3: Number of City-pair Routes in China's Airline Industry
Year
1950
1955
1960
1965
Domestic
7
15
12
51
Regipnal
0
0
International
0
Total
7
16
17
57
1970 67 0 4 71
1975 128 0 7 135
1980 159 3 18 180
1985
L
1987
233
277
3851990
27
39
44
58
84
1992 492 13
1994 630 13
267
323
437
563
727
Notes: Regional routes refer to routes connecting Hong Kong and a city in Mainland China.
Sources: Transport (1985-95).
9TABLE 4: Overview of Chinese Airline Performance, 1980-94
(Index 1980 = 100; the numbers in the parentheses are rankings in the world)
A. Passenger-kilometres
Domestic
International
Total
Performed
Annual Growth
1980 1985 1990 1994 1980-94
100 (18) 313 (9) 514 (7) 1488 (4) 21.3%
100 (60) 412 (34) 701 (31) 1287 (23) 20.0%
100 (33) 339 (20) 562 (15) 1436 (8) 21.0%
B. Tonne-kilometres Performed (passenl_er, freight and marl)
1980 1985 1990
Domestic
International
Total
Annual Growth
1994 1980-94
100 (17) 302 (9) 487 (7) 1396 (4) 20.7%
100 (51) 416 (33) 758 (28) 1577 (20) 21.8%
100 (35) 338 (21) 572 (18) 1453 (I1) 21.1%
Sources: ICAO (1981-95).
domestic, regional and international routes, respectively).
Table 4 shows this recent grow_ inthe context of world aviation. In 1994 China ranked 8th
(llth) in the world in terms 0f revenue p assen_r-_lometer s (t0taf-torme-ki]ometers) performedl
compared with its 33th (35th) place in 1980. In 1994 Ch_na'S:d0mestic passenger:kilometers ranked
4th, behind the U.S., Russia, and Japan. Its annual growth rate during the 1980-94 period averaged
around 21% for both domestic and international traffic. This rate was 4.3 times the world average.
The dramatic growth of the Chinese airline industry can be attributed to several factors:
increased disposable income, more leisure time, developing trade and tourism, and the airline reform
discussed above. For example, the real GDP has increased almost 3 times from 1980 to 1994, with
an average growth rate of 8.7% per year, compared with that of 5.8% in 1970s and 4.0% in 1960s
(Yearbook, 1995). Research on airline demand using data from industrialized countries has found
that the income elasticity of airline demand ranges between 1.5 to 1.8. _ This means that a 10%
increase of nation income would increase demand for air travel by about 15% to 18%. The annual
economic growth rate in China was 8.7% during the 1980-94 period. Even applying the high end of
Oum, Gillen and Noble (1986), for example, estimate an income elasticity of 1.5 for business
travellers and of 2.0 for leisure travellers, using a data set of 200 U.S. domestic routes in 1978. The
mean estimate is about 1.7 given the business/leisure travellers mix in their data.
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the income elasticity estimates to China would, thus, imply an annual growth rate of 15% for airline
demand, which is still less than the actual rate of about 21%. This suggests that factors other than
general economic growth may be at work. It would be very interesting to do further research to
isolate the positive impact of the airline reform (the liberalization of regulations and aviation policies,
etc.) on the industry growth. It is quite clear, for instance, that the government policy of encouraging
both market and route entry has facilitated the large expansion of new routes and total traffic.
4.2. Market structure and route concentration
The breakup of CAAC into independent airlines and the entry of new carriers have
significantly changed market structure. Before 1987 (the second-stage airline reform), the industry
was a CAAC monopoly. Now the Chinese airline industry may be characterized as an "oligopoly."
The market participants include ten CAAC carriers (carriers under CAAC) and more than a dozen
non-CAAC carriers. Table 5 shows passenger traffic (including both domestic and international
traffic) performed by the Chinese airlines in 1991 and 1994. As can be seen, the six CAAC trunk
airlines controlled the majority of the market share. In 1991 the top three airlines, namely, Air China,
China Southern and China Eastern, together had a 60% of the total revenue passengers performed
while the other three trunk airlines had 26% market share. The remaining 14% traffic was supplied
by four other CAAC carriers and more than a dozen local airlines. The dominance of the top three
carriers was weakened: their combined market share fell from 60% in 1991 to 53% in 1994. The
decline is due mainly to the growth of local, non-CAAC carriers: their market share rose from 7% in
1991 to 12% in 1994.
In fact, the rise of local carriers in China has been dramatic. As can be seen from Table 6,
local carriers started to serve domestic routes in 1986 and regional routes (routes connecting Hong
Kong and a city in the mainland of China) in 1987. After entry they grew quickly, especially in the
domestic market with average growth rate 104% per year over the 1986-94 period, which was much
higher than the growth rate for CAAC carriers. Note that services on the international routes are
reserved only for the top three CAAC carriers.
As a concequence of the growth of local carriers, the 3-, 4- and 6-firm concentration ratios in
the Chinese airline industry had been falling in recent years, as reported in Table 7. (The 3-, 4- and
6-firm concentration ratios are calculated as the sums of the market shares of the 3, 4 and 6 largest
firms, respectively.) On the other hand the Herfindahl index, the sum of the squared market shares of
all firms, stayed almost constant over the period. For illustration, the available figures for the U.S.
airline industry were also reported. Although direct comparison is problematic, if we take these
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TABLE 5: Traffic Performed by China's Airlines
1991 1994
Airline Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue
Passengers Passenger- Passengers Passenger-
(million) km (billion) (million) km (billion)
CAAC Trunk Carriers
Air China
China Southern
China Eastern
China Northern
China Southwest
China Northwest
Sub-total
Other CAAC Carriers
Local Carriers
Total
2.90 8.10
5.69 5.48
4.20 4.65
2.00 2.98
2.06 2.77
1.58 2.11
18.43 26.09
1.14 1.83
2.21 2.26
21.78 30.13
5.37 11.79
9.91 10.74
5.61 6.91
3.59 5.41
4.38 5.85
2.10 2.74
30.96 43.44
3.08 4.86
5.35 6.86
40.39 55.16
Notes: Other CAAC carriers are: Xinjang Airlines, General Aviation Airlines, Yunnan
Airlines, and Great Wall Airlines.
Local carriers are non-CAAC airlines which include Xiamen Airlines, Shanghai
Airlines, Shichuan Airlines, Hainan Airlines, United Airlines, Shenzhen Airlines;
Wuhan Airlines, New China Airlines, Zhongyuan Airlines, Changan Airlines, Fujian
Airlines, Guizhou Airlines, Nanjing Airlines, and Sandong Airlines.
Sources: Transport (1992, 95).
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TABLE 6: Entry of New Local Airlines in China
A. Revenue Passenger-km Performed (thousand)
1985 1986 1987 1990 1992 1994 Annual Growth
CAAC Carriers
Domestic 5949 8301 10503 _ 12197 21120 28212 18.9%
Regional 768 896 1008 1864 2779 2948 16.1%
Local Carriers
Domestic 0 21 583 1259 2821 6242 103.8%*
Regional 0 0 52 140 126 116 12.1%**
B. Total Tonne-km Performed (million)
1985 1986 1987 1990 1992 1994 Annual Growth
CAAC Carriers
Domestic 674.2 919.0 1172.3 1348.2 2338.8 3183.0 18.8%
Regional 90.6 103.6 118.4 214.4 323.9 358.4 16.5 %
Local Carriers
Domestic 0 2.0 51.4 103.4 265.8 593.0 103.7%*
Regional 0 0 3.7 7.6 7.1 6.7 8.9%**
Notes: * Growth rates are over the 1986-94 period.
• * Growth rates are over the 1987-94 period.
Regional routes refer to routes connecting Hong Kong and a city in Mainland China.
Local carriers refer to non-CAAC carriers.
Sources: Transport (1986-95).
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TABLE 7: Firm Concentration Ratios in China's Airline Industry
-3--firm Concentration Rat_ -
4-firm Concentration Ratio
6-firm Concentration Ratio
Herfindahl Index
1991 1992 1993 1994' U.S. 1990
58.7% 58.8% 54.4% 51.7% NA
67.9% 68.4% 64.1% 60.6% 61.5%
84.6% 82.9% 80.2% 76.7% NA
0.17 0_18 0.17 0.17 0.12
Notes: The 3-, 4-, and 6-firm concentration ratios are the sums of the market shares of the 3,
4, and 6 largest firms, respectively. The Herfindahl index, the sum of the squared
market shares of all firms, ranges between 0 and 1.
NA: Not available.
Sources: Transport (1992-95).
figures at face value they suggest that the Chinese airline industry is slightly more concentrated than
the U.S. airline industry.
It is often argued in the airline research that the markets at the city-pair level are more
relevent for the purpose of competition and consumer welfare than the markets at the national level.
Table 8 thus examines concentration at the 30 largest domestic city-pair markets in China, in
decending order of market size. An equivalent number of firms is reported for each route. (The
equivalent number of firms is the inverted Herfindahl index, calculated using each carrier's market
share on the route). In 1993 there were, on average, 2.06 firms on one of the top 30 domestic routes.
The number increased to 2.40 in 1994 (a 20% increase). The increase also occurred for both the top
10 and top 20 city pairs. These observations suggest that there were two or three "equivalent"
carriers operating on busiest domestic routes and that concentration declined at the route level between
1993 and 1994.
4.3. Airline operation and competition
With the liberalization of China's airline industry, several trunk airlines and more than a
dozen small local airlines have emerged, and airline network has expanded rapidly. The number of
domestic, regional and international routes increased by an annual rate of 10.3%, 11.0% and 11.6%
for the 1980-94 period, respectively (see Table 3). There were more than 600 domestic routes as of
1994, almost four times the number of routes in 1980. Moreover, the network pattern has
fundamentally changed from a single airline, linear network to a local, "hub-and-spoke" system. The
country has been decomposed into six air regions which correspond to the operational bases of the six
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TABLE 8: Concentration at the 30 Largest Chinese City-pair Markets, 1993 and 1994
City-pair
Beijing-Guangzhou
Guangzhou-Shanghai
Beijing-Shanghai
Guangzhou-Haikou
Guangzhou-Guilin
Beijing-Xian
Guangzhou-Chengdu
Guangzhou-Hangzhou
Beijing-Shenzhen
Beijing-Chengdu
Shanghai-Xiamen
Shanghai-Shenzhen
Guangzhou-Shantou
Guangzhou-Xiamen
Beijing-Nanjing
Guangzhou-Chongqing
Guangzhou-Kunming
Guangzhou-Wuhan
Beijing-Hangzhou
Beijing-Dalian
Guangzhou-Nanjing
Shanghai-Fuzhou
Chengdu-Lhasa
Shanghai-Chengdu
Shanghai-Xian
Beijing-Urumqi
Beijing-Shenyang
Chengdu-Kunming
Shanghai-Guilin
Shanghai-Wuhan
Average
1993 1994
Passengers
Equivalent
Number
of Firms
907420 2:87
859876 2.86
742683 2.11
521693 1.27
503810 1.05
476154 1.62
439011 2.12
418078 2.82
379833 1.80
344531 1.55
330272 2.41
328973 3.54
315867 1.00
308342 2.43
306411 1.82
300982 3.26
293841 1.72
281408 1.37
269155 2.69
257594 1.89
252592 2.44
224252 1.61
210159 1.00
204400 2.07
303165 2.41
191415 1.59
179719 1.00
177325 2.98
176606 1.86
175220 2.50
353129 2.06
City-pair
Beijing-Guangzhou
Passengers
969751
840961
677707
515944
501146
493649
450909
438454
419293
406779
Guangzhou-Shanghai
Beijing-Shanghai
Guangzhou-Haikou
Beijing-Xian
Guangzhou-Chengdu
Guangzhou-Hangzhou
Guangzhou-Chongqing
Beijing-Shenzhen
Beijing-Chengdu
Guangzhou-Wuhan
Guangzhou-Shantou
Nanjing-Beijing
Guangzhou-Guilin
Shanghai-Shenzhen
Dalian-Beijing
Hangzhou-Beijing
Guangzhou-Xiamen
Guangzhou-Kunming
Shanghai-Xiamen
Beijing-Shenyang
Guangzhou-Nanjing
Shanghai-Wuhan
Shanghai-Fuzhou
Beijing-Harbin
Beijing-Wuhan
Chengdu-Shanghai
Chengdu-Lasa
Shanghai-Xian
Haikou-Shenzhen
365573
353735
353004
334228
331711
331418
331135
321365
318955
310201
270628
258030
257096
255289
254769
240347
238830
223151
211704
209160
Average 382831
Equivalent
Number
of Firms
2.52
3.40
2.40
2.15
1.61
2.66
2.83
3.34
3.19
2.25
2.00
1.05
2.17
1.00
3.81
1.89
2.29
3.05
2.21
2.70
1.85
2.48
2.84
2.15
3.93
2.85
2.19
1.00
1.30
2.78
2.40
Notes: The equivalent number of firms is the inverted Herfindahl index, calculated
carrier's market share on that route.
Sources: Transport (1994, 95), Timetable (1993, 95), OAG (1994).
using each
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trunkairlines.Bycenteringin itshubcity,2eachtrunkairlineis adominantcarrierin itsown region
while competing with each other on routes linking major cities of different regions. For instance,
China Eastern, a trunk carrier, competes with China Southern, another trunk carrier, on routes
Shanghai-Guangzhou (respective hub cities) and Nanjing-Xiamen (inter-regional, non-hub cities).
However, China Eastern is a dominant carrier on its intra-regional Shanghai-Ninbo route, competing
only with Shanghai Airlines, a local carrier. The inter-regional routes which see competition between
hub carriers usually are busy routes; they cover more than half volume of total domestic air traffic.
As shown in Table 8 above, typically there are at least two "equivalent" carriers on those routes.
Competition of China's airlines is mainly in the domain of non-price aspects. (The prices of
all domestic flights are still regulated and set by CAAC.) An important competitive device is a
carrier's networking or route structure. In particular, a network which can offer more destinations
and convenient connections has a competitive advantage. Although CAAC's approval is required for
route entry, most of the airlines' requests seemed to get approved without much trouble. Another
competitive device which carriers can use is flight frequency. A high flight frequency on a route can
reduce passengers' schedule delay costs (load factor will fall, however) and thus improve service
quality. Other competitive devices include: flight scheduling, safety, aircraft type, airlines' travel
agents and reservation, marketing promotions, service quality (e.g., inflight services and meals), and
flight punctuality.
Competition has played a positive role in the airlines' drive to maximize economic profits
and/or minimize costs, reflected in the improvements in their financial performance and productivity.
Competition is good for business; apart from forcing the players to be more competitive, competition
can create demand. Many Chinese, for example, have yet to fly an aircraft, so flying is a noval
experience for them. The entry of new local Carriers in the late 1980s and early i990s helped to fill
that need especially for people living in remote areas.
Competition also plays an impo_t role in airlines' adopting new technology and/or ensuring
the efficient use of technology. This is achieved through a longer-term view of investment in
technology and the principle of fitness survival. A necessary condition here is that the firm can retain
profit and make its capital purchase decision. In the Chinese airline industry, observations suggest
that now each carrier has greater incentives to acquire new and more efficient aircraft and to develop
efficient compute reservation systems and hub-and-spoke delivering systems.
2 Beijing for Air China, Guangzhou for China Southern, Shanghai for China Eastem, Shenyang
for China Northern, Chengdu for China Southwest, and Xian for China Northwest.
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The (former) centrally planned economies share at least one common feature with the market
economies: the transport sector is one of the largest sectors of respective economy. It is no small
challenge to understand the functioning of this vital economic sector in the transition process. In this
paper I have described the dramatic airline expansion in China. This expansion is made possible, not
only by China's general economic growth creating new levels of affluence and business traval, but
also by its enterprise and regulatory reform focusing on economic incentives, corporate governence
and competition. However, in more recent years traffic growth is probably more than matched by
capacity, and rationalization of the industry has the potential to further improve efficiency While at the
same time maintaining competition. Based on the Chinese experience in airline reform, two lessons
may be drawn for general enterprise and industry reforms:
First, major carriers' attitude towards entry and competition is essential for the success of
reform. This point is related to the role of economic/output expansion in the initial stage of industrial
reforms. From the above discussions, we have seen that allowing (almost) free entry in air transport
has had little adverse effect on state-owned companies. This is because there is enough business for
everyone. Political pressure to restrict entry has consequently been limited and has been outweighted
by the objective of creating competitive markets. This would then build the momentum for furthering
the shift to unlimited competition and making it irreversible. As capacity becomes more adequate,
however, coordinated efforts may be needed to limit the entry of inefficient carriers or to allow them
to be merged with other carriers. Second, we need to examine the transitional industrial policies such
as merger/competition policy in the presence of various imperfect markets (e.g., imperfect financial
market). This approach will help re-focus our attention of enterprise reform from the enterprise per
se to the surrounding industrial and market environment.
China, with a population more than double that of the U.S. and Western European combined,
will undoubtedly play a more important role in world aviation in the future. The traffic growth rate
for China will depend upon its rate of economic growth and, in turn, on its political evolution. The
regulatory regime will continue to change to reflect these trends. These trends, and the aviation
system arising from them, will contribute to bringing China and other nations closer together.
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1. BRIEF HISTORY OF AIR TRANSPORT IN KOREA
From 1948 up to the year of 1969, Korean civil aviation industry had been
negligible due to Korean War, political turmoil, and poor economic growth.
During these years international air transport in Korea was serviced mainly by
the foreign carriers of Northwest Air, Japan Air, and Cathay Pacific Air. But
since 1969 when KAL(Korean Air Lines) was privatized, Korean civil aviation
industry has developed very rapidly thanks to the successful growth of Korean
economy and the active business of KAL.
During the twenty five-year period of 1970-95, the air transport market in
Korea has considerably expanded at the annual growth rate of 14.2% on the
domestic routes and 21.5% on the international routes (Table I), while the
annual economic growth rate of Korea was only 8.7x. Especially in the second
half of 1980's, owing to the Seoul Olympic Games, the liberalization of
overseas travel by the government, and the unprecedented economic boom, the air
transport market has grown at the annual rate of 34.1% domestically and 18.7%
internationally. The market share of Korean carriers on the international
routes was above 60% in the late 1980's. After it decreased to 46.7% in 1990
due to the active frequency increase of foreign carriers, it increased
significantly to 64.5% in 1995 due to the second carrier(Asiana Airlines)'s
growth.
Table 1. The Growth Pattern of Scheduled Air Transport in Korea
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
1970 - 95
annual growth
rate (%)
Domestic Passenger
Traffic
(thousand pass-km)
257,341
293,356
502,158
1,144,548
3,913,595
7,172,110
14.2
International Passenger Market Share of Korean
Traffic Carriers on Inter-
(thousand pass-km) national Routes (%)
457,633
2,847,963
10,158,300
17,726,525
35,942,957
59,763,085
21.5
w
62.6
46.7
64.5
Source : DOT, rStatistical Yearbook of Transportationj
Note : Asiana Air started domestic operation in Dec. 1988, and scheduled
international operation in Jan. 1990.
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Now KAL ranks one of the biggest 15 airlines in the world, with 49 jumbos,
15,400 employees, and 4.3 billion dollars of operating revenue. This successful
growth of KAL seems to be based upon the government policy of privatization in
the early stage, the open-sky policy to promote the free competition with
foreign carriers on the international routes, and the position of natural
monopolist in the market of Korean travellers.
As the demand for air transport has increased by 90 times for the past
twenty five years, the civil aviation industry of Korea comes to a big turning
point in the late 1980's. In 1988 the Korean government started to deregulate
the air transport industry, and licensed the second carrier AAR(Asiana Air
Lines) to operate on the domestic route and the Korea-U.S. transpacific route.
Since then the aviation industry has been maintained as a two-airline system
with one major carrier and the other relatively smaller one. Now AAR occupies
31% domestic market share and its market share on the international routes is
31x of KAL's.
The backgrounds of this deregulation are: Firstly, the air transport
market has become too big for single airline to operate monopolistically;
secondly, at that time the government started to deregulate and liberalize all
the sectors of the economy to promote efficiency; and thirdly, it was affected
by the international trend of airline deregulation, particularly by the U.S.
deregulation. While there are six other non-scheduled air service companies in
Korea, their businesses have been negligible so far.
As a special case different from other countries like U.S. or Japan, the
domestic market in Korea is not profitable at all. While KAL, the market
leader, has suppressed the air fare to a low level, AAR, the follower, has
experienced much difficulty in increasing its air fare high enough to cover the
operating expense. This kind of pricing behavior can be observed sometimes in
the market structure of Duopoly. With the high operating cost due to the
absence of enough regional airport facilities and the subsequent low
utilization of aircraft, this low air fare in domestic routes has driven them
to accumulate big operating loss.
So the two carriers, both KAL and AAR, seeked to expand their network to
more cities overseas, and finally drove the government to announce "The
Guidance Rule for National Airlines' International Operation" in Oct. 1990.
This rule permitted _ to maintain its monopoly position on the long-range
international routes while giving priorities to AAR on the short-range
international routes, and allowed double tracking on the high dense routes. In
Aug. 1994, this rule was changed to "The Rule to Promote the Competitive Power
of National Airlines." As this deregulation rule removed the restriction of
forbidding A_'s long-range international operation, AAR could serve European
and Australian cities. And it showed the standard of double tracking in
numerical num_r. For example, the double tracking is allowed in the long-range
routes when the annual demand exceeds 210,000 passengers, and in the
short-range routes the demand for allowing double tracking is 180,000
passengers.
But despite of the active route expansion of AAR, the operating loss of
AAR on both domestic and internationa! routes weakened very much its financial
position. This means that even if the frequency increase turned out very
beneficial to the consumers, the negative producer surplus made the net effect
_
on Korea's welfare obscure and unclear. Now some critics address that the
market size surrounding Korea is too small to have two profitable airlines.
This is a background for the open-sky policy of Korean government.
Therefore, this study analyzes the economic effects of two-airllne system
which has been the biggest deregulation in the history of Korean air transport
industry, and shows the prospects for the open-sky policy of Korea, which leads
to bigger market size, more chances and threats to the air transport industry
of Korea.
2. PERFORMANCE IN THE KOREAN DEREGULATIOH ERA
2.1 Yield
On the domestic routes the air fares had been strictly regulated by the
government even after deregulation until 1991, because the government intended
to control the consumer price index through fixing the transport fares. From
1992 to 1995 the air fares could not be changed in the duopoly market
structure. In 1996 the market leader, KAL, lowered the domestic air fare by 5z,
which was not understood as a measure for more profit, but as the policy of
KAL's top manager to thank the customers for KAL's growth and prosperity. But
the market follower, AAR, did not follow this kind of leader's predatory
Table 2. The yield of Korean carriers
1980
1984
1988
1991 KAL
AAR
1995 KAL
AAR
1980-88
annual growth
rate (x)
1988-95
annual growth
rate (_)
Yield on Domestic Routes
current won/RPK
43.5
61.5
62.5
1985 won/RPK
61.4
63.0
55.1
Yield on International Routes
current won/RPK
33.4
49.1
52.0
1985 won/RPK
47.1
50.3
45.9
79.2 55.5 56.3 39.4
63.6 44.5 76.8 53.8
45.7
46.6
80.4
81.9
4.6
3.7
53.6
48.2
5.6-1.3
-2.7
30.5
27.4
-0.4
-5.7
Source : Airlines' data
Note : 1) The data of 1980-88 are Korean Air's.
2) Annual growth rate was computed from KAL's data only.
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behavior. Rather than that, AAR raised its air fare by lOx in early 1997 to
widen their price gap to 15x now. Therefore, the air fares hardly represent the
supply and demand circumstances in the domestic air transport market of Korea,
and thus it is not likely to be meaningful to compare the domestic yields
before and after deregulation.
On the international routes KAL's yield in beth nominal and real terms had
increased up to 1986 (Table 2). But since 1986 it has remained stagnant in
nominal terms and decreased in real terms, partly because of the two airlines'
competition, but mainly due to the significant growth of the foreign carriers'
frequencies into Korea.
2.2 Departure Frequencies
Morrison and Winston(1986) and Oum, Stanbury, and Tretheway(1991) found
that increased flight frequency was the most important source of welfare gain
resulting from U.S. and Canadian deregulation. Table 3 reports the Korean
carriers' average weekly departure frequencies of scheduled services and their
available seat kilometers Qn_th:Ko[@andomestic and overseas routes.
On the domestic routes average weekly departures and available seat
kilometers had increased by about 16% annually between 1980 and 1988. Since
1988 the total frequency has increased by 16.6% annually and seat capacity by
19.8% which are higher than before. The growth of frequency and seat capacity
after deregulation is due to the AAR's active operation on the domestic routes.
Table 3.
1980
1984
1988
1991
1995
1980-88
iannual growth
irate (%)
L_
i1988-95
iannual growth
irate (%)
Departure Frequencies and Seat Capacity of Korean Carriers
# of Average WeeKly Departure
Frequencies
Domestic
296
499
947
1,710
2,772
15.6
16.6
International
343
386
486
698
1,062
4.5
11.8
Available Seat Kilometers
(thousand ASK)
Domestic
863,018
1,448,954
2,784,006
5,799,799
9,845,265
15.8
19.8
International
15,167,256
14,120,783
18,366,835
26,241,327
66,843,546
2.4
20.3
Souruce : DOT, rstatistical Yearbook of Transportationj
Both departure frequencies and available seat kilometers in the
international services show that the dere_ation has the positive effect to
the consumers. The welfare effect of the Korean carriers' capacity expansion on
-4 -
the international routes will be pretty significant as far as Korean
travellers, who occupy half of total international travellers, tend to prefer
Korean carriers to foreign ones.
2.3 Productivity
Labor productivity (RTK per employee) increased at the rate of 4.0x
annually from 1980 to 1988. Since 1988 the growth rate of labour productivity
has become significantly higher than before (Table 4). This productivity growth
in the deregulation era has been based on the efficient use of labor driven by
scarce resource of air crews and wage hikes since 1988. The labor productivity
of AAR has been increasing very rapidly since it expands the international
network.
Hours flown per aircraft per year, as a rough measure of capital
productivity, have increased a little bit since deregulation. The reason why
the capital productivity has not been improved very much is because it is
affected mainly by the number of possessed aircrafts, which is often determined
by the financial condition rather than efficiency issue. However, the hours
flown per aircraft per year of the new entrant AAR have increased very much as
it expands operation.
Table 4. Productivity Indicators of Korean Carriers
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
KAL
1991
AAR
1995 KAL
AAR
1980-88
annual growth
rate (%)
1988-95
annual growth
rate (%)
Labour Productivity
(RTK per employee)
200,143
225,495
249,562
264,819
273,307
322,371
98,058
561,826
492,795
4.0
10.8
Capital Productivity
(Hours flown per aircraft per year)
2,888
2,499
2,692
2,845
2,749
2,761
2.727
3,234
3,308
-0.6
2.3
Source : Airlines' data
Note : Annual growth rate was computed from KAL's data only
_
2.4 Employment and Wages
Table 5 lists the number of employees and average wages of the two
airlines. Total employment increased rapidly by 7.6x annually since AAR started
its operation.
Since deregulation started, both nominal and real wages have increased
very rapidly mainly due to the entrant's demand for experienced manpower of
airlines. Real average wage per employee had increased steadily during the
1980-88 period at the annual rate of 6.Ox. But it shows sharp increase after
deregulation started despite of high consumer price hikes in 1990-91.
Table 5. Employment and Wages of Korean Carriers
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
KAL
1991 AAR
Total
KAL
1995 AAR
Total
1980-88
annual growth
rate (x)
1988-95
annual growth
rate (x)
Source : Airlines' data
Number of Employees
9,788
9,786
10,225
10,493
12,198
14,221
2,659
16,880
14,738
5,672
20,410
2.8
7.6
Average Wage per Employee
current thousand won
5,349
7,186
8,395
10,700
13,684
22,471
13,979
35,261
22,491
12.5
14.5
1985 thousand won
7,544
7,785
8,601
10,409
12,067
15,736
9,789
20,046
12,786
6.0
7.5
Note : The annual growth rate of # of employees was computed from the data of
total employees, while that of average wage was computed from KAL's data
only.
2.5 Carrier Profits
Table 6 indicates that KAL has been recovered from the recessions of early
1980's as years go by. In 1989 _ showed the best performance in its 20 years'
history. After deregulation started, the profitability of _ was worsened to
net loss in 1990 and consistently recovered since 1991. Although the recent low
profitability is the general phenomenon in the world aviation industry due to
the low demand, it can not be denied that the fierce competition between the
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Korean carriers partly contributed to it.
The loss of the entrant was certainly caused by the huge initial
investment on aircraft and labor. Although AAR is still below the break-even
point, its profitability has been improved slightly since 1990.
Table 6. The Operating Revenues and Profits of Korean Carriers
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
KAL
1991 AAR
Total
KALL
1995 AAR
Total
1980-88
annual growth
rate (x)
1988-95
annual growth
rate (x)
Operating Revenue
(million won)
558,688
835,904
985,558
1,314,295
1,541,929
2,008,809
210,408
2,219,217
3,379,879
1,053,748
4,433,627
13.5
16.3
Operating Income
(million won)
26,970
114,531
105,250
145,083
118,456
194,948
-3,789
191,159
291,558
116,810
408,368
20.3
19.3
Net Income after
Interest and Tax
(million won)
-30,202
4,674
3,912
12,128
26,457
15,951
-35,573
-19,622
105,886
30,626
136,512
26.4
Source : Airlines' Annual Report
Note : Annual growth rate was computed from the data of the carriers' total
amount.
3. MULTILATERAL LIBERALIZATION AND OPEN-SKY POLICY OF KOREA
3.1 Multilateral Liberalization of ICAO and UR
In order to cross-subsidize the loss of domestic operation, both KAL and AAR
have been eager to expand their international route network. This drove the
government to take the policy of Open-Sky, which is in accord with ICAO's
proposal for Open-Sky Policy.
In the 4th ICAO International Air Transport Conference in December 1994, the
ICAO proposed very progressive and ambitious multilateral liberalization
packages in the fields of market access, safe guards, carrier ownership and
control, structural impediments, regulation environments, and doing-business
issues.
Although most of the developed countries like U.S. and EU and Asian NIES'
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are favor of the liberlization packages, the underdeveloped countries of Africa
and Asia insist more precise measures on safeguards and safety nets which are
the exception clauses for them. Especially their policies are split in the
multilateral liberalization of market access which is the most controversial
issue in the package.
Besides ICAO's proposal, they made some progress on multilateral
liberalization in the air transport industry through UR negotiation. Since the
issue of hard rights(traffic rights) has been dealt in the bilateral agreements,
it could not be included in the UR negotiation. Thus they reached an agreement
on only the issue of soft rights(buslness rights on auxiliary air transport
industries) in December of 1993. In GATS(General Agreement on Trade in Services)
of UR, the multilateral liberalization of the businesses of aircraft repair and
maintenance services, sales and marketing of air transport services, and
CRS(Computer Reservation System) services are included. The proceeding of the
liberalization package of each country should be checked by UR(now WTO) in the
period of 5 years at least.
3.20P_en-Sky Policy of Korea through ICAO and UR _
The policy of Korean government on multilateral liberalization of ICAO is
"progressive liberalization'. In the issue of market access, Korean government
proposes progressive liberalization considering all the factors and environments
in the world aviation market, and consistent screening and revision on the
liberalization plan and program in the period of 3_5 years. Korea insists the
need of yardstick for finding any anti-competitive behavior and restraining
measures to induce fair competition in the air fare and capacity.
In the process of UR negotiation, Korean government promised the
liberalization of the sales and marketing of air transport services and CRS
services. Although these businesses have been open to foreign investment since
1995 as they promised in UR, the business of aircraft repair and maintenance
services was not necessary to be included in the final table of permission in
UR. But regardless of UR, this business has been open to foreign investment
since 1997, following the policy of Korean government to open the trade in
services for its own sake.
4. REGULATION ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY OF KOREA
The foreign investments in Korea are regulated by the law of rRegulatlon on
Foreign Investments in Koreaj and fLaw of Stock Trading4 . The industries in
which foreign investment is restricted and the permitted percentage of foreign
equity is found, are listed in the Regulation on Foreign Investments. The Law of
Stock Trading regulates the permitted portion of foreign investment in the
stocks listed on the Korea Stock Exchange. Besides these laws, fLaw of Air
Transportj is applied to the foreign investments in the air transport industry
of Korea. But this law has the most deregulated clauses on foreign investments
in air transport industry.
The current regulations on foreign investments in air transport and its
auxiliary industries are listed in Table 7. The total foreign equity in the
scheduled and non-scheduled airlines is permitted below 23% and the equity of
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Table 7. The Current Regulation on Foreign Investments in Air Transport Industry
business
scheduled
Law of
Transport
(A)
• permit
Air Regulation
on Foreign
Investments
(B)
•permit
and
non-schedu
led
airlines
charter or
lease
services
auxiliary
air
transport
industries
foreign
equity below
50x
-permit
foreign
equity below
50x
foreign i
equity below
20x
•open lOOx
• open lOOx
to foreign
investment
•open lOOx
to foreign
investment
to foreign
iinvestment
Law of Stock Trading
(c)
• new firm or new
stocks in capital
increase: permit
foreign equity below
20x
•old stocks in stock
market: permit
foreign equity below
23x
•old stocks outside
stock market: foreign
investment is
strictly prohibited
•new firm or new
stocks in capital
increase: permit
foreign equity 100%
•old stocks in stock
market: permit
foreign equity below
23x
• old stocks outside
stock market: foreign
investment is
strictly prohibited
• new firm _ or new
stocks in capital
increase: permit
foreign equity 100%
• old stocks in stock
market: permit
foreign equity below
23x
•old stocks outside
stock market: foreign
investment is
strictly prohibited
current regulation
(A+B+C)
• new firm or new
stocks in capital
increase: permit
foreign equity below
ZOx
• old stocks in stock
market: permit foreign
equity below 23x
•old stocks outside
stock market: foreign
investment is strictly
prohibited
•new firm or new
stocks in capital
increase: permit
foreign equity I00% in
capital increase, but
below 50x in total
equity
• old stocks in stock
market: permit foreign
equity below 23%
• old stocks outside
stock market: foreign
investment is strictly
prohibited
• new firm or new
stocks in capital
increase: permit
foreign equity i00%
• old stocks in stock
market: permit foreign
equity below 23%
• old stocks outside
stock market: foreign
investment is strictly
prohibited
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one foreign investor is regulated below 6% in stock market according to the Law
of Stock Trading. But as the Regulation on Foreign Investments regulates the
total foreign equity below 20% in the airlines, this is the actual limit of new
foreign investment.
In the case of the airlines which are not listed in the Korea Stock
Exchange, foreign investment is strictly prohibited, since the current law
prohibits the foreign purchase of the stocks outside the stock market. But in
the case of establishing new firm or capital increase, the foreign equity on the
newly issued stocks is permitted below 20% as the same with the case of the
listed airlines. And there is another measure of drawing CB(Convertible Bonds)
to induce foreign capital.
In the business of charter or lease services of aircraft, which needs at
least two registered aircrafts, they permit foreign investment 100% in capital
increase, but regulates it below 50_ of total equity because of the nationality
clause on aircraft registration. The foreign investment in the listed stocks of
this business is regulated below 23% in stock market as the same with the case
of airlines.
In all the other auxiliary air transport industries like repair and
maintenance services of aircraft, fuel supply services, air cargo handling and
intermodal services, courier services, CRS services and catering services, new
investment is iOOX Open to fOreigners_ _ut the regulation on foreign investment
in stock market is the same with before, which means 23% for the maximum equity.
The remaining air transport-related services which are not open to foreign
investment are the services of cabotage rights which mean aircraft operation on
domestic routes and air traffic control services. The time schedule for raising
the limit of foreign equity on scheduled and non-scheduled airlines above 20% is
not fixed yet.
5. LESSONS FROM THE EARLY EXPERIENCE OF DERESULATION AND OPEN-SKY POLICY
In the case of Korea, the problem of accumulating loss on the domestic
routes in the duopoly system is not expected to be solved in the near future.
Therefore, because the loss of domestic operation should be recovered from the
profit of international operation, it is inevitable that only the carriers
operating on the domestic routes should be permitted to operate on the
international routes. This means that the present air transport industry in
Korea has the natur6o_ monopoly for the purpose of cross-subsidization.
The carriers' performance during the deregulation era is not very
supportive to the present competitive system from the national viewpoint. In
the domestic operation consumer surplus greatly improved through the rapid
growth of departure frequencies and the low fare of KAL, while producer surplus
was severely impaired by the operating loss of the airlines.
In the international operation consumer surplus increased through discount
fares for sales promotion, decreasing yield and growing market share of the
Korean carriers. But producer surplus either stagnated or decreased a little
due to the operating loss and flat capital productivity, despite of the
improved labour productivity.
At this stage, it may be too early for Korea to draw any meaningful
conclusions on the economic effects of deregulation from the experience of such
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a short period of deregulation. The main concerns of the present two-airline
system are the accumulating operating loss of the new entrant and the worsening
financial conditions of the incumbent, although it is undeniable that it
contributed a lot to the consumers.
There are some policy proposals on how to reorganize the market structure
and readjust the present competitive system in order to maximize the net
benefits. First of all, the entry barrier into the domestic market has to be
removed to promote the competition more and more. Because the domestic routes
are not profitable with the present duopoly system and airlines' cost
structure, the only carriers who are confident enough to cut down the operating
costs will enter the market. However, in the international operation, there
seems to be no room for Korea to have more than two scheduled airlines in the
near future. Even with the two airlines, it is still questionable to make them
compete freely on any international routes without government intervention on
their route structure through route allocation.
It is unquestionable that Korea should have the open-sky policy to meet
the growing demand of consumers and to support the network of the Korean
carriers. In ICAO's multilateral liberalization, Korea has the position of
progressive liberalization which stresses the importance of setting up the
measures for fair competition, as long as the principle of equal participation
and reciprocity is kept. In UR negotiation, Korea has opened the auxiliary
services as much as the other countries. Recently bilateral negotiation on
open-sky agreement is in progress between Korea and U.S. This is expected to
widen the business opportunities of Korean carriers significantly.
As a part of industry-wlde open-door policies to foreign investment, Korea
has lifted the ban on foreign investment in most of the air transport and its
auxiliary services and has widened the limit on foreign equity in the industry.
Particularly foreign investment is permitted in the scheduled and non-scheduled
airlines by 2Oz. In most of the other auxiliary services, foreign investment in
new firm or capital increase is permitted up to lOOx, although foreign equity
is limited within 23x in stock market.
Up to now there is no significant inflow of foreign capital in airline
businesses. And there is no direct investment or equity swap of foreign
carriers with Korean carriers. But direct investment and building new firm of
foreign capital tend to grow in the industries of intermodal services and
courier services. In the near future it is expected to have active foreign
investment in other auxiliary services of air transport in Korea.
In order to prepare for the more competitive environment in the open
market of air transport industries, the Korean carriers are recommended to be
included in the global airline system through marketing alliance or equity swap
with other foreign carriers. This policy is necessary for improving efficiency
in airline management and obtaining more business opportunities in the
international market. The open-sky policy of Korean government is expected to
continue to make Korean carriers competitive enough for foreign challenge.
II -
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government regulations and government has introduced new taxes and increased
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The result is an industry characterised by financial instability _and low traffic growth.
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"OpenSkies" in India - Is the policy succeeding?
Introduction
More than 100 airlines entered the Indian airline industry after World War II (Brimson
1985) and the intense competition precipitated what might reasonably be described as
"destructive competition". Tata, a diversified industrial group, owned the largest of the
carriers, Air India, and this became Air India International as the Government nationalised
the industry. Eleven of the remaining private sector airlines then were merged to form
Indian Airlines and the scope for competition was removed. Air India's role was to serve
international routes and Indian Airlines operated domestic services under the control of the
Director General of Civil Aviation and the regulations set out in the Air Corporation Act
(1953). This framework remained unchanged until the late 1970's when there was
mounting criticism that Indian Airlines was not promoting tourism and industrial
development at the regional level. The Government's response in 1981 was to start a
third-level, feeder airline, Vayudoot, but aviation policy was coming under increasing
pressure.
With its 12 million passengers a year, the domestic Indian airline market is relatively small.
However, there is potential for the industry to become one of the largest in the world
behind the USA, Europe (in a single market), China and Japan. Key factors to consider are
the sheer size of India, its prospects for economic growth, its strengthening business and
tourism sectors, a more liberal approach to airline competition, and poor surface transport
links. India has the world's second largest population in the seventh largest country, it is
the fifth biggest economy and it has a pool of highly trained scientists, engineers and other
technicians. In the longer term, the Indian airline network could have a strong mix of
dense traffic routes with relatively long sectors.
The current population of India is approximately 880 million and the growth rate is 2.1
percent per annum. Bombay, Delhi and Calcutta each has more than 10 million residents
while Madras, Bangalore and Hyderabad have close to 5 million people each. Another ten
cities have more than one million residents. It has been estimated there is a "middle class"
of between 20 and 58 million households able to afford consumer durables and potentially
a target group for the airline industry. What is more, the trend has been for the proportion
of households in the two highest income levels to increase (Ministry of External Affairs
1996).
When India gained independence in 1948 its economic strategy was based on the concepts
of self-reliance and social equity. The Government assumed control over a wide range of
industries through a process of nationalisation and licencing regulation while tariffs and
import controls were used to erect barriers to external competition. However, the
arguments for adopting the successful growth strategies of the East Asian economies had
become compelling by the 1980's (Krueger 1995). The Government of India began to
adopt a more outward-looking policy relying on international markets to provide
technology and capital. Foreign exchange controls have been eased and market forces
determine the exchange rate. Liberal and progressive policies have been adopted to
promote competition and exports and the Government has invited the private sector to
participate in the provision of necessary infrastructure, particularly in the energy,
telecommunications and transport sectors. As a result of these reforms, India has moved
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away from its dependence on agriculture and mining and now trade and services
contribute 70 percent to the nation's gross domestic product. Throughout the 1980's, the
economy grew by more than 5 percent per annum (Asian Development Bank).
Though the average per capita income for India is low, the increasing economic strength
of a sizeable group of households with high incomes has raised expectations of strong
growth in airline travel. It has been argued that the demand for airline travel is highly
elastic with respect to income because travel by air is at an early stage in its product life
cycle. Assuming an elasticity of between 1.56 and 1.75 (Gallagher & Jenkins 1996), the
medium-term growth from this source alone would lie in the range 7.5 to 9 percent per
annum. In addition, the Government's Tourist Action Plan aims to increase the number of
international visitors from 1.6 milfion to 5 million a year. This Plan called for an 80 percent
increase in capacity in the domestic market.
In other situations where airlines have been deregulated, air fares have tended to fall and
there have been similar expectations in India. Gallagher & Jenkins (1996) argue that the
price elasticity of demand would lie in the range of-2.0 to -2.3, again because the market
is only just beginning to emerge and because there is a latent demand that has not been
catered for in the past. These authors conclude that the effect of deregulation in reducing
fares "... may prove to be the most important short-run determinant in generating new
traffic". The reductions in air fares were assumed to follow from improvements in aircraft
utilisation and from declining costs in a deregulated environment. The combined impact of
higher incomes and lower fares was predicted to yield traffic growth of 9.7 percent per
annum at least until 2001. At that stage, capacity constraints and a maturing market are
expected to reduce the rate of growth. The Airport Authority of India is planning for
growth of 10 percent per annum in domestic passenger movements through its terminals
until 2005 (Bhatura 1996).
Despite these prospects Indian Airlines' traffic increased at only 0.9 percent per annum in
the period between 1982 and 1996, although the average rate masks widely varying
performance. Up until 1987'88, the carrier's passenger numbers had been growing at
between 7 and 17 percent per annum, but thereafter traffic began to fall. A major problem
resulted when an Indian Airlines' A320 crashed in 1990 and the Government grounded the
remainder of the airline's A320 fleet during a ten-month investigation. The number of
international visitors to India was growing relatively slowly and some of the blame for this
was levelled at Indian Airlines. It had a reputation for lateness, for cancelling flights and
poor customer service and the Government was under pressure to inject capital into the
airline. Vayudoot had not solved the problems of providing access to tourist destinations.
Even before the problems with the A320 fleet, Indian Airlines was operating with a high
and increasing load factor, reaching a peak of 82 percent in 1988-89. The argument that
Indian Airlines lacked the capacity to cater for the growth in demand was gaining
increasing credibility. Independent assessments estimated that the market would increase
to around 25 million by 1995 if capacity restrictions were overcome and if services
improved in a more competitive market (Louden 1993). This could have been achieved
had growth rates of 10 percent per annum been maintained from the mid-1980's. Instead,
traffic fell by one-quarter between 1987-88 and 1990-91 and to maintain the target of 25
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million passengers in 1995-96, it would have required an average annual growth rate of 26
percent from 1990-91.
At the same time the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were urging India
to allow the private sector greater scope to compete in areas of the economy previously
reserved for state enterprises. The Government responded in 1989 by announcing an
"open skies" policy under which it would allow air taxi operators to begin scheduled
services in competition with the national carriers. In addition, the Government stated its
intention to privatise Air India and Indian Airlines by placing them under the Companies
Act with subsequent sale in part or in whole. The Government has continued its reforms
and now allows private sector airlines to operate scheduled services on the main trunk
routes. Indian Airlines has been able to achieve marginal increases in passengers, but the
growth has been taken up mostly by the new airlines. Collectively, the private airlines
carried more than 40 percent of the total passengers in 1995-96 and the growth is
beginning to exceed forecast rates for the first time since the early 1980's.
However, the changes in policy have not proceeded smoothly. The Government's
approval for selected operators to begin scheduled jet services in 1992 resulted in raids on
Indian Airlines' staff. It has been reported that 115 of Indian Airlines' 450 pilots resigned
in the 15 months to June 1993 (Louden 1993) and the incumbent was forced to ground its
B737-200 fleet for want of crews. The Government responded by trying to protect its
carrier, but the momentum of competition continued amidst growing criticism of the
nation's aviation policy. The World Tourism Organisation (1994) has rejected the claim
that the Government has introduced an "open skies" policy. Others have described the
industry as "chaotic" (Ballantyne 1996). Despite the promise of a new emerging market
within a liberal competitive regime, the number of passengers is at least 50 percent below
the level it would have been had the growth expectations been fulfdled. Many of the new
entrants have failed and the remaining carriers are reported to be barely profitable, fares
have increased and the Government has reversed its policy on equity alliances with foreign
airlines. There is still a long way to go before India's airline industry is able to grow at the
rates seen in other Asian economies such as China, Indonesia and Taiwan.
This paper documents the changes that have occurred in the regulation of the Indian airline
industry in the past decade and assesses outcomes in terms of market growth, fares and
changes in services. Claims that government-imposed costs and low fares forced on the
airlines by the regulator are major contributors to the financial difficulties in the industry
are examined. There is some support for these arguments, but the paper argues the key
shortcoming of the current regulatory approach is the way in which the airlines are
required to meet "community service obligations". This matter will need to be addressed
for India to derive maximum advantage from aviation reform.
Regulatory changes - 1986 to 1997
The approach to liberalising competition in the airline industry in India has been gradual
and it is fair to say that policy has lagged behind the market, although this is hardly a
phenomenon confined to India. The same claim has been levelled at the USA and Australia
(Trent 1995, Hooper 1997) and it is a familiar pattern in the developing country context
(Hooper et. al. 1996). Nevertheless, in India the Government commenced with minor
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changes that were immediately under pressure and it so far has not been able to establish a
sustainable regulatory and competitive envirom_nt.
In 1986 the tourism sector argued that there was insufficient capacity on some key routes
and the Minister of Tourism and Civil Aviation responded by allowing private sector
airlines to operate as "air taxis". A condition attached to the licences was that aircraft had
to have at least 15 seats and no more than 50 seats. Furthermore, there was a requirement
to use "expatriate funds" to acquire aircraft and air taxis were not permitted to plan any
departures within 2 hours of an Indian Airlines or a Vayudoot flight. Though fifteen
licences were issued 0Vlhatre 1994), there was continuing criticism of the lack of capacity
on tourism routes. This led to the Government's announcement in 1989 that it was
implementing an "open skies" policy according to which there would be a progressive
relaxation of restrictions on the air taxi operators with eventual approval to provide
scheduled services.
Eleven new applications for air taxi licences were submitted to the Director General of
Civil Aviation and, in 1990, five airlines were given approval to commence. Fates
continued to be regulated and the Government retained its controls over foreign
investment in the airline industry. Also, air taxi operators were required to serve an equal
number of flights on routes of less than and greater than 700 kilometres. Air Asiatic, based
in Madras, imported a Boeing 737 to fly between Madras and Bombay, but it discontinued
operations after only five months during which time it made 363 flights and carried 23,437
passengers. The other new entrants mostly operated smaller turbo-prop aircraft. By 1991
the policy was regarded as a failure (Malik & Malik 1996).
The fatal crash of an Indian Airlines' A320 aircraft in 1990 was a major setback for the
carrier and for the Government, especially since the carrier's A320 fleet was grounded
until a lengthy investigation was completed. The loss of a substantial share of the
incumbent's capacity resulted in an urgent need for the private sector airlines to expand
and there were clear signals that the Government would allow the private sector airlines to
expand and to advertise scheduled services.
The commencement of East West Airlines in February 1992 marked the start of a new era.
This airline was owned by one of India's largest travel groups and it had a major impact on
the market with its seven B737-200's and three F27's. Its entry was assisted by a pilots'
strike at Indian Airlines and East West carried more than one million passengers in 1992-
93. One of the significant policy developments was that the air taxis were permitted to
obtain up to 40 percent of their equity finance from foreigners. Jet Airways, also backed
by a travel group, took up this option in 1993 with 20 percent funding from Kuwait
Airways and 20 percent from Gulf Air. In the same period, the other significant airlines to
introduce jet aircraft were Damania Airways and ModiLuft. By the end of 1993, 17
operators had been granted air taxi licences and another 20 had obtained preliminary
approval and new entrants were serving 54 routes (Malik & Malik 1996).
The rapid expansion of the new entrants took traffic away from Indian Airlines and
Vayudoot. Also, Indian Airlines was weakened through the defections of pilots and
engineers to the new carriers while it faced continuing industrial strife. At one point,
Indian Airlines had six of its 10 A310's unserviceable, and 12 of its 19 B737-200 and one-
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third of its A320 aircraft could not be used (Ballantyne 1996). Vayudoot was reported to
have made a loss of $5 million US in the first five months of 1994 and the scope of its
operations was reduced to the hilly regions of the north-east. This was a short-term
measure and Vayudoot was folded into Indian Airlines in 1994.
The Government responded with a crack-down on the new entrants. Recruitment of pilots
and engineers from Indian Airlines was prohibited, the air taxis were prevented from
publishing their timetables, the requirement that the private sector airlines fly an equal
number of routes above and below 700 kilometres was enforced, and the new entrants
were denied permission to import any aircraft with 120 seats or more (Mhatre 1994).
Indian Airlines ceased contracting out surplus engineering capacity to the private sector
airlines and the new entrants have had difficulty getting adequate access to terminal
facilities. The official position was that Mumbai (formerly Bombay) and Delhi airports
were congested and were unable to cope with rapid growth in aircraft movements
(Mhatre 1995).
The status of the new entrants was made clearer in 1994 when the Government repealed
the Air Corporation Act (1953) and issued new guidelines for granting scheduled airline
status. The Government argued that it needed to examine applications for licences on a
case by case basis, but operators had to demonstrate a sound financial position, to have a
minimum fleet of 3 aircraft and to show evidence of an appropriate maintenance
organisation and training facilities. The former requirement to operate an equal mix of
short and long routes was changed to a more explicit statement about which "social" and
other low density routes were important to the Government.
The new regulations defined three types of routes. The first category was comprised of all
of the main trunk routes. The "social" routes included the remote areas in the north-east,
Jammu and Kashmir and the Andaman Islands, while the third category covered all of the
other non-trunk routes. Each scheduled carrier flying Category I routes is required to
deploy an additional minimum of 10 percent of that capacity (in terms of available seat
kilometres) on Category II routes and 10 percent of the capacity on these routes is to be
operated within those regions that have some of the least economic fares. In addition, the
carriers have to provide a further 50 percent of their capacity on Category III routes.
The other major policy development in 1994 was the enactment of the Air Corporations
(Transfer of Undertakings and Repeal) Act under which Air India and Indian Airlines
became limited liability companies incorporated under the Companies Act (1953). In the
words of the Director General of Civil Aviation, the industry has been "demonopolised"
(Vakil 1996). Air India's lack of aircraft capacity and its declining share of international
traffic to and from India prompted the Government to give Indian Airlines greater access
to regional, international routes where its aircraft were suitable. Though the possibility of
merging the two government carriers has been raised on several occasions, so far this
option has been rejected. Also, there has been no clear commitment to privatisation, a step
that would be difficult to take while both carriers are performing poorly. In the period
between 1990-91 and 1993-94, Indian Airlines incurred a series of losses amounting to
more than US$220 million (Director-General of Civil Aviation).
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The status of liberalisation in India remains uncertain. The Government controls entry on a
case by case basis and its refusal to allow the commencement of a new carrier jointly
owned by Tata Industries and Singapore Airlines has been criticised widely (Ballantyne
1996). The new liberal policy is based mainly on guidelines that can be interpreted and
changed easily without any forewarning (Malik & Malik 1996). During 1997, for example,
the position on foreign equity injections by foreign airlines has been reversed and Kuwait
Airways and Gulf Air have been instructed to divest themselves of their interests in Jet
Airways, now the largest private sector airline. The Government levies heavy taxes on the
airlines, it forces the airlines to cross-subsidise unprofitable routes, and it keeps the general
level of fares down while protecting its own carrier. Under these difficult and uncertain
conditions there has been a remarkably robust interest by the private sector.
New entrant and incumbent strategies
The amount of aircraft capacity on offer has increased substantially as a result of the
liberalisation policy, although one analyst has commented that there has been
...uncontrolled expansion, transforming a monopoly market into a chaotic free-for-all
almost overnight. There are now seven scheduled private airlines, 18 non-scheduled
operators and 27 others waiting in the wings proposing to enter the fray (Ballantyne
1996). Consumers have a wider choice of airlines offering greater reliability and frequency,
increased capacity, improved in-flight service and better passenger reservation and
handling. However, the parlous financial state of the industry casts doubt on whether the
momentum can be sustained.
In developed airline markets, the most successful entry strategy has been to capture
market share with low fares and this requires a low-cost approach. In some respects the
new Indian airlines did minimise their costs, they started with older versions of the Boeing
737 and they eliminated some training costs by poaching pilots, engineers and managers
from Indian Airlines. There have been limits, though, to how far the low-cost strategy
could be pursued. For example, the new airlines paid as much as five times the competing
salaries in Indian Airlines in order to attract staff (Ballantyne 1996) and, in any case, the
Government's embargo on further recruitment from Indian Airlines has put an end to that
source of personnel.
The Government regulates fares and the scope to compete with discounts is very limited.
Under these circumstances rivalry among the airlines is confined to service. The new
entrants have been forced to commence with relatively small fleets and then have been
expected to spread their capacity across different classes of routes. East West Airlines
operated two different types of aircraft in order to get a satisfactory match of aircraft to
routes of varying traffic densities, but this proved to be uneconomic in a small fleet. When
NEPC took over Damania Airlines and renamed it NEPC Skyline, it retained the original
NEPC as a feeder airline. Also, NEPC has taken over the management of UP Air, a
regional carrier in the state of Uttar Pradesh. Jet Airways announced its interest in
developing a relationship with a feeder airline, but the common approach has been to have
a single type of aircraft in the fleet.
The option of building up frequency on a route before opening competition on other fronts
has not been available to the new Indian carriers. The alternative has been to operate with
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low frequency and a large network. Better service is achieved by motivating staff with
higher pay and better conditions and by using modem aircraft. The most successful new
entrant, Jet Airways, has a fleet of B737-400 aircraft. Punctuality and reliability are
supported by these staffing and fleet strategies, but it appears that aircraft utilisation is
lower in order to establish a good reputation. For example, Jet Airways describes in its in-
flight magazine how it maintains its reliability and safety during the monsoon period by
holding capacity in reserve.
Initially the new Indian carriers leased older versions of the Boeing 737, but many have
been introducing the B737-300, -400 and now the -500 series. When these ownership
costs are coupled with relatively poor utilisation resulting from operating constraints, the
new entrants have not derived any significant advantage from this quarter. Given the
uncertain state of the reform process, all of the new entrants have operated with leased
aircraft. This has added to the financial costs of entering the industry, particularly since
currency costs have increased as the Indian Rupee has been decreasing in value.
Access to sufficient capital resources is one of the key requirements for a new airline,
particularly while establishing a piace in the market. ModiLufL Sahara!ndia, and NEPC all
have been backed by large industrial groups Jet Airways is owned by a sizeable travel
group, as was East West. Gulf Air and Kuwait Airlines each owns 20 percent of Jet
Airways. Another potential entrant, Tata-SIA, would be owned by the powerful Tata
Industries and Singapore Airlines. The proposal is to introduce 19 aircraft over a five-year
period, but the Ministry of Civil Aviation has refused to grant a licence despite the
Ministry of Finance's urging to approve the joint venture. The Ministry of Civil Aviation
has taken the view that the domestic airline industry has too much capacity akeady and
that there is no need for the new airline. Also, the Ministry's recent embargo on
investment by foreign airlines has become a further obstacle to the Tata SIA venture.
The new entrants lacked adequate terminal facilities and each has invested in its own
security systems and ground handling. Apron congestion at Bombay, New Delhi, Calcutta
and Madras has posed a major problem. The Government now requires the airlines to park
their aircraft overnight at the nearest designated airport rather than at their operational
base and this is claimed to be a constraint on the adoption of hub-and-spoke network
strategies (Vakil 1996). In 1996 the Government has taken steps to address these
problems by adopting a "Tourist Action Plan" according to which it will upgrade existing
airport facilities and build new airports (Mayes 1996). However, it is surprising the new
entrants have not entered into some form of alliance to share some resources let alone to
co-operate in a broader form of marketing alliance to achieve a more effective coverage of
the Indian network with small fleets.
An additional factor affecting airline costs is a 117 percent surcharge on the price of fuel
introduced by the Government during the Gulf War, the proceeds being used to subsidise
energy costs elsewhere in the economy. This increased the price from 60-70 cents US per
litre to around $1.60 per litre (Prasad 1996). Although the airlines have been granted a
dispensation to import their own supplies, customs duty and handling charges bring the
costs up to a similar level. Added to this, airport charges are high and the airlines are
required to collect a 15 percent tax levied on the passenger fare, the Inland Air Travel
Tax. Several airlines have had difficulty in paying the tax revenue to the customs
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authorities and at least two, ModiLuft and East West, have had their operations suspended
at various times while they were in default.
The difficulties in reducing costs and the inability to compete on the basis of markedly
lower fares prescribe the opportunities for the new airlines. The new entrants in India have
based their strategies more on service and reliability and they have been able to capture
market share as the incumbent has not been able to supply sufficient capacity to cope with
a growing market. It is not clear that these are sustainable advantages as Indian Airlines
has improved its service. Moreover, Indian Airlines has a much larger fleet and a more
extensive network and its introduction of a frequent flyer plan in 1993 gives it a marketing
strength. There are several extenuating circumstances that must be taken into account in
assessing its past performance including having the main burden of providing services on
the social routes. The grounding of its A320 fleet for ten months and shortages of pilots
and engineers have been major constraints. At the same time, it has to deal with a large
number of entrenched unions seeking to improve their positions in a changing
environment. Salary increases have been approved and the airline has a strategy to deal
with its shortages of pilots.
A major component of Indian Airlines' strategy is the commencement in March of 1996 of
its own low-cost operation, Alliance Air. The aim is to keep overheads to the minimum
and to use the older B737 aircraft from the Indian Airlines fleet. This has made it possible
to recruit former pilots without having to deal with seniority issues when they re-entered
Indian Airlines. Indian Airlines is disposing of any B737's not required by Alliance as it
reduces the diversity of aircraft in its fleet. At the same time, the option of merging and
privatising Air India and Indian Airlines has been re-evaluated. The current position of the
Government is that both airlines will be kept separate, but the roles of the two airlines
have changed. Air India is to focus on long-haul routes while Indian Airlines was granted
wider access to regional routes. Previously, Indian Airlines had operated to other nearby
countries in South Asia, but it was granted access to another 17 international routes
stretching from the Middle East to Malaysia. Furthermore, there is a commitment to carry
out joint marketing initiatives including code-sharing, joint frequent flier programmers and
integrated reservations systems. As was the case with the incumbent carriers in the USA
after deregulation, Indian Airlines is learning how to take advantage of its size.
Have the changes been successful?
Choice of airline
There have been numerous attempts to establish new airlines, but the first to make a major
impact was East West Airlines. It entered the market at a time when Indian Airlines had
part of its fleet grounded and also suffered from industrial disputes. East West was able to
expand rapidly and was the largest of the new entrants in 1993-94. Table 1 shows that Jet
Airways, with its strategy of targeting the business sector with a high-quality service, has
taken over the position as the largest private sector airline. M.G. Express entered into
marketing and technical agreement with Lufthansa and renamed itself ModiLuft. It too
expanded rapidly on tourist routes and shorter routes and was the third largest carrier in
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1995-96. NEPC was operating as a regional airline with F27 aircraft and now has taken
over Damania, renaming it NEPC Skyline.
Table 1: New entrants
Operator 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 Share
1995-96
Jet Airways 665,749 1,239,819 1,606,819 30.9%
East West Airlines 1,055,177 1,041,587 941,157 18.1%
ModiLuft 296,933 575,348 858,429 16.5%
Damania Airways 395,514 672,160 690,840 13.3%
NEPC Airlines 78 220,561 456,215 8.8%
Sahara India Airlines 59,574 170,700 380,422 7.3%
Archana Airways 38,596 0.7%
U.P. Airways 13,890 35,609 32,802 0.6%
Others 22,074 23,291 199,420 3.8%
Total 2,508,989 3,979,075 5,204,700 100.0%
Source: Director-General of Civil Aviation. Annual Reports.
The impact the new airlines on service levels has attracted praise (Vakil 1996, Banantyne
1996), but a measurable dimension of the approach to service is the frequency offered on
key routes. One of the features of the Indian airline market is the concentration of traffic
on a small number of key routes. Almost two-thirds of the total domestic passengers
handled at India's airports is confined to Mumbai, Delhi, Calcutta, Madras and Bangalore
and the next five largest airports bring the cumulative total to 80 percent. In view of this,
the weekly frequencies are very low. Indian Airlines has five scheduled flights each day in
each direction on its busiest route, Mumbai to Delhi. Jet Airways has targeted the densest
routes and it has a higher frequency on this route than Indian Airlines. Table 2 shows Jet
Airways has the highest frequency between Mumbai and Madras and it matches Indian
Airlines on two other routes. On all of the other trunk routes, Indian Airlines dominates.
Table 2: Weekly flights for top ten competitive routes (total both directions) - 1996
From To Indian Jet Sahara Indian NEPC Skyline
Airlines Airways Airlines
Delhi Mumbai 70 82 12
Bangalore Madras 42 15
Bangalore Mumbai 42 28 12 28
Calcutta Delhi 38 28
Madras Mumbai 34 42 12
Bangalore Delhi 28 14 12
Calcutta Madras 28 14
Calcutta Mumbai 28 28 28
Delhi Madras 28 12 7
Ban_alore Calcutta 14 14
Sources: Airline timetables - Indian Airlines, Jet Airways, NEPC Skyline and Sahara India Airlines.
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Jet Airways' strategy of targeting the business travel segment has been a key consideration
in its route planning. It has built up its frequency and confined its network to the densest
trunk routes. The other new airlines have spread themselves more thinly. Table 2 indicates
that Sahara Indian Airlines and NEPC Skyline do not even have return daily flights in
many of the densest markets. Table 3 illustrates how each airline has configured its
network to include the busiest airports. Out of the 20 possible direct connections between
the five busiest airports, Indian Airlines offered 10 (7.4 percent) out of the total of 136
routes listed in its 1996 schedule. Jet Airways concentrated on just 7 of these routes, but
this was a proportionately higher share of the 27 routes it served.
Table 3 shows that Jet Airways, more than any of the other carriers, has a network
focusing on connections between the busiest airports. It is the only airline to have more
than half of its routes with both of the connected airports in the top ten in terms of
passenger movements and 93 percent of Jet's routes have at least one airport in the top 5.
This evidence supports the complaint by Indian Airlines that it has the heaviest burden of
serving the lower density routes despite the regulations on network coverage.
Table 3: Percent of airlines' routes connecting top 20 airports by airline in 1996
Airline Both Airports In At Least One Airport In Neither
in
Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Top 20
Indian Airlines 7.4 22.8 31.6 74.3 77.9 85.3 14.7
[10] [31] [43] [101] [106] [116] [20]
Jet Airways 25.9 55.6 63.0 92.6 92.6 92.6 7.4
[71 [15] [I7] [25] [25] [25] [2]
NEPC Skyline 12.2 26.5 36.7 83.7 83.7 85.7 14.3
[6] [13] [18] [35] [41] [42] [7]
Sahara 16.0 36.0 44.0 92.0 92.0 96.0 4.0
[4] [9] [l I] [20] [23] [24] [I]
Sources: Director-General of Civil Aviation. Airline timetables - Indian Airlines, Jet Airways, NEPC Skyline and Sahara India
Airlines.
Notes: Number of sectors in brackets. Airports are ranked in terms of passenger movements.
Fares
In the USA, it has been estimated that deregulation resulted in a 22 percent reduction in
real average air fares between 1978 and 1993 (Morrison & Winston 1995). In Australia,
average air fares declined by almost 20 percent in real terms in the five years following
deregulation (Australian Competition & Consumer Commission 1995). Moreover,
discretionary travellers have been offered a wide range of discounts as the airlines have
learned how to manage a larger portfolio of fares using yield management systems. In the
USA, approximately 37 percent of passengers paid less than the average fare prior to
deregulation and this has increased subsequently to 60 percent (Morrison & Winston
1995). In Australia, the average fare lies between 30 and 40 percent below the published
economy fare on most routes (Australian Competition & Consumer Commission 1996). It
has been the use of these promotional fares that has been largely responsible for the
increase in traffic in competitive markets.
In contrast, liberalisation of competition in India has been accompanied by rises in the level
of fares. Indian Airlines has increased its charges several times in the period between 1993
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and 1995 and the private sector airlines followed suit. In less than three years, air fares had
increased by 40 percent in nominal terms (approximately 20 percent in real terms). There
has been a fundamental difference between the situation in India as it entered a more
competitive era and the situation in developed airline markets. The evidence in the USA
was that regulation resulted in higher costs and, when the airlines were able to compete on
whatever terms they chose, the emphasis turned from service competition to price
competition. In India, regulated air fares remain low. It has been claimed that fares are half
the level of comparable air services in Europe even after allowing for differences in
operating costs (Dasgupta 1995). If this is true, there is little scope for reductions in fares
on the scale seen elsewhere
Table 4 provides comparisons of published economy air fares in India with the USA,
Europe and Australia over comparable distances. Though account needs to be taken of the
widespread discounting in developed, competitive markets, the claim that fares are very
low in India does appear to have some basis. Since costs per passenger kilometre decline
with distance travelled, it is not surprising to see that the fares per kilometre are higher on
the shorter routes. However, the differential between the fares in India and in other
countries is highest on short routes, India's air fares are relatively lowest in short-haul
operation. Note that the average length of the 136 sectors listed in Indian Airlines'
published schedule is 670 kilometres. The average fare across these sectors (unweighted
by traffic volumes) was 12.5 cents (us) per kilometre in August 1996 with a standard
deviation of 2.5 cents per kilometre.
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Table 4: Comparisons of published economy air fares -
India_ USA_ Europe and Australia ($US 1996 values)
Region Port (1) Port (2) Distance in kms Fares Fares
(point to point) $ US c/.km (US)
India Varanasi Lucknow 236 37.86 16.02
Bangalore Madras 259 40.29 15.53
USA Cleveland Dayton 261 331.44 126.99
Europe Birmingham Edinburgh 251 178.84 71.25
Australia Sydney Canberra 236 115.22 48.81
India Goa Madras 713 85.04 11.92
Ahmedabad Delhi 727 80.38 11.05
USA Detroit St Louis 706 436.38 61.81
Europe Rome Munich 707 388.35 54.93
Australia Sydney Melbourne 707 201.23 28.46
India Madras Mumbai 996 100.75 10.12
Delhi Mumbai 1,084 106.64 9.84
USA Houston Kansas City 1,037 526.98 50.69
Europe Glasgow Frankfurt 1,082 422.03 39.00
Australia Sydney Hobart 1,040 254.10 24.43
India Cochin Delhi 2,001 209.95 10.49
Delhi Trivandrum 2,159 225.18 10.43
USA Detroit San Antonio 1,944 757.26 38.95
Europe Athens Paris 2,102 674.19 32.07
Australia S_,dney Cairns 1,970 415.08 21.07
Source: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1995) and Indian Airlines'
(August 1996).
schedule
Notes: Fares published by the ACCC have been updated using movements in consumer price indexes
and exchange rates published by the International Monetary Fund.
In the United States, deregulation had its biggest impact on the longer routes as fares
adjusted to bear a closer relationship to costs. Table 5 presents an analysis of actual air
fares in 1988 (expressed in 1996 values), ten years after deregulation, and the fares that
would have been set were the regulated formula to apply (Pickrell 1995). As a point of
comparison, the average of the fares for the Indian sectors in each distance category is
presented. It is well-known that the formula applied by the Civil Aeronautics Board kept
the fares low on the shorter routes. A similar situation occurred in Australia where it was
accepted that fares on short routes needed to be reduced for the airlines to be competitive
with surface transport (Gannon 1982). It is not surprising to find evidence that air fares on
shorter routes in India are low relative to the costs involved.
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Table 5: Regulated and deregulated fares: USA and India
(Values expressed in cents per available seat kilometre in 1996 US values)
Distance Actual US Fare Estimate of US
(kilometres) Regulated Fare
Under 463 26 20
463 to 925 19 16
925 to 1850 15 13
1,850 to 2,800 11 12
Indian Regulated Fare
13
13
11
10
Source: Pickrell (t 995) and OECD Main Economic Indicators.
Note: Pickrell reported actual fares and estimated the regulated fare in 1988 in cents per mile. These
values have been expressed in the table in 1996 cents using movements in consumer price indexes and
exchange rates published by the International Monetary Fund and converted to kilometres.
A simple formula that has been used to calculate regulated air fares in the USA and
Australia includes a flag-faU and a distance component. Though there is no similar formula
published by the authorities in India, a least squares regression analysis of published
economy fares reveals a model conforming to this basic relationship. The estimated model
takes account of reductions on fares for remote routes. Also, distance is measured on a
point-to-point basis whereas there are many airports served via other airports. A dummy
variable accounts for higher charges on indirect routes. The following result was obtained:
FARE = 511- 150" (REMOTE) + 3.08* (DISTANCE) + 149 *(DIRECT)
(10.2) (-2.4) (51.0) (2.2)
I
Adjusted R 2 - 0.96
Where
FARE
DISTANCE
DIRECT
REMOTE
= published economy fare in Rupees
= point-to-point distance in kilometres
= 1 if indirect service or 0 if direct service
= 1 if route is nominated as a "Type III route", otherwise zero
The formula indicates that fares increase by 3.08 Rupees (9.3 cents US) for every
kilometre travelled. A similar approach applied to 1,000 heavily-trafficked routes in the
USA resulted in a model with fares increasing at a constant rate with distance. A one
percent increase in distance resulted in a 0.38 percent increase in the fare, but a one
percent increase in traffic on the route resulted in a reduction of 0.48 percent (Morrison &
Winston 1995). This indicates the importance of traffic density in the economics of airline
operations, but competition was found to be an additional moderating factor in the USA.
Using the model for Indian air fares, and evaluating this at the mean distance, it appears
that a one percent increase in distance in India results in a 0.8 percent increase in fares.
Given the predominance of short routes in the Indian Airlines' network and the higher
costs per seat kilometre associated with short-haul operations, it is not surprising to
generate this result. No data were available to test the importance of traffic volumes on
Indian air fares, though the results reported above suggest it is unlikely this has had a
significant influence on the regulated fares.
It appears that the average flag-fall is 510 Rupees ($15.48 US). However, the fare is
increased by 149 Rupees ($4.51 US) when it is necessary to fly via another point and it is
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reduced by 150 Rupees ($4.55 US) when the flight is to a destination in the north-east,
Jammu, Kashmir or the Andaman Islands. At the mean distance, these effects amount to a
5.8 percent increase and a 5.9 percent reduction in fares, respectively.
Jet Airways' published economy fares range from being the same as Indian Airlines' prices
to 29 percent more on the 26 routes where it competed in 1996 and its average increase
was 4 percent. In comparison, NEPC advertised economy fares that were 10 percent more
than Indian Airlines' prices, ranging between 30 percent less to 80 percent more on the 30
routes where the two airlines were competing head to head. Jet Airways increased its
business class fares by 15 percent early in 1994, but the differential with Indian Airlines'
business class fares in 1996 was 8 percent. NEPC charged 10 percent more on average for
business class than Indian Airlines. It has been claimed that the new entrants have greater
scope for influencing the level of fares on routes that were not served previously by Indian
Airlines. NEPC advertised 18 routes in 1996 that were not in the published tariffs for
Indian Airlines. The average economy air fare charged by NEPC on these routes was 15
percent more than the level obtained from the regression model and the range was from 36
percent below to 77 percent above. This indicates there is some substance to the claim.
The scope for discounting so far has been limited, but in 1994 Indian Airlines introduced
discounts of up to 10 percent for point-to-point fares and some airlines were offering a
free return trip on selected frights in 1996. Jet Airways says it is not prepared to discount
its fares (Vakil 1996). It is difficult to say whether the lack of discounting activity is a
result of regulatory controls or the lack of rivalry among the airlines. One commentator,
however, has accused the airlines of working together in "an apparent price-setting cartel"
(Ballantyne 1996). The main support for this claim was the ready acceptance on the part
of the new entrants to match Indian Airlines' substantial price increases. To be fair,
though, this might be a reflection of the difficult economic conditions in the industry and
the need to cross-subsidise unprofitable routes.
Growth in the market
Despite the regulatory changes and the dynamic conditions in the industry, traffic has
grown slowly. Indian Airlines carried 3 million fewer domestic passengers in 1995-96 than
it did in 1987-88. The private sector airlines, including scheduled and air taxi operators,
carried 5.2 million passengers in 1995-96, a 43 percent market share. Table 6 shows that
traffic levels fell until the air taxi operators were permitted to operate scheduled services
and then the market increased by 40 percent in five years. In comparison, when Australia
deregulated its airline industry in October 1990, the total number of domestic passengers
was around 11 million a year but has since more than doubled in size. The Indian air travel
market has fallen well short of expectations held for it when the Government fu:st began to
respond to criticisms of the policy a decade ago.
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Table 6: Passenger traffic task 1980 to 1995-96
Year end Passengers (millions) IA Market Change in
March 31 Share Traffic
" Indian Airlines Vayudoot New Entrants Total Market % %
1981 4.85 4.85 I00.0
1982 5.56 0.02 5.58 99.6 15.I
1983 6.15 0.08 6.23 98.7 11.7
1984 6.82 0.I0 6.92 98.6 II.I
1985 7.91 0.20 8.11 97.5 17.1
1986 8.62 0.20 8.82 97.7 8.7
1987 9.I8 0.30 9.48 96.8 7.5
1988 9.93 0.40 10.33 96.I 9.I
1989 9.54 0.45 9.99 95.5 -3.3
1990 9.39 O.14 9.53 98.5 -4.6
1991 7.47 0.44 7.91 94.4 -17.0
1992 8.31 0.30 0.03 8.64 96.2 9.3
1993 7.27 0.21 0.38 7.86 92.5 -9.I
1994 7.23 2.51 9.74 74.2 23.9
1995 6.90 3.98 10.88 63.4 I1.7
1996 6,93 5.20 12.13 57.I I1.5
Source: Director-General of Civil Aviation, India, and various annual reports.
Note: Data to 1986 in calendar years, thereafter in financial years with year end on 3 ! March.
The industry's financial difficulties
Since the Indian Government allowed private sector airlines to re-enter the industry as air
taxis in 1986, numerous applications have been submitted for approval and a number of
these resulted in the formation of airlines with ambitions to become national carriers or
even major regional, feeder airlines. Of airlines falling into this category, there have been
some notable failures. East West Airlines, Damania and ModiLuft all managed to capture a
significant market share and then have encountered severe financial problems. There have
been reports that the net profits of these carriers was less than 3 percent of turnover in
1994-95 (Mayes1996) and the new entrants have been struggling to survive.
East-West became the largest of the new entrants when the Government allowed the
private carriers to operate on a scheduled basis. Its rapid expansion was a contributing
factor in its problems, but having a mixed fleet of aircraft proved to be costly. East West
suffered further problems when one of its aircraft crashed on a training flight and then it
received adverse publicity when one its senior executives was murdered. However,
"mediocre product and loose management" have been cited as the main reasons for the
failure of the airline (Malik & Malik 1996). ModiLuft's problems resulted in a bitter public
dispute with Lufthansa about the termination of a technical and management agreement.
Again the airline's difficulties appear to have arisen from rapid expansion that stretched its
capacity and on faulty strategy (Malik & Malik 1996). After moves to attract foreign
investment into the ailing carrier came to nothing and NEPC's attempt at a take-over
failed, ModiLuft ceased business in 1996.
Damania Airlines began in 1993 as a "business traveller's airline" with 3 B737-200 aircraft
and in its three years of operation it carried close to 2 million passengers while incurring
$20 million US in debt. It pushed the barriers of in-flight service and had aircraft grounded
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at one stage for flouting a government ban on serving alcohol to passengers during flights.
As its debts mounted, its aircraft spent more time on the ground, but the main difficulties it
faced were in meeting the Government's requirements to serve uneconomic routes. In
1995, Damania was taken over by NEPC and renamed as NEPC Skyline while the original
NEPC with its 7 F27 aircraft was retained as a feeder airline operating on regional routes.
The new entrant presence in the market now is dominated by Jet Airways with
NEPC/NEPC Skyline, Sahara India Airlines, a handful of regional airlines, and a larger
number of air taxi operators making up the remainder. The incumbents also have had
financial problems. Vayudoot's failure and mounting losses for Indian Airlines have been
discussed above. The picture that emerges across the industry is one of poor financial
health despite favourable conditions in the Indian economy. Analysts have assessed that
the load factor required for an airline to break even in India ranges between 67 to 74
percent and a small change in load factor results in wide swings in profitability (Dasgupta
1995, Vakil 1996).
The airlines have complained that the Government's surcharge on fuel and its inland
passenger tax raise costs unreasonably for a fledgling industry. Further criticism is levelled
at the fares the airlines are constrained to charge (Dasgupta 1995). In 1994, the cost of
fuel was 0.57 cents per available seat kilometre for the US airlines (Gallagher 1995). It is
not clear what other costs are included in the category of "flight operations" for Indian
Airlines, but these were 38 percent of the airlines' total operating costs and amounted to
1.99 cents per seat kilometre in 1994. The least squares regression model of fares reported
above indicates that the price of air travel increases by 9.3 cents US for every kilometre
travelled. In comparison, the costs of operating a new B737-400 on a route of 700
kilometres in Australia has been estimated to be approximately 6.8 cents US per available
seat kilometre when expressed in 1996 values (Bureau of Transport & Communications
Economics 1994). Low-cost operators in the USA such as ValuJet and Southwest Airlines
are reported to have costs closer to 4.5 cents per available seat kilometre, but ValuJet had
an average revenue per seat kilometre close to 9.3 cents (1996 values) while Southwest
was earning about three-quarters this rate (Gallagher 1995).
Southwest Airlines, the most consistently profitable airline in the USA, is able to survive
on average prices below those charged in India. What is different is that the Indian carriers
have little scope to practice price discrimination using yield management systems. This
prevents them stimulating growth in the price-sensitive segments of the market while
charging higher fares to business travellers. The market could become larger and the
airlines could use their aircraft capacity better if they were given greater scope to increase
published fares and to use promotional discounts. Southwest Airlines has developed a
strategic position in its markets with its high frequency and direct flights coupled with a
low-cost strategy that maximises the utilisation of its fleet. The Indian carriers have tended
to compete on the basis of service and they have not taken advantage of operational
approaches used by low-cost carriers in other countries or of the hub-and-spoke systems
that favour larger operators.
The Government has a strategy to upgrade its airports and this will overcome the physical,
infrastructure constraints on the airlines (Bhatura 1996). These problems will take time to
resolve, but constraints imposed by the regulatory system can be addressed in the short-
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term. As a measure of the cost to the airlines of the requirements on them to support
community service obligation Indian Airlines claims to have only 20 routes that are
profitable while the losses it incurred on social routes in 1985 was at least $48 million US
(Mayes 1996). A key difficulty for all of the airlines is the requirement to spread capacity
across the three different classes of routes. Damania Airlines' problems were exacerbated
when it was forced to conform to the Government's guidelines. East West Airlines
operated turboprop aircraft along with its small fleet of jets and found it had a major
problem in managing costs while trading frequency, load factor and consumer preferences
for the jets operated by Indian Airlines on its social routes. It eventually grounded its
F27's after incurring heavy engineering, maintenance and training costs. Jet Airways has
succeeded by minimising its exposure to the routes with low traffic densities.
The new entrants face a difficult choice. They can risk punitive measures by not
conforming to the regulations, they can operate a mixed fleet of aircraft with consequent
inefficiencies and reduced flexibility in scheduling and marketing, or they can associate
themselves with feeder airlines. There are signs that the feeder airlines are developing a
capacity to respond and Indian Airlines has formed its own feeder airline. However, the
new airlines have started with larger networks and with lower frequencies than would be
likely under completely free conditions.
This means that the airlines are not able to exploit economies of traffic density that, in the
USA, continue to be achieved up to 40 million route ton kilometres (Gillen et. al. 1990).
Research into economies of traffic density in India would be useful, but it is likely that
these would be fully exploited by the main carriers only on the routes connecting Delhi,
Mumbai, Calcutta, Bangalore and Madras, if at all. Left to themselves, the airlines have a
strong economic incentive to develop their networks in such a way that they would spread
the fixed costs of entering new routes across a sufficient volume of traffic. The regulations
on allocating capacity place severe constraints on this option.
All of these factors are resulting in lower aircraft and labour productivity than is
achievable in other airline markets. Indian Airlines had a large workforce in 1993, 22,000
employees for its 7.2 million passengers. This represents a labour productivity result of
350 passengers per employee or 32,500 revenue passenger kilometres per employee,
approximately 40 percent and 20 percent, respectively, of the rates achieved in the US
domestic industry in the same year. The cost per seat kilometre for Indian Airlines was
5.83 cents and this compares with an average for the US industry in the same year of 5.03
cents (Gallagher 1995). It has been noted above that fuel costs are high in India, but
maintenance costs also were one-third higher than the average for the USA on a unit cost
basis in 1994 while sales and distribution costs were slightly lower in India. The higher
costs of fuel and maintenance are compensated for by lower wages in India even
accounting for the lower labour productivity.
It seems there is scope for the Indian carriers to exploit their low labour costs and to be
competitive with low fares. However, the Government can improve the prospects of
reducing costs by setting a more stable regulatory environment and by allowing the airlines
greater commercial freedom to develop appropriate strategies for the nation's developing
market. A fundamental problem is the Government's position with respect to the two
categories of "social" routes. The low density routes tend to be relatively short and, as the
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surface transport system improves, there should be less need to siibsidise them. There is no
good reason why such services would need to be subsidised for tourists. In the USA, there
were similar concerns that small communities would suffer after deregulation but the
experience was more frequent, propeller-driven aircraft replaced the larger jets (Pickrell
1995). The regional airlines have used aircraft appropriate for the low density markets and
have given the small communities frequent access to hubs where connections can be made
to larger carriers.
Undoubtedly there is scope for promoting smaller airlines to deal with the low density
routes in India but there are some significant routes that are not of a short haul nature (eg
Andaman Islands). The Government has drawn particular attention to the most needy
areas as Category II routes. One of the approaches that could be taken is to provide
specific subsidies for airlines operating these routes. This was the approach taken in the
USA with its Essential Air Service programme according to which communities that could
generate fewer than 40 passengers a day in each direction were eligible for financial
support. The EAS programme has been modified on a number of occasions but will be
withdrawn in 1998, 20 years after deregulation. In 1994, 300 communities were listed by
the US Department of Transportation as eligible for EAS assistance-but there were only
77 claimants and the cost of the programme was $26.8 million Abbey (1995).
That the Government of India considers there are some regions that should receive
subsidised air services is not in itself a problem, but the method of achieving this result is
constraining the development of efficient networks and appropriate matching of aircraft to
routes of varying densities. It is difficult for a regulator in low density markets to
determine the optimal fares, aircraft choice and networks (Forsyth 1992). A better
outcome is likely to be achieved by granting the airlines greater freedom to choose where
and how they will operate and the ability to set fares in accordance with conditions in each
market. This will mean that a mechanism must be found to provide direct subsidies for the
non-economic routes. The Government could adopt the view that the subsidy should
continue to come from other airline users and it could achieve this through some tax on
passengers. Though there are some objections to cross-subsidies of this kind, there is a
need for a thorough evaluation of alternatives to the current regulatory system.
Concluding comments
India has joined the growing ranks of nations that allow competition in their domestic
airline markets. However, its cautious approach has placed a premium on the protection of
Indian Airlines and on the continuation of uneconomic services on s0cial routes. Fares
have increased and traffic has grown much more slowly than should have been expected
given economic conditions. The tourism sector was a vocal critic of protectionist policies
but ambitious plans to increase the number of international visitors requires further
expansion in capacity and improvement in standards. India is capable of developing a large
domestic air travel market but the financial problems faced by the airlines threaten to stall
progress.
Though published fares appear to be low in India, airlines in other parts of the world are
able to maintain profits with similar average yields. Unit costs do seem to be higher in
India than in the USA but improved performance would allow the airline industry to
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become more profitable. There does seem scope to improve labour productivity in Indian
Airlines, though this is not as important as in other countries because of India's low wages
and salaries. The serious problems faced by the airlines in matching aircraft to routes and
developing strong networks with relationships between feeder airlines and trunk carriers is
impeded because of the regulatory approach. It would be possible to devise an alternative
system to give the airlines greater commercial freedom while raising sufficient funds to
support a direct subsidy system for the social routes. There is scope for the performance
of India's airline industry to be improved and there is a need for a thorough evaluation of
alternatives to the current system.
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Abstract
This paper statistically investigates the charging system of Japanese domestic air fares
and predicts the effect of the revision of current system on the consumer's surplus.
Using 222 cross section data of 1995, this paper unveiled that (a) the fares in the long haul
markets were set higher regardless of the number of passengers, (b) in the outstandingly
dense markets, the fares were set higher than the predicted full cost level, (c) however, in
the thin and shorter haul markets, fares were a little lower. Considering the price
elasticity of these three types of routes, this paper concluded that the reduction of air fares
in the long haul markets (especially dense markets) to the "distance-proportional level"
would lead to the substantial gain of consumers surplus, and this would surpass the loss
of consumer's surplus that might arise in shorter haul routes. There still remains
substantial room for the Japanese government to improve the consumer's benefit without
worsening, or maybe with improving, the status quo of the airlines.
1 Introduction
The Japanese domestic air markets have been tightly regulated in terms of charging
fares, frequency, entry, and exit throughout the era of so-called "Old regime (1972-86)" and
that of "New Domestic Policy (1986-)". Recently, the threshold that regulated the
numberof carrier in a route had gradually been lowered and finally it was abolished in
April, 1997. On the other hand, the charging system of fares had hardly been revised
prior to 1996 except for the slight changes in 1989 and 1990 I. However, in May 1996,
Ministry of Transport allowed each airline to freely choose to set the fare within a 25%
range below a maximum fare and expanded the availability ofdisceunt fares, but actually,
a number of normal fares of large markets were raised, so it seems that this "nominal"
policy revision doesn't necessarily work well 2.
The primary purpose of the fare regulation has been to cross-subsidy the deficit-ridden
local routes with trunk and other large local markets. This policy has enabled domestic
airlines to expand route network without cutthroat competition, to protect profits for the
reinvestment, and to maintain stable management of growth 3.
Judging by this context, the fares of large and/or dense routes are set higher above the
commonly assumed level, namely, "distance proportional" level, and consumer's surplus in
these routes have been converted to the compensation for the deficits that come about in
thin and/or small routes.
This paper investigates in what kind of routes the fares are set higher than the
"distance proportional' level, and then predicts how much consumer's surplus will change
1 In these revision, the fares were slightly lowered in the across-the-beard way because of
the change of tax system. The fares of north and south bound routes, which had been set
higher in order to offset the loss of revenue due to the irregular climate change, were also
reduced.
More detailed information about the policy of Japanese domestic and international
aviation policy is depicted in Yamauchi and Murakami (1995) and Yamauchi and Ito (1996).
In 1998, being allotted some slots in Sapporo, Tokyo (Haneda) and Osaka (Itami), the new
entrants (Skymark Airlines and Hokkaido International Airlines) are supposed to operate
in such a dense trunk route as Tokyo-Sapporo (about eight million passengers carried per
year) by charging much lower price. This may stimulate the fare competition among
airlines, but the frequency of these airlines will be much less than that of "Big 3 (Japan
Airlines, All Nippon Airways, and Japan Air System)", it is not sure whether these new
entrants can survive the competition in these markets.
2
by rectifying thecurrent chargingsystemof Japanesedomesticair fares. In orderto do
so, the next chapter does the preliminary analysesnecessaryfor the consecutive
researches. Thechapter3depictstheprocedureof analysesin the former hal_ and then
constructs the models and derives the empirical results.
2 The Preliminary Analyses
(1)The Structure and Variation of Japanese Domestic Air Fares
The Japanese domestic air fares except for those of commuter airlines are determined
so that the total revenue from them will cover the total cost of each firm 4. This doesn't
guarantee that the revenue of each route covers its total cost. The art of charging each
fare of a route is such that it is approximately proportional to the stage length, in principle.
This method has been thought to most effectively wipe out the feeling of inequality or
discrimination in pricing which consumers might otherwise have. However, the fares
per distance actually vary among the routes, although we control the factors that cause
the cost differences (for example, whether the fleet consists of turbo-prop aircraft or not).
In order to see to what extent the fares vary, this part regresses the fare per distance to
the stage length, using the log linear form and introducing the dummy variables that
reflect the cost difference among the routes. The longer the stage length is, the lower
the fares per distance are expected to be, because the operating costs decrease as the stage
length is longer, so the sign of the parameter of stage length is expected to be negative (i.e.,
the convex curve may be expected). The function to be estimated may be regarded as the
different form of the average cost curve rather than the actual marginal cost curve of the
domestic market, but has the same shape of the margina! cost curve, since the marginal
cost of operation decreases as the stage length is longer. If the statistics of the
estimated function should be substantially significant, it can be said that the domestic air
3 Yamauchi and Ito, ibid., p.38.
4 On the other hand, the fares of commuter routes are determined so that the revenue of
each route will cover the cost of the route. Eventually, the fares per distance of
commuter routes are set higher than those of trunk and local routes.
3
fares are set at "relatively" reasonable level, because they are construed as being charged
like the way of marginal cost pricing, covering the total cost of operatiorL
The original form of the equation to be estimated is as follows.
Ln(P/DIST)=a+b*DOKINAWA+c*DISLAND+d*DEXP+e*DNARR+f_DTURBO+g*DYS
+h*DTR+(i _j_DOKINAWA+k*DISLAND+I*DEXP+m*DNARR
+n*DTURBO+o*DYS+p*DTR)Ln(DIST)+ p
,where /_ is the error term, P/DIST is the round trip normal fare per distance of each
route, and DIST is the stage length of each route. All the following variables are dummy
variables.
• DOKINAWA : i for the routes serving Naha International Airport in Okinawa Island,
and the others zero.
•DISLAND : 1 for the routes serving the isolated islands other than Okinawa Island, and
the others zero.
•DEXP : 1 for the routes which can be regarded as competing with Shinkansen Express,
(namely, for the routes along which Shinkansen serves direct service), and the others zero.
• DNARR : I for the routes where such narrow bodied aircraft as DC-9, MI)-80s, B737, and
A320 is mainly inaugurated, and the others zero.
• DTURBO • 1 for the routes where smaller turboprop aircraft with less than 30 seats is
mainly inaugurated, and the others zero.
• DYS • 1 for the routes where YS-11 (64 seat configuration turboprop aircraft) is mainly
inaugurated, and the others zero.
-DTR : The trunk dummy variable. 1 for Tokyo (Haneda)-Sapporo, Tokyo-Osaka (Itami
and Kansai), Tokyo-Fukuoka, Tokyo-Naha, Osaka (Itami and Kansai)-Sapparo, Osaka-
Fukuoka, Osaka-Naha, Fukuoka-Sapporo, Fukuoka-Naha, and the others zero.
The estimated results are shown in Table-1. The data are the cross section data in
1995, and the sauces are Jiko_d_._, (Time Table monthly published by Japan Travel
Bureau), 1995.10 and Koku Yuso Tokei Nempo (annually published operating data of
airlines), Ministry of Transport, 1996.
As are expected, the parameter "i" is negative and the fares of the Okinawa-bound and
the isolated island-bound routes are lower than those in the other routes. In addition,
4
ShinkansenExpressplaysan important role asacompetitorwith airlines, for it keeps the
air fares lower. In the routes where narrow bodied and turbo prop aircraft are
inaugurated, the fares per distance decrease more substantially than those in other routes,
as the stage length is longer.
Table-1 The regression results of Ln(P_/DIST_ ) function
a b c d e f g h
_-.1055.310
(58.105)
i
-.1 O0
(-3.906)
i
J
-.060
(-3.073)
k
(-3.452)
I
.642
(5.406)
m
1.046
(6.196)
!1
-0.039
(1.255)
o p
Para- -.180 -.129 -.170 -.051
meter (-9.292) (4.969) (3.924) (6.585)
Note :(1)estimatedby OLS. _2 = .858 SE = .094 n = 222
(2) "Variable decreasing method" is used for the choice of statistically significant
variables.
(3) t-statistics is in parentheses.
(4)These routes are excluded from the data. (a) Commuter routes, Co) The routes
serving in Narita (because passengers of these routes can be regarded as the
international tourists), and (c) the routes not operated throughout the year.
Looking at the statistics, we find _2 is not so large, even though this model introduces
all the variables that reflect the cost difference. This means that the other factors than
distance affect the art of pricing. We can regard each positive residual in this estimated
function as the extra mark-up charged for the corresponding routes, while each negative
residual is expected to stand for the extra discounts from the average cost level
(2) The Classification of Domestic Markets
As is shown in 2(1), there exists the diversity in the level of the air fares. As long as
airlines can , although restricted]y, control the fares, they must have charged them
depending on the factors of the market structure of each route such as the volume of
demand(PAX), the price elasticity of demand, load factor(LF), and distance(DIST) 5.
5From the viewpoint ofthe traditionalindustrialorganizationtheory,the number of
competitorsaffectsthe mark-up ofthe price. However, even though there are more than
This part of chapter 2 classifies 222 Japanese domestic markets into three groups each
of which consists of the similar routes in terms of PAX, LF, and DIST by Ward method
cluster analysis 8. Figure-1 shows the result of cluster analysis (the tree of clusters), and
Table-2 summarizes the character of each cluster.
Figure-1 The result of cluster analysis
°
_. 12. 2i.
8. 16.
The seared sum of the residuals
Table-2 The characterofeach cluster
Average Average LF Average DIST Total PAX
PAX(*1000) (%) (IOn) (.I000)
1_ cluster (n=114) 99.1 58.6 989.4 11294.3
2"_cluster (n=50) 1136.8 60.5 861.1 568392
3_ cluster (n=58) 148.0 63.2 278.3 8586.6
Note : Each cell shows the average value of each variable in 1995. The data source m
Koku Yuso Tokei Nempo (annually published operating data of airlines), Ministry of
Transport, 1996.
two airlines, they charged the same price under the regulatory regime prior to May 1996
(namely, at the time when the data to be used in the following analysis was collected), so
this case doesn't consider this factor.
6 The information of the price elasticity of each route is hard to obtain, so this factor is
excluded from this duster analysis.
6
The routes in the first cluster can be discribed as long haul but thin and inefficient
markets. The second cluster contains long haul and by far the densest markets of all,
and the third cluster contains thin, short haul, and relatively efficient markets.
3 The Effect of the Revision of Current Air Fares : Empirical Analysis
(1) The Procedure
Using the cross section data introduced 2(1), the latter half of this chapter estimates
the demand function of each cluster, and then derives the approximate changes of
consumer's surplus if the art of charging domestic air fares is revised.
In advance of the emp_ical analysis, this part explains how the results of preliminary
analyses of the last chapter are associated with the following analyses. The factors
necessary here are :
(a)
(b)
(c)
the demand elasticity of each cluster,
the residuals obtained from Ln(P_/DIS_ ) function 7,
and the data of passengers and fares.
The results of the previous chapter are used for (a) and Co).
It is convenient to complementarily use the designated marks in Table-3 to simplify the
explanation of the procedure of the following analyses.
Table-3 The designated marks used in the procedure of the analysis
(A) the
name of
the group
(cluster)
(B)the price
elasticity of
demand
(absolute
value)
(C) the sum of the residuals
obtained from Ln( P_/ DIST_ )
function
SR'o(>O)
(D)the total
number of
passengers
PAX_
(E) the supposed
conditions of
each mark
a c_ >Cp
fl e_ SRt_(<' O, SR a + SRp = O) PAXp PAX,_ > PAX o
7 It goes without saying that the sum of all the residuals is zero, but those in each cluster
is expected to be non-zero.
Supposethat therearetwogroups(clusters)of routes, tt and fl (see row (A)), and that
the absolute value of the estimated demand elasticity of the routes in cluster tz and _ is
£a and Ep respectively (row 03)). Also suppose that the sum of the residuals of each
route belonging to cluster a, SR a is positive (this means that the fares of the routes in
cluster tz are set relatively higher than the "distance-proportional" level), while SRp
negative (See row (C). Of course, SR_ + SRp = 0) ), and that we call the total number of
passengers of each cluster PAX_ and PAXp, respectively (row (D)). If all the
conditions shown in row (E) are satisfied, namely, the price elasticity of demand of a is
larger than that of fl, and total number of passengers carried of cluster tt is larger than
those of _, the gain of the consumer's surplus by one percentags's fare reduction in
cluster a is expected to surpass the loss of consumer's surplus that may occur in p by the
same percentage's fare rise.
Using three types of demand elasticity of each cluster stated in the last chapter, and
the data of PAX_ and FARE t , the next part predicts how much the consumer's surplus of
each route would change by the revision of air fares, and finally figures out how much the
total amount of consumer's surplus of Japanese domestic air markets would change,
adding up the amount of change in consumer's surplus of each route. In the meantime of
analysis, it is necessary to define at what level the fares should be set and by how many
percentages they should be changed. This paper assumes the case of matching the
current air fares with the level of the estimated curve of Ln(P t/DIST_ ) in 2(1), namely,
the estimated average cost level The way of calculating its ratio is as follows :
C_ = /_t , where C_ is the changing ratio of the fare of route i, and /_i is
Ln( P_/ DIST, )
the residual of route i in Ln(P_/DISTt) function s. The way of charging air fares
assumed here still guarantees that the airlines can totally earn profits in the domestic
operation, and may give the passengers the feelings of equality of pricing.
s For example, CR of Tokyo-Osaka(Itami) is about 1017, so in this case, it is predicted how
the 1.7%'s discount of the fare will increase the consumer surplus of this route.
The demand functions to be estimated in the following part is one of the three
simultaneousequations• the others are the load factor and the fleet size function,
respectively.
(2) The Simultaneous Equation Model and their Empirical Results
This part starts to construct the simultaneous equation model and then goes on to the
empirical analysis. The models to be constructed here explains the carriers' behavior
under the condition where both fares and frequency are regulated in the short run.
Taking this regulatory regime into consideration, this paper chooses the passengers
carried (PAX), the load factor (L_, and the fleet size (FL_ as the endogenous variables in
the simultaneous equation model (with a bar over them). Thus the model consists of
three equations. "+" and %" are predictable sign of each variable.
(1) PAX, = f_(+)P_,(+)POP_,(+)INC,,(+)FRQ,,(+)FLT, t
L DIST_
(2) LF_ = g{(+)PAX,,(+)DIST,,(+)HI, }
(3) FLT_ = h{(+)PAX,,(+)DIST,,(-)FRQ, }
All the equations are over-identified, but meet both order and rank condition. The
variables and their explanation are shown in Table-3.
Table-3
Name
PAX,
1",
DIST,
POP,
INC ,
The ex
Sauce
(a)
(b)
(a)
(c)
(c)
FRQ, (a)
FLT, (a)
LF, (a)
HI, (a)
flanation of the variables introduced in the simultaneous equation
Definition
The number of r0und-trip passengers carried in route i ....
Normal round trip fare of route i
Stage lengthofro.ute i
The square root of the product of the greater-area population of each
originand destinationcityservedby route i
The square rootof the product of the disposableincome of each origin
and destinationcity,servedby.route i ......
The number of the totaldeparture in route i
The average seatnumber ofaircraftinaugurated in route i
The average round-tripload factorofroute i
The Herfindhal index ofeach route i
Note • The data sauces are ; (a) Koku Yuso Tokei Nempo, Ministry of Transport, 1996 (b)
Jikokuhyo, Japan Travel Bureau, March 1996, (c) Chiild Keizai Soran (the handbook of
statistics of regional data), Toyo Keizai Shimposha, 1996.
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In the demand function, FRQ, and FLT_ represent the service quality variables.
The more the frequency increases, the more easily the passengers can prefer the favorite
flights, so the frequency delay will decrease 9. In addition, FRQ, is expected to play the
same role as FRQ, in the demand function for the same reason.
The load factor function was introduced in Douglas and Miller(1974) l°. The
purpose of this function is to show how the quality competition affects the demand and
supply balance. The fleet size function explains what determine the carrieds behavior of
organizing their fleet in order to optimize the efficiency. Here (PAX), (DIST), and (FRQ)
are expected to affect the inauguration of aircraft, because the more the passengers
increase and the longer the stage length is, the larger aircraft the carrier inaugurates,
whereas the increase of frequency may curtail the size of aircraft under the condition that
the market develops moderately. Because the empirical results of these two functions
aren't directly concerned with the purpose of this paper, they are not shown here.
The summary of the price elasticity of demand of each cluster as well as the sum of the
residuals of Ln(P t/DIST t) function is shown in Table-4. The 2SLS regression results of
each demand function are shown in Table-7 - 9 in Appendix.
Table-4. The priceelasticityofeach cluster
14 cluster 2_dcluster 3'dcluster
The sum of the residuals of each cluster .1546 -.2183 .0637
Price Elasticity of demand( cj ) -.8017 -.5409 -.5727
Note" all of the coefficients are significant at 1% level
Generally speaking, like the case of the US prior to the deregulation, the fares of longer
haul routes (i.e., the routes in the 1_t cluster) are set higher than those of shorter haul
routes, for the sum of the residuals of the 1_ cluster is substantially positive. In
addition, as the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand of the 1_ cluster is
relatively larger than those of the others, partly because many touristy routes are
9 See Douglas and Miller (1974a), pp.82-83, (1974b), pp.658-659, and Panzar (1979), pp.92-
95.
1oDouglas and Miller (1974a), pp.50-54, and (1974b), pp.660-663.
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included in this cluster, so the consumer's surplus is expected, in average, to be
substantially ameliorated by changing the current fare of the 1_ cluster to the level of
estimated average cost of each route.
On the other hand, the sum of the residuals of 2_d cluster is negative and the routes in
this cluster are much larger than the others in average, so the revision of fares might lead
to the substantial reduction of consumer's surplus of this cluster, even though the price
elasticity is the smallest of all I1. However, twenty one of fifty routes in 2_d cluster have
the positive residuals, and many of them consist of such large routes as Tokyo-Sapporo or
Tokyo-Fukuoka, it is not necessarily determined whether or not the revision of fares
would reduce the consumer's surplus of this cluster. This reveals the opacity and
inconsistency of the charging system of air fares under the regulatory regime" why the air
fares are set higher or lower although the price elasticity of demand is the same and the
number of passengers, distance, and the load factor don't differ so significantly within the
cluster.
The price elasticity of the routes in the 3_ cluster is as small as that of the 2_d cluster,
and the sum of residuals in the 3rd cluster is barely positive. This means that the
revision of air fares in this cluster may not have much influence on the change of the
consumer's surplus.
The change of consumer's surplus of each route (CCS i) is derived from the Marshall's
manner of calculation:
CCS_=CI_*FARE,*PAX,(1-1C_*e.j) (i = 1,2,---,222, j = 1,2,3)
Then the totalchange ofconsumer's surplus (TCCS) isdescribedas"
222
TCCS = _., CCS i
t-I
Table-5liststhe top twenty routesthe CCS_ ofwhich would increaseby the revisionof
airfaresand theirpredictedamount per year.
11Many largebusiness routes(e.g.,Tokyo-Sapporo, Tokyo-Osaka, Tokyo-Fukuoka, etc.)
are included inthe 2"dcluster. This may cause the smaller priceelasticityofdemand of
thiscluster.
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Table-5
TOKYO
TOKYO
The list of the route the CCS, of which would increase by the revision of air fares
Route The expected increase'of 'CCS, ('$US-1,000) Cluster No.
FUKUOKA 23287.67 2
HIROSHIMA 9787.84 2
ITAMI 9446.01 2
SAPPORO 7531.36 2
7302.31 3
SAPPORO 7022.30 2
AOMORI 6321.99 2
OKAYAMA 5199.41 2
TAKAMATSU 4746.22 2
TOKUSHIMA 3846.66 2
MISAWA 3586.74 2
KUSHIRO 3538.84 2
SENDAl 3527.98 2
OKINAWA 3335.43 2
SAPPORO 3113.12i 2
3080.83! 3
TOTTORI 2897.72 1
2432.77 2
ASAHIKAWA 2367.83 2
OBIHIRO 2055.7(] 2
Note •In order to help both thq Japanese and the others understand the amount easily,
TOKYO
TOKYO
FUKUOKA MIYAZAKI
NAGOYA
TOKYO
TOKYO
TOKYO
TOKYO
TOKYO
TOKYO
ITAMI
KANSAI
ITAMI
KAGOSHIMA FUKUOKA
TOKYO
FUKUOKA SAPPORO
TOKYO
TOKYO
these are calculated supposing that 1 US dollar = 100 Yen.
What is the most apparent in this table is that seventeen of twenty routes belong to the
2_d cluster. This means that each airline exploits the consumer's surplus o£ long and
haul and dense markets and derives its profit f_om there. In addition, Table-6 shows the
change in consumer's surplus in each cluster and TCCS.
Table-6 The change in consumers surplus in each clusterand TCCS
Change in CS (*1000) .... 3324.49 4606.14 -976.84 6953.79
Note : $1(US) = ¥100 is supposed.
If the art of charging fares is revised, the consumer's surplus of the 3_ cluster may
decrease, but those of the I _t and 2"d cluster will increase much more substantially than
that of the 3_d's, so TCCS is expected to increase by more than 6.95 million US dollars.
However, it seems that the new art of domestic air fares initiated in May 1996 doesn't
12
necessarilyimprovethis lossof consumer'ssurplus,for thefareswereraisedmainly in the
route of the 2 "d cluster type, while they were lowered in the local routes that serves the
points in Hokkaido and Okinawa Although each airline was allowed to discount the fare
by maximum 25% off the normal fare after this policy change, the fares were raised in
those markets whose residual in Ln(P s/DIST t ) function is positive TM. This policy change
may have reduced consumer's surplus of those who purchase the normal fares, even
though it gave all the passengers the impression that it would ameliorate the consumer's
surplus l_.
4 Concluding Remarks
The analyses of this paper reveal the character of the charging system of Japanese
12Speaking of the trunk routes except for those which serve Narita, six of thirteen routes
(Tokyo-Sapporo, Tokyo-Osaka (Itami and Kansai), Tokyo-Fukuoka, and Osaka-Fukuoka)
experienced the rise of fares by 5.56%, while the rest (Tokyo-Okinawa, Osaka-Sapporo,
Osaka-Okinawa, Fukuoka-Sapporo, Fukuoka-Okinawa) benefited from the revision of air
fares (the reduction ratio is 2.55%). Generally speaking, the long distance routes that
serve Okinawa and Hokkaido (except for Sapporo) experienced the reduction of air fares,
but it is apparent that the rectification of air fares aimed at increasing the benefit of the
industry, not of the consumer, because it allowed for the rise of fares in "already lucrative"
routes. For example, the correlation coefficient between the residuals in Ln(P_/DIST_ )
function and the rising percentage of the fares after the policy change in 1996 is r=.3615
(t=6.710, n=222). This means that the airline can dig up all the more profits for the
rectification_
13However, since the discount ticket for advanced purchase and frequent flyer program
have been more and more available compared with the era prior to 1996, the well-informed
consumers about the air fares has more and more come to benefit from the opportunities
to purchase discounted tickets than ever. When we more precisely analyze the issue of
the change in consumer's surplus after this policy change, it is prerequisite that we have
the information about the ratio of discount ticket users in the total passengers.
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domestic air fares and figures out the effect of the revision of the current fares on the
consumer's surplus.
Under the regulatory regime, the charging system has not been transparent in dense
long haul routes, while the higher fares were observed in many thin long haul routes.
Speaking of dense long haul routes, it doesn't follow that the changing the air fares to the
"distance-proportional" level would diminish the consumer's surplus in the cluster
because the sum of the residuals are positive. The fares of such outstandingly large
markets as Tokyo-Sapporo, Tokyo-Fukuoka, and Tokyo-Osaka, the three biggest routes in
Japan, are charged higher than the average, and the fare reduction might significantly
increase the consumer's surplus of this cluster.
As the fares of thin long haul routes are also higher and the price elasticity of demand
is relatively larger in these markets, the fare reduction in these routes might lead to the
amelioration of consumer's surplus. On the other hand, the fares of shorter haul routes
are set lower in average, so the change of fares to the "distance-proportional level" would
reduce the consumers surplus of this type of routes. However, both the absolute value
of the price elasticity of demand and the number of passengers of these routes are so small
that the reduction in consumer's surplus is expected to be so subtle. Totally, the
substantial increase of consumer's surplus in longer and dense markets would offset the
welfare loss that might arise in shorter and thin markets, and total gain in consumer
surplus would be more than 6.95 million US dollars per year.
Judging by the empirical results, the domestic air fare policy of Ministry of Transport
prior to 1996 had been desirable for the industry in that it guaranteed the airlines positive
profit, but had not been appropriate for consumers in that there must have existed the
room for the amelioration of consumer's surplus. To make the matter worse, the
consumer's surplus may have decreased all the more for the revised regime in 1996,
because many of the normal fares of long haul dense routes were raised and airlines have
sought to exploit more profits from long and dense markets. As stated in chapter 1, the
greatest change in this minor policy revision was that Ministry of Transport allowed each
airline to freely choose to set the fare within a 25% range below a maximum fare, but this
doesn't have any actual meaning, because the airlines (especially Japan Airlines and All
Nippon Airways) succeeded in raising the fares in "across the board" way in those markets
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where the competition is supposedto take place, namely, in double and triple track
marketsTM. Indeed, this negative welfare effect on consumer's surplus may have to be
discounted to some extent, because the availability of discount tickets has been expanded,
such as "advanced purchase (maximum 35-6% off in 1996)" that has the restrictions
similar to those on US discount tickets t5 or the "domestic frequent flyer program" that has
the meaning equivalent to the discount ticket. The problem might be less significant
than this paper predicted so long as consumers can easily access these discount ticket, like
the case of the deregulation in the US in which more and more passengers came to
purchase varieties of discount tickets, although the inflation-adjusted normal fare level
increased more than the pro-deregulation level. However, the availability of discount
tickets is still limited in that the percentages of discount ratio are much smaller than
those of the comparable fares in the US 16 or the domestic frequent flyer program is
separated from the international one, because of the legal restriction (Premium Law) in
JaparL There still remains substantial room for the Japanese government to improve
the consumer's benefit without worsening, or maybe with improving, the status quo of the
airlines.
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Appendix
Table-7
:lnteroept
Ln(P/DISTi
Ln(POP)
Ln(INC)
Ln(FRQ)
Ln(FLT)
The regression results of the demand function of the 1_ cluster
Parameter
5.790724035
-.801667139
SE
.409208542
t -statistics
14.15103411
-22.45134743.035706861
.185518058 .009125844 20.32864734
-1.037882684 .044381706 -23.38537153
1.040781057 .003713439 280.27414500
.028687798.257804675
.999088_
8.98656192
Table-8 The regression results of the demand function of 2_d cluster
Parameter SE t -statistics
Intemept -3.852078627 .044358380 -86.83992932
Ln(P/DIST) -.540864647 .004902349 -110.3276567
In(POP) .001273337.061188439
.003208703
48.05359535
Ln(INO) .658586091 .008758088 75.19747682
Ln(FRQ) 1.138044828 .000897329 1266.029194
Ln(FLT) .452044920 140.8809035
i
_--2 J .999984 .002817
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Table-9
Intercept
Ln(P/DIST)
In(POP)
Ln(INO)
In(FRO)
The re_ressionresultsofthq
Parameter SE
2.114181438! .878835638
i
-.572695102 .070766088
.079043602! .0t 4078107
-.720400828 .114293247
1.! 39589356 .009988452
Ln(FLT) .551558563 .059660055
i
I .998081 SE [ .046164
Note : All the equations are estimated by 2SLS. N=222
demand functionofthe 3_dcluster
t -statistics
2.40566193 !
-8.092790211
5.61464709C
-6.30309 ! 81_]
1!4.09068520C
9.24502264?
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THE COMPETITIVE POSITION
OF AIRLINE NETWORKS
Jan Veldhuis
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Paper presented at the AIR TRANSPORT RESEARCH GROUP Conference
Vancouver, 27 June 1997
3The contentsofthispaperisasfollows.Firstlyqualityand frequencyof directaswellasindirectconnectionsare
operationalized by variables indicating the 'connectivity' between markets. Secondly this concept is illustrated by
introducing the so-e, alled 'connectivity matrix', which is a simple statistical representation of the performance of
any airport in the markets served from and via these airports. Before introducing this concept we have defined a
study area, as well as a classification of five airport classes. The study area is Western Europe, consisting of
Benetmg UK, Ire.lend, France, Germany, Denmark, Switzerland and Austria. The five airports classes are:
1. The 'mainports' in Western Europe:
London Heathrow, Paris CDG, Franlffurt and Amsterdam
2. The 'secondary' airports in Western Europe:
Brussels, Luxemburg London Gatwick, Manchester, Dublin,
Paris Oily, Lyon, Berlin Tegei, Munich, Copenhagen,
Zurich and Vienna.
3. Regional airports: all other airports in Western Europe.
4. All other airports in Europe, outside Western Europe.
5. All airports outside Europe.
2. Operationalization of'connectivity'
In this paragraph the concept of'connectivity' is elaborated and operationalized. This has been done using the
ABC World Timetables for 1994 and 1996. Many passengers make transfers at hub airports to their final
destinations, even in case good direct connections are available. The choice passengers make is depending on the
attractiveness of the available alternatives. Attractiveness is often expressed in utility functions, where variables
like available frequencies, their travel times and fares are weighted. Other factors like comfort, loyalty to airlines,
specific preferencies for certain airports or airlines do also play a certain role. The latter ones are hardly
systematically available and even difficult to measure, so we keep - when meastaing the attractiveness of a
certain alternative - the main ones: frequencies, travel time and fares. Fares on certain routes change sometimes
by the day. Advanced yield managing systems, used by some major airlines, result in large differences of fares.
So a systematic and coherent fare information system, representing the actual fares paid, is also not available.
However there may be some systematics in fare differentiatiorg Fares on non-stop or direct routes are generally
higher than on indirect routes between two airports. Fares on indirect routes are generally lower for online (or
code-shared) connections than for interline connections. Fares on a route are generally lower if more compe-
titors are operating on these routes. And finally fares are 'cartier-specific' and are depending on the ability of
carriers to compete on fares. It can be concluded that fares are generally depending on the number of
competitors on the route and the product characteristics, like travel time, number of transfers, kind of connection
(online or interline) and the carrier operating on the route. So - although we have no explicit fare information -
fare differentation is taken implicitly on board when taking the latter characteristics as a proxy.
1. Introduction.
The competition between airports is an item that is frequently discussed. Often lists of aiports ranked by total
number of passengers, cargo or aircraft movements are used to descn'be competitive position of airports. Of
course these are indicators, that have certainly relevance, but also the diversity of their networks and fi-equendes
offered to main economic centers must be taken into accost.
Statistics published by airports, international bodies and timetables published in ABC or OAG do partly give an
insight view in this diversity. They often produce fi'equencies and/or traffic by 'flight stage' and these indicators
are good measures for the diversity of the networks offered by the relevant airports.
Nevertheless, little is known about routes actually flown by passengers. Passengers may fly for instance from
Amsterdam to London, but in many casesonward connectionsare made. The qualityand frequency of those
connections are not registrated by regular statistics. Statistics reglstrate in these cases two separate trips, one
from Amsterdam to London, and one from London to Vancouver for instance. But the quality and frequency of
these indirect connections do contnl)ute as well to the am_'tiveness and so to the competitive position of
airports. Particularly regional airports and regional airlines are often marketing these aspects. Although for these
airports only a limited number of direct connections to the larger airports in the region exist, we find sometimes
timetables for these airports with many onward connections to all parts of the world. For airlines typical
examples are Air UK and British Midland, who seek cooperation with larger airlines to attract additional
passengers for onward connections. Finally also the larger airports and airlines are - although not uniquely
depending on this - increasingly emphasizing connecting traffic. Examples are the operations of the USA hub-
carriers, who have established intensive hub operations at hubs like Atlanta and Chicago. It will problably even
increase in importance as mega-airlines will emerge who establish global networks via a limited number of hubs.
All these aspects are relevant for the attractiveness and competitiveness of airlines and airports. For them this is
crucial information, but we see still no consistent statistics that adress these aspects, although some airports are
conducting studies and enquiries to have some insight view in this field.
This paper is an attempt to provide some information concerning these aspects. The paper may help identifying
the position of airports (and airlines) in the main markets within Europe and between Europe and other world
regions.
4The route characteristics mentioned have been operationalized in a variable indicating connectivity, expressed in
so called 'connectivity units' (CNU's). This variable is a function of frequencies, travel time and the necessity of
a transfer. We have argued above that also indirect connections (including transfers at other hub airports) con-
m'bute to connectivity of a certain airport. Travel times of indirect connections are generally longer, but the
frequenc/es of indirect connections are general/y much higher. And fmal/y they contribute to a much more
competitive environment on those city-palm For instance on the Amsterdam - Vancouver route with 4 direct
wceldy connections in summer 1996, many airlines offer indirect connections with a transfer at their respective
hubs, with fi'equendes much higher than the direct ones, but of course with longer travel times. Therefore
indirect connections have been included, of course with some allowances for connecting time. Only indirect
connections with connecting time longer than 45 minutes have been included. The attractiveness of one single
(direct or indirect) frequency is defined here as depending of the perceived travel time. Necessity of a transfer is
considered to be incorporated in travel time. Additional time penalties for transfer time have however been inclu-
ded. Passengers generally perceive tranffer time as more inconvenient than flying time, as additional risks exist of
missing connections and loss of baggage. The transfer time, when transfering from one aircraft to another, has
been triple counted, to ca/culate percdved travel time. We have choosen a factor of 3, after making a global
check with actual route choices bases on passanger enquiries at Schiphol. We may however carry out further
research on this issue. By triple-counting transfer time, the perceived travel time is longer than actual travel time
for indirect flights. To account for perceived travel time for every single fi,equency a 'quality index' is defined that
represents the loss of attractiveness due to extra perceived travel time on top of the normal non-stop travel time.
In case total perceived travel time is equal (or even less) than the normal non-stop time on that route the quality
index equals 1. This is of course often the case for non-stop flights. If total perceived travel time exceeds certain
limits (defined as a function of non-stop travel time), this index equals zero, assuming that the attractiveness of
those flights is none. In all other cases an interpolation is made, depending on actual perceived travel times. The
normal non-stop time is calculated using the coordinates of the airports of origin and destination, from which
distance can be derived. Assuming speeds and allowing some time for take-off and landing, _normal non-stop
times' can be obtained. Maximum perceived travel time (the limit beyond which the attractiveness is considered
as zero) is detemined as a function of non-stop travel time. For a one hour non-stop flight this time limit is
defined at 3 hours, and for a 12 hour flight this limit goes as high as 24 hours. Note that even for city-pairs
where non-stop flights are technically not possible (generally those over 14 or even 15 hours) still non-stop times
have been calculated. Finally in determining quality indices, the kind of transfer (online or interline) has been
incorporated to represent somehow the effect of fares. We have included only 'online' connections, including the
connections where a code sharing is made. For those connections the fare setting is normally not based on the
actual Oonger) routes flown, but take into account the market circumstances that exist on the concerning city-
pair. For 'interline' connections the fare setting is normally based on the actual routes flown and sometimes even
two separate tickets have to be bought by the passenger.
5Summarizing the following model has been applied:
wher@:
MAXT = O-0.075*NST) * NST
P'rr = FLY + 3*TRF
QUAL = I-0'TT-NST)/_-NST)
CNU = QUAL * FREQ
MAXT = Maxinmm perceived travel time
NST = Non-stop travel time
FIT = Perceived travel time
FLY=Flyingtime
TRF = Transfertime
QUAL = QualityIndex
CNU = Number of Connectivity Units
FREQ = Frequency
The model is illustrated in the next table, where an example is elaborated for performance of British Airways in
the Amsterdam - Vancouver market. Based on the coordinates of both airports the (calculated) non-stop travel
time is 9.78 hrs. The maximum travd time equals - applying the model - 22.17 hrs. All connections with longer
perceived travel times, have quality indices, and so 'connectivity unit' levels equal to zero. Two connections did
meet the criteria. Both connect at Heathrow, one as an online BA-connection and one as a code-shared BA/CP-
connection. The quality indices and connectivity have been calculated applying the above model and may be
found in thenext table:
Connectivity of Briti'_ Airways
in the Amsterdam -Vancouver market (summer 1996)
.._..o...n..._.o._..T__v..d...Z__e..(_'_-).......................................................................................................................9-78
Maximum Perceived Travel Time _n's.) 22.17
..C_eLS ..2__._ ...................................................................................................B._.A B A/CP ...............
.o#_._ ..................................................................................................._ ....................._
D.._._e..T_._om__._ ........................................................! _ _o_ !0_:_..................
.._val. T'..._...e.._a.t...T_._..__rt 14:15 10:15
,.!___ .......................................................................,--..,,_ _ ....................
.R_._e.x._e.._om..!_.._....................................................! _ _ ! _1 1 _ _
._..!_..____.._.o_._........................................................_7._50. _ _
.__o_._ ..................................................................................._ ............_ ....................
.._a_.e..._:). ...............................................................................................................10 Z_ k2.:25
.._.!_e...._....:). ..........................................................................................................,2.._..........................I: _L
..P..e_!z__.T._!X_...._....:)... . .. ............................................................................_ Zs E s _
.._._.._..d.._.. . ................................................................................................................9_,_ o,,?__,
.D.y.._..o.f...o._.9 _. ....................................................................................................!,2_,4 s ,_,7 _ _,_:_s
....F.r_ue..n._.. .........................................................................................................................................Z S
Number of Connectivity Units (CNU) 3.06 1.95
6Note that the online BA-connt_-'tions (7 times a week) result in a connectivity level of 3.06. These connections
am equivalent to 3.06 non-stop connections with traveJ time equal to 9.78 hrs. We have however only listed the
British Airways connections here. In the next table an overview is given of all other carriers operating on this
route.
Sununa_ of Connectivi_ in the Amsterdam - Vancouver market
Carrier Route Freq Qual.Ind CNU
KL AMS-YVR ' 4 i 1.00'] 3.98
'_ .........._-_-T-x_ .................-_ ......-o_g_i. ......_Ti6
'/i_k.......3gig-_:_ ...............5_ ..../J _i-1................._i_'_
'/i32_..............._g,_-_ ..................-_ ..-6_3-_F ..........i:__
NW/AS AMS-SEA-YVR ...................-7" ............0 '2-i'i ......--I-14"9"
.......................................................
• ............................. ..................................
"'0_X ..................... 5", ..............._76"i-!..................._1"6:/'_
AMS-IFK-YVR
...... ..°..,_. _°,°°o,°,..°.,.....-** ......
AMS-MSP-YVR
AMS. ORD-YVR
| •
Total direct 4 • 1.00 l 3.98
............................................................................................Total indirect "46" _ ................. 0"['2"4" ] .................. °i"lTi4" !
• - 19 1 0 48 I 9 10Indirect via l_urol_ .. • •
....................:............._ ................................................._ .........................................
_ v_l.C._ ,7! 0.08: 2.14
Note that only KLM operates with direct flights on this route. Their 4 non-stop flights add to a connectivity level
of3.98,indicatinga qualityindexverycloseto unity. LuflJmn_ is the secondplayeron thisroute.Even with a
transfer at Frankfurt, geografically somewhat outside the Amsterdam-Vancouver route, high quality indices are
performed, indicating a moderate time loss Frankfurt due to transfer. The contn'oution in the total connectivity
of the routes via the US-hubs is moderate. Although daily connections exist, the time loss at New York,
IvYmncapolis and Chicago results in low quality indices, and so in low connectivity levels.
The Amsterdam-Vancouver market is an example,where many indirectconnections can be made. The distance
is long and between the two ends some main hubs on both continents (like London, New York, l_mneapolis and
Chicago) are located, via which these indirect connections can be made. Not all markets have these
characteristics, as the following examples, represented in the next table,, may illustrate.
Connectivity from Amsterdam in selected markets ,,
Lt-_ i MAD i IFK i YVR ! SLC
:" ' I a'
Total direct 159 1 37 31 i -_ i
.......Total"'-"'""'"indirect........""'-" ............""-""" ....................................... [J........................11 "".............72 i_.....................g 1 _"...................9
! I
_ ._.__.s_ . [ 4, 54 i 9ivia
......................................[ ..._...................._ ........, ............
i_ii__ norts.................................... i 01" 11!' ",
._.-.==.........................................................................................................., .,....................
r_onal_....m ! ,, r . _ ,via l U,: IE i
..................: .... . .... .... . i................... ,_..................÷... .... . .... .
................... .,. ....................... ....°............,.. .......................... • .
via other Euro_ L_rts i 7 i 4 _ i
..................................................................................................................i .... ..i .. ...._--_.... ...-_--_,. .........._
via'ICA'ports ! l z, _,
7Consider the Amsterdam-London (LI-IR) market. Many indirect connections can - theoretically - be made.
However the (triple counted) transfer time increases the perceived travel time at least with 2.25 hours. The flying
time of the two flights on top of these 2.25 hours lead to perceived travel times longer than the maximum travel
time of about 3 hours. Therefore on this route no indirect connections, meeting the criteria are found. The total
number of direct connectivity units equals however 159, equivalent to more than 22 non-stop flight daily. In
applying this procedure, we may however have underestimated indirect connectha'ties in short distance markets
with non stop time of- say - one hour, in case no direct flights are available. These connections do not meet the
criteria, so they are left out by the model. However - as direct flight are not available - these short distance
indirect connections may be the only alternatives for passengers. For these connections the coeflldent of 3 for
transfer time may be too high. Further research is therefore needed.
A second example is the Amsterdam-Madrid route. The distance is longer than the one from Amsterdam to
London and indirect connections are found within the criteria, some via the Western European mainports en
route and some via European airports outside the study area of Western Europe. Note that hardly any
connections are found via secondary and regional airports in Western Europe. For the Amsterdam-New York
market however, even via secondary airports in Western Europe connections are found. Increasingly the largest
airports outside Europe, like New York, are connected not only by the 'big four' mainports, but also by
secondary airports. This is however only the case for the largest airports outside Europe. 'Secondary
destinations' like Vancouver are still connected only by European mainports or by the large hubs outside
Europe. The last example is a destination like Salt Lake City. Although a domestic hub in USA, it is not directly
connected to Western Europe. Therefore it can only be conected from Amsterdam via hubs in the USA.
83. The connectivity matrix
On the basis of the methodology elaborated above, we have assembled the 'connectivity matrix'. We have used
Amsterdam as an example. For this airport the matrix is displayed in the table below.
Connectivit_ Matrix for Amsterdam {summer 1996)
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The upper part of the table is displaying the performance of Amsterdam as direct connections are concerned. In
1996 from Amsterdam 230 destinations are served directly (without necessity of a transfer) with an average of
14 frequencies per week. As distance increases the average frequency decreases. To the 3 Western European
mainports the average frequency is 102 per week (over 14 daily), whereas to intercontinental destinations the
average frequency is only 6 per week. Amsterdam is therefore serving 3235 weekly frequencies. There may be
less departing flights, as more frequencies may be served with one flight. If intermediate stops are necessary,
time loss is unavoidable, resulting in 'quality indices' less than unity. Nevertheless the average quality index for
all frequencies is still 0.95, indicating that the overall time loss due to intermediate stops is small and most
frequencies are served non-stop. Even for intercontinental destinations the average quality index is 0.90.
9Multiplying the level of fi'equencies with the respective quality indices, the total number of direct connectivity
units is obtained. This level can be interpreted as being equivalent to 3070 weekly non-stop departing flights. By
multiplying connectivity levels with average distances (m non-stop hours) an indication is obtained of the total
(non-stop equivalent) hours flown from the respective airport (in case of Amsterdam 9025 hours weekly), which
is indicative for the total size of the network operated from the airport concerned. The fight upper part may give
an impression of the relative performance in the two year period 1994-1996 (expressed in average yearly %
increases). Note that the total connectivity has increased by 8% annually. This growth is the result of a 2%
yearly increase in the number of destinations, a 5% yearly increase in average frequency and finally a 1% yearly
increase in average (time) quality. This overall picture differs however significantly between the route groups.
There has been a considerable growth in new destinations on the European routes, whereas on intercontinental
routes some routes have been suspended. There are nevertheless some underlying dynamics. Although the total
number of intercontinental destinations has decreased, the have been opened 9 new intercontinental routes
(among which Beijing, Memphis and Surabaya). The increase in average frequency we find in almost all route
groups, although this effect is most predominantly on intercontinental routes.
4. Onward Connectivity and Hub Connectivity
The second part of the table displays the 'onward connectivity'. Particularly to intercontinental destinations
connectivity levels via other hubs are high (2875) in comparison to the direct connectivity levels (582). The
cases elaborated above for Amsterdam to selected intercontinental destinations have illustrated the wide variety
of choices on top of the choice for direct travel. Note however that in the case of Amsterdam the majority of
those connections lead via hubs outside Europe (2117 out of 2875). This is an important consideration for an
airport. It means a relative strong position in the markets for those carriers who operate at the hubs outside
Europe, relative to those carriers who operate at competing hubs in Europe. Consequently, there is a stronger
emphasis on long range networks, relative to short range networks. The share of hubs outside Europe in the
onward connctivity level has even grown in importance, regarding the average growth factors from 1994 to
1996 (31% for hubs outside Europe, versus 6% growth for the three competing mainports). The connectivity
growth to intercontinental d_ons via the three competing mainports (6%) is particularly relevant in relation
to direct connectivity growth to intercontinental destinations (8%). Although the difference is small, it is an
indication of the somewhat decreasing competitiveness in Amsterdam of the three competing hub-r, arriers at
Heathrow, Charles de Gaulle and Frankfurt in relation to those carriers serving direct connections to
intercontinental destinations.
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Stmmmfizing, we must conclude that the vast majority of connectivity growth is leading via hubs and not via
direct connections. This is remarkable, as the phenomenon of 'hub-bypassing' is frequently emphasized, as being
of increasing importance. The changes between 1994 and 1996 do certainly not confirm this at least for the
Amsterdam case. We see this happening for almost all routes groups, particularly for the USA/Canada routes.
We have analysed these routes from Amsterdam somewhat further, as these intercontinantal routes seem to be
the most important for the Amsterdam case. Four main route alternatives do exist to USA/Canada. Direct routes
as well as routes via European mainports, secondary airports and finally via USA- (or Canadian hubs) itself.
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Consider first the direct routes. We see the KLAl/Northwest-block (indicated by KL+) as the most important
player on these routes. Their market share in direct connectivity has increased from 52 to 62% (131 out of211
in 1996). But, although still small, the connectivity of United Airlines CLIA)has gone up stronger than the one of
KL+ (18% versus 11% for KL+). The declining share of Delta Airlines (DL), is caused by changes in statistical
registration and not by a declining network quality. For some carriers we find in ABC cases where indirect
connections have been considered as direct connections (indicated as 'plane changes at intermediate stops').
This effect is neglegible if aggregates are considered, but it may show some anomalies if further desaggregations
are analysed. This is the case for Delta Airlines, where we find in 1994 some of those 'plane changes' considered
as direct connections, which have been leR out in 1996.
The routes via European mainports are dominated by British Airways (BA), as may be expected regarding its
geographical location. Nevertheless also the networks of Air France (AF) and Luflhan_ (LH) have a significant
share in these routes. Note finally the role of British Midland Airways (BD), as a niche player on the Amsterdam
- Heathrow route, and acting as a feeder for the USA-carriers as American (AA) in 1994 and United (AA) in
1996.
Furthermore the routes via secondary airports have increased in importance when compared with routes via the
traditional mainports. Particularly connectivity of British Airways (BA) has developed via London Gatwick, due
to congestion at Heathrow.
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Note finally the routes via intercontinental hubs and the significantly increased conenctivity of the KL+/NW-
systerrL W'Rh the 131 direct CNU's, an additional 1121 indirect onward CNU's can be realized. The average
number of onward connections (the 'average onward connectivity') per direct connection of the KL+/NW-
flights to USA/Canada is therefore 8.6. This is an indication of the 'onward connective power' of these flights.
This 'onward connective power' in the USA of the KL/NW-flights may seem high. This figure has indeed gone
up since 1994 fi'om a level of 4.4, but is still small in comparison with these figures for United Airlines (13.4) or
even Delta Airlines (22.1).
The third part of the table adresses 'hub-connectivity'. This refers to connections with European origins that can
be made via the airport, in this case Amsterdam. Direct connections operated out of Amsterdam lead to a total
connectivity level of 3070 CNU's. Flights into Amsterdam t_om other European origins, feeding into those
direct connections, result in an additional 8497 CNU's via Amsterdam. Therefore out of every direct CNU, an
additional (feeding) 2.8 hub CNU's can be realized. So the average number of hub connections (the 'average
hub connectivity') per direct connection of all flights departing _om Amsterdam is therefore 2.8.
Hub connectivity in Amsterdam is most predominant to intercontinental destinations. For intercontinental
destinations the 'average hub connectivity is even 11.9. Out of every direct CNU to intercontinental destinations
11.9 additional hub CNU's can be realized from other European origins (6915 hub CNU's versus 583 direct
CNU's). This is an indication for intensive feeding operations fi'om European origin to intercontinental
destinations. More than 50% of these are originating in regional airports in Western Europe.
The fight part may give an indication of the increase of hub connectivity since 1994. Overall hub connectivity
has increased with 34% yearly, which is high in comparison with the increase of direct connectivity with only
8%. With a relative small increase in the actual network, a much higher increase in hub connections has been
realized, indicating a further intensifying of hub connectivity.
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5. Average Onward and Hub Connectivity
The last part of the connectivity matrix is adressing 'average onward and hub connectivity'. These indicators
have already been defined above, but it is interesting to analyse them somewhat further, as they differ
significantly between the various air services. Consider for instance these figures for the group of 'European
Mainports'. They are analysed more in detail in the next table. Average onward connectivity is 1.9, indicating
that for every direct CNU on the routes from Amsterdam to the three other mainports, an additional 1.9 onward
connectiom can be made from those rnainports.
Connectivityfrom Amsterdam to European Mainpo_.s, 1996
' Connectivi.._. Units .......... Aver_. _ ..........
...................................._ ......................____----_--_ ......... ----r.
Destination ] Carrier Direct _ Onward ! ]]u-l_ Onw I Hub
London Hrow |KLM 531 " 12 .....................[...........0_2.
Z]ZZ]]]ZZZZ]]_]_T.]L_7$-Z?I_,]TfTZ]_@]]ZZZZZ]..........._-,2..i.................
B rM"_ Midl. 591 38 0.6[
i Others 1 i !
......................................[ .................................................I...........r J ..................
....................................,_......................................................._................................................................:- !................
i Others 5! t
Frankfi.u't : KLM 19 _ 3 i 2 0.1 i 0.1
.....[ .............4.......... .........................1..........6- 7..i.................
.......................................i_ ....,, 41 , i
Total i. 297 1 572 I 38 1.9i 0.1
Note however that onward connectivity is exclusively concentrated at those carriers operating at the three
competing hubs, i.e. British Airways in London Heathrow, Air France in Paris CDG and Ltlffhanm in Frankfurt.
On the other hand hub connectivity is exclusively concentrated at the carrier operating in Amsterdam (KLM).
The onward connective power of all Imflhan_ flights from Amsterdam to Fmnkfim is strong, at least for the
cases shown in the table. These flights arriving in Frankfl_ connect very well to the departing Imflhansa (or
code sharing partners) flights from Frankfurt, in _ch a way that on average an additional 6.7 connections can be
made. Note that on the other hand the hub connective power of the KLM flights to Frankfurt is low. This is
caused by the definition of the study area. As stated in the previous paragraphs, we have limited the study to
departing flight from Europe only. For most flights originating anywhere in Europe with final destination in
Frankfurt the maximum perceived travel time is lower than the perceived travel time in case of a transfer in
Amsterdam. Therefore we do find a limited number of KLM-connections in Amsterdam with final destination in
Frankfurt.
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Although we have concluded that average onward connectivity of the _ flights to Frankfurt is high, we
fred much higher averages for other carriers operating on flights out of Amsterdam, as next table may illustrate,
where we have displayed the top-20 air services, as average onward connectivity is concerned. The daily Delta
flight from Amsterdam to Atlanta has the strongest onward connective power. On average 36 onward CNU's
are made. Note also the strong onward connectivity of the KLM/Nortwest system at the three Northwest hubs
Memphis, l_finneapo5s and Detroit. But even in Boston and. Seattle many onward connections can be made.
Connectivity fi'om Amsterdam to selected hubs_ 1996
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In general onward connectivity is concentrated at those carriers operating at competing hubs. Hub connectivity
is concentrated at those carriers operating as _ome-caniers' in the airport itself (in this case KLM in
Amsterdam). We see this confirmed in the previous examples. Therefore most flights have feeds at only one
side: the hub of the operating airline. The exception however is showed by the gI2d/Northwest system. These
transatlantic flights are operated in code-sharing agreements. Onward connections in the USA are made by
Nothwest Airlines and the feed into Amsterdam is made by Kt2vl. Therefore those flights have connections at
both sides, making them attractive for many European origins as well as USA destinations. The
KLM/Northwest-flights to bfmneapolis for instance make on average 28.6 onward connections possible to
USA-destinations in lVlinneapolis as well as 19.6 feeding hub connections out of European origins in
Amsterdam.
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Although the_.ubconnectivepower'oftheKLM/Northwest flighttol¢finneapolismay seem high,we findmuch
higheraveragesfor KLM flightsto other intercontinentaldestinationsout of Amsterdam, as nexttablemay
illustrate.The dailyflighto Bangkok forinstanceshows an averagehub connectivityof even 33.3,indicating
thatfor everyKLM-flight to Bangkok an additional33.3 connectionscan be made from European originsvia
Amsterdam toBangkok. So many arrivalsfrom European originsconnectverycloselyto theflightdepartingto
Bangkok
Conncctivit_ via Amsterdam to selected destinations, 1996
.................................j .....................__ _ u _ A_Ses
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,_-- ! |
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......-:-:.......... - ........................................................................... "1................................................................... i.....................
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................................[.................................................6 3_ I!.....
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Note that these top-20 destinations - as average hub connectivity is concerned - show practically no onward
connectivity, as at these KLM-destinations neither onward KLM/NW-flights, nor onward flights of code-sharing
partnersdo exist.
Note finally that hub connectivity is predominantly concentrated at intercontinental destinations. Perceived travel
times of connections from European origins via Amsterdam (or any European hub) to other European
destinations, are generally too long in relation to the non-stop travel time, at least whem applying the above
defined model. This model may however - as stated before - not be realistic for indirect intra-European
connections, in ease no direct flight is available. Particularly KLM has been succesful in connecting intra-
European flights, but the model is probably attributing too high penalties for tranffer time in these cases.
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6. Condusiom
The analysismade above may have given an impression of the connectivity performance of Amsterdam Airport.
Wehaveshowninthispaperonlytheand)sisforAmsterdam,asthepurposeofthispaperis illustrative.These
analysis however may be shown for any airport in Western Europe. Further on dynamics in connectivity may
fur_er elaborated.
Developing these connecthdty indicators may enable airlines and airports to identify their position in the own
networks and in relation to competing networks. Further research is however necessary. Utility functions have
to be developed further, in order to relate connectivity more closely to actual route choice.
This analysis may be helpful for air_es and airportsin identifying their market position and assessing alternative
marketing strategies. These alternative strategies may be adressed in the framework of emerging alliancies,
codesharing agreements and network globalization. Another application may be to evaluate effectiveness of
rescheduling to improve connectivity.
Air Transport and Regional Economic Development
in the European Union
Brian Graham
(School of Environmental Studies
University of Ulster, Coleraine, N. Ireland, UK BT52 1SA)
The general objective of this paper, which concentrates on scheduled passenger air
services, is to discuss the European Union's (EU) aviation liberalisation policy within
the specific context of the variable economic performances and potentials of regions.
Almost all previous discussions of the actual and potential repercussions of this
policy have been dominated by the interrelated issues of competition and privatisation
(Graham 1995). It is argued here, however, that the patterns of demand within the
EU's air transport network are shaped by economic and social forces external to the
mode, which impact differentially upon - and often constrain - the effectiveness of
aviation liberalisation measures. Although the precise causal relationship between
infrastructural provision and economic development is less than clear, the EU and
individual Member State governments have invested heavily in transport and other
infrastructure as a stimulus to economic growth and to help attract inward investment
to less advantaged regions. Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of this process is
provided by the Trans-European Networks (TENs) being constructed to underpin the
Single European Market (SEM). The Trans-European Transport Network (TETN),
for example, is envisaged as a means of enhancing accessibility and integration, while
harmonising national networks into a macro-network for the EU as a whole, not least
by providing missing connections (often at border locations) and the attempted
elimination of bottlenecks (CEC, 1994a). This initiative, which embraces rail, road,
maritime and air transport modes, is also linked to other EU policies and objectives
being articulated through the Regional Development and Structural Funds, which aim
at socio-economic convergence and cohesion through the reduction of income
inequalities and development disparities between central and peripheral regions and
the promotion of an EU characterised by greater solidarity and social inclusion.
Infrastructure has been a primary recipient of such investment, much of the
expenditure being concentrated in the four poorest countries - Spain, Portugal, Ireland
and Greece.
Simultaneously, however, all transport modes have been subjected - in
varying degrees - to policies of liberalisation. (This term is preferred to deregulation.
which in the EU - as elsewhere - is in fact a misnomer for re-regulation, the
replacement of one set of interventionist rules by another more flexible set.) The
liberalisation of the EU air transport market, completed in April 1997, is perhaps the
most radical such initiative, largely because it has created a Single Aviation Market.
In some contrast, the application of liberalisation measures to other public transport
modes and providers within the EU - particularly rail - remains essentially defined at
the scale of the Member State. The phased introduction of airline liberalisation was
realised through three policy packages, progressively applicable from 1 January 1988,
1 November 1990 and 1 January 1993 : the latter - by far the most fundamental - was
implemented over a four-year .period (Table 1).. The First and Second Packages were
largely concerned with provisions that permitted the liberalisation of intra-European
Community bilateral agreements, the inter-governmental accords that continue to
control capacities and frequencies on many global air transport city-pairs. The Third
Package, however, was very much more radical. In effect, its four-year transition
period has transformed national - or nationally-defined - carriers into Community
airlines. Effective 1 April 1997, all EU carriers have had open access to virtually all
routes within the Union's 15 states (plus Norway and Iceland). This includes full
cabotage - the right to operate eight-freedom domestic services, irrespective of the
airline's home state. The only exceptions are some Public Service Obligation (PSO)
routes, which remain protected from competition (although awarded through
competitive tendering). Many of these serve otherwise remote island communities.
2Additionally, the initial termsof the Third Package abolished the distinction between
scheduled and charter carriers, permitting the latter to re-designate their flights as
scheduled if they so wish. When this has occurred, however, frequencies are too low
to appeal to the business market on which scheduled airlines depend. Consequently,
although some blurring of the distinction has taken place, the Inclusive Tour (IT)
leisure market (charter) remains largely distinct from the scheduled (business and
leisure) segment.
Although the actual provision of air services - excepting only the PSO routes -
is now left to market forces, airports generally remain as state-funded and operated
infrastructure. Although there has been some outright privatisation, most notably in
the United Kingdom (UK), which has pursued an ideologically-driven transfer of
public assets to the private sector, other Member States have opted for more
circumspect public-private arrangements that allow airports to be incorporated within
integrated transport planning while encouraging private investment. Even then,
however, the provision of publicly-funded air transport infrastructure may not
necessarily be commensurate with the provision of enhanced air services, a reflection
of restrictions on demand.
This brief summary of EU aviation policy also serves to demonstrate that no
transport network can be understood or analysed apart from the historical processes,
socio-economic forces and political decisions which created them. Thus, air transport
provision in the EU cannot be 'ring-fenced' as an issue in itself but must be interpreted
through its interactions and interfaces with other aspects of economy and society.
Within this general context, the paper has three precise aims:
• to isolate the potential conflicts and tensions that arguably exist between EU
aviation and economic development policies:
• to discuss the role of air transport in the wider context of the relationships
between transport infrastructure provision and regional economic development:
• conversely, to assess the extent to which wider economic and social
manifestations of regionalisation impact upon the spatial demand for air transport
and its role in the TETN.
Aviation and economic development policies in the EU
Although not necessarily the case, there is ample scope for tensions or conflicts
between the essentially Keynesian ethos and objectives of planned TENs and
cohesion policies, which seek a shared public-private articulation of economic
development, and the neo-liberal advocacy of aviation deregulation. Such tensions
are potentially exacerbated by the obvious differences that exist in the agendas being
followed by DGXVI and DGVII - the European Commission (EC) directorates
dealing respectively with regional policy and transport. The aviation policy is uni-
modal in scope and has consistently allocated a higher priority to liberalisation than to
cohesion, the major goal of regional policy. As argued here, the two objectives are
not necessarily incompatible but there is little evidence that DGVII is prepared to
interpret air transport policy within this wider remit.
Aviation policy depends on the efficacy of market forces in determining the
spatial allocation - or supply - of air transport. Hence - PSO provisions apart - it
consciously eschews any mechanisms to offset the potential disadvantages of neo-
liberal economics readily apparent as incumbent airlines seek to protect their market
positions, largely by adopting strategies that ultimately subvert competition. These
include concentration at hub airports - effectively the establishment of spatial quasi-
monopolies, alliances aimed at extending this control over market areas and perhaps
even predation. The experience of the UK prior to the replacement of national
aviation regulation by EC authority, suggests that the European airline industry can be
made more competitive but, particularly because of imbalances of company size and
restrictions on capacity at the largest airports, the realisation and maintenance of
competition requires continuing regulation, albeit of a different form. In other words,
the consumer benefits from a competitive regime may need protection if they are to
be prolonged beyond the burst of often speculative market entry that inevitably
follows the onset of liberalisation or deregulation. Nevertheless, the interventionist
3role of the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) was markedly down-graded by the
advent of the Single Aviation Market, DGVII being content to regulate air transport
through the enforcement legislation on competition, mergers and predation already
existing in wider EU law. It is increasingly clear, however, that the time-period
required to hear any formal complaints concerning predation, for example, effectively
precludes any such protection being extended to many airline complainants (Airline
Business, May 1997). Again, although hub dominance and alliances may be anti-
competitive, the EC has attempted to intervene only once - in the case of the proposed
British Airways/American Airlines global alliance. Even then, that initiative did not
emanate from DGVII (such external affairs being beyond its direct remit) but from
DGIV, the competition directorate.
To question DGVIrs reliance on open-market competition as virtually the
only mechanism of liberalisation is not to deny the consumer benefits stemming from
enhanced airline competition. The state-owned flag-carriers, for example, often
offered only high-cost, low-frequency services to less advantaged locations, often
combined with poor connections across capital city airports. It remains the case,
however, that consumer benefits from competition - higher frequencies, cheaper fares,
increased connections - are unevenly distributed, an issue which aviation policy fails
to address because it has been conceived and executed in apparent modal and
ideological isolation. Moreover, issues of regional development apart, tensions also
exist between the unquestioned free market ethos of air transport policy and its belief
in the mobility-enhancing effects of the marketand other European objectives
concerned with sustainable development and environmental protection. In a situation
of already scarce airport infrastructure, public opposition to additional runways and
mounting concern over aircraft noise and atmospheric emissions, aviation
liberalisation increases flight movements by enhancing frequencies and connections
but often at the expense of depressed load factors and smaller aircraft. Competition
for high-yield passengers also encourages practices such as business-class cabins on
short-haul flights which, in a wider context, are inherently wasteful because they
depress capacity and load factors, while also leading to the use of larger aircraft to
carry the passenger loads originally catered for in smaller cabins. The cumulative
effect of aviation liberalisation may be to boost demand for scarce infrastructural and
environmental resources to an extent greater than that actually required by aggregate
increases in demand. This is not compatible with the wider notions of sustainability
contained in Article 2 of the Maastricht Treaty.
If we return to the perspective on transport incorporated in regional
development policies and the TETN, it is again apparent that EC strategies are
characterised by differing ideological trajectories. Convergence and cohesion policies
evoke a much more conscious public-private articulation in which market forces are
shaped and constrained by spatial planning. It is assumed that accessibility disparities
are one repercussion of the increasingly complex patterns of spatial polarisation of
economic and social welfare that exists in capitalist countries. Therefore, regional
planning aims at reducing such disparities - the so-called 'access gap', one mechanism
being multi-modal transport complementarity operationalised through inter-modal
interchanges. In this wider C0ntext, a single mode such as air transport can be
visualised only as one element within a much wider mesh of processes through which
transport impacts on economic development, its demand pattern largely established
by that complex. In turn, this underlines the point that liberalisation and the
establishment of a pro-competition regime may not be the key issue in EU air
transport but merely one significant factor among a much larger array of processes.
Regional development, accessibility and EU transport networks
Before addressing these issues, however, it is necessary to elaborate on the very
ambiguous nature of the relationships between air transport and regionalisation in
Europe. Unfortunately, this invokes a succession of rather nebulous and contested
concepts - most notably mobility, accessibility and peripherality, all of which impact
on the spatial patterning and volume of demand for air transport, which consequently
is determined by a complex mesh of interrelated factors, operating at a variety of
different scales. The globaldemandfor air transportis c_deiy determinedby the
dichotomybetweenthemobile (approximately30percentof theworld's population)
and the immobile, denied accessby poverty to air transport and many other
manifestationsof what the Westchoosesto defineasglobal free markets. Demand
for air transport is essentially fixed by Gross Domestic Product (GDP)/capita.
Equally,mobility within theEU alsovariesspatiallybecauseof variationsin wealth.
Conventionally, these have been conceptualisedin terms of centre-periphery
relationshipsalthough- asarguedhere- this is too restrictedaperspectiveto explain
adequatelythecontemporaryheterogeneityof EU regionaldisparities.
At an aggregatescale,DGXVI's document,Europe 2000+ (CEC, 1994b),
which discusses spatial planning in the EUR12 (prior to the accession of Austria,
Sweden and Finland in 1995), divides the EU into a succession of transnational
macro-regions, defined by geographical location and shared socio-economic
characteristics (Figure 1: Table 2). Each of these macro-regions has differing
requirements of air transport, reflecting the complex mesh of factors that -
GDP/capita apart - impact on demand for the mode. These include location,
population density, the extent of urbanisation and market segmentation, the
cumulative effect being the creation of a finely differentiated mosaic of demand
within the broad parameters of the macro-regions. For example, a fragmented low-
density environment obviously provides a potential market for air transport but that
will be translated into actual demand, only if the population - as in the Scandinavian
countries - is sufficiently wealthy to purchase business and leisure mobility. Again,
as less than 30 per cent of scheduled air travel is made for business reasons, there is a
limited potential for low-density routes in less densely populated regions, precisely
because these are likely to be the highest-cost air services. Many are entirely business
oriented, depending on repeated flights by a fixed and often heavily restricted
customer base. Thus demand may well be defined by no more than the distinctive
business attributes of a particular locality.
Over 40 per cent of the EU's population live in the two most wealthy macro-
regions, the Centre Capitals and Alpine Arc. All the principal airport hub systems -
London, Paris, Frankfurt, Amsterdam - and the EU's 'capital', Brussels, are located in
the former region. Together with Switzerland, the Alpine Arc, which is the most
prosperous EU region, generates high density intra-regional air traffic and north-south
connections to the Centre Capitals Region. To the west, conversely, the largely rural
Continental Diagonal has only 5 per cent of the EU's current population. Its largest
conurbations, most notably Madrid and Toulouse, are well integrated into
international airline networks but a substantial number of medium-sized towns
depend on connections provided by regional airlines, which may well be oriented
only to national capital cities. Almost inevitably, Berlin is emerging as the air
transport hub of the New L_inder, the other cities, including Leipzig and Dresden,
sustaining only weakly developed networks. The western Mediterranean - the so-
called Latin Rim stretching from North Italy to Andalusia is increasingly well-
connected by air, not least because of a succession of strong cities stretching from
Venice through Milan, Turin, Nice, Marseille, Barcelona to Mtilaga. Conversely, air
transport in the Central Mediterranean - the Mezzogiorno and Greece - does little
more than connect peripheral cities and islands to Rome/Milan and Athens. The
Atlantic Arc is a diverse macro-region with a large number of airports. Although its
major cities, including Dublin, Nantes, Bordeaux and Lisbon, may be relatively well
connected by air to the major European cities, the links between them are poor,
reflecting the rather obvious conclusion that a shared geographical peripherality does
not generate demand. The North Sea Region sustains a significant number of intra-
regional air services, while its proximity to the Centre Capitals Region ensures that
many regional airports have effective hub connections. Finally, the ultra-peripheral
islands - the Canaries, Azores and Madeira - are heavily dependent on air transport
while Scandinavia is also much more reliant on air transport than is the old Union.
This general pattern of regional variability in air transport demand is rendered
very much more complex by the notion of accessibility, and the inevitable question it
poses: 'accessibility to what, where and by whom?' According to Tolley and Turton
(1995, p. 14), 'the real meaningof mobility or thetrue goal of transportis access'.
Vickerman(1995),who arguesthattheproblemof peripheralityis essentiallyoneof
accessibility, seesthe term aslinking two conceptsat least - locationand market
potential (essentiallypopulation). In Europe 2000+, accessibility is measured in
terms of cost and time rather than distance and it must also be recognised - as in the
PSO provisions of the Third Package - that the access of isolated areas to wider
networks is a basic social equity objective (CEC, 1994b). Other EC documents are
framed in terms of accessibility of firms to factors of production and markets and of
reducing the inaccessibility of disadvantaged peripheral regions to the core,
particularly in terms of time (CEC, 1994c).' There is also accessibility to: Brussels,
the decision-making core of the EU; the national capitals of the individual Member
States; and intercontinental air transport hubs. If an airline is essentially marketing
mobility and accessibility, this diverse array of essentially point-to-point possibilities
reflects a particular conceptualisation of market segmentation. Moreover, these broad
categories of accessibility conceal a far more finely differentiated - even individually
defined - mesh of requirements. Thus a scheduled airline has to patch together what
may be very small increments of accessibility and attempt to aggregate them into - at
bare minimum - a 19-seat commuter aircraft. At this scale, an airline is marketing
accessibility to a sub-market essentially defined by a single individual.
More broadly, however, an airline is marketing not simply point-to-point
manifestations of accessibility but also access to a modal and spatially diffused
transport network. The TETN embraces notions both of inter-modal competition -
although peripheral demand may be insufficient to justify expenditure on duplicated
infrastructure - and multi-modal complementarity, the latter directed at improving
access to an array of networks. Air transport constitutes one such modal element,
partly overlapping with and partly complementing other networks, which is not
necessarily the perspective of DGVII's modally-specific aviation liberalisation policy.
Whatever the scale or mode, any network must contain elements of hub-and-spoke
symmetry, the various modes interconnecting at hubs which are effectively multi-
modal 'mainports' (Nijkamp, 1995). The balance of power in any network - which
must combine point-to-point and transfer traffic - emanates from control of the modal
hub, thereby allowing access to many peripheral places. Ironically, therefore, one
effect of the TETN is to make peripheries more accessible from cores - to the
advantage of the latter. Furthermore, while peripheries are benefiting from the
TETN, so too are the already most privileged regions. For example, although roads
are probably the most important means of enhancing accessibility measures for the
four poorest EU states, the conurbations that will continue to derive maximum
accessibility benefits from improvements in the trans-European road network are
largely located in the Centre Capitals and Alpine Arc Regions (Guti6rrez and Urbano,
1996).
Turning to network characteristics, air transport most closely resembles High-
Speed Trains (HSTs), not least because both modes require relatively large urban
places to generate sufficient demand. They also share in creating new spatial patterns
of accessibility on top of existing road and 'classic' rail networks. Neither offers
continuous accessibility - indeed it is the pattern of restricted access to the respective
networks that constitutes their shared diagnostic factor (Vickerman, 1994). Both HST
and air transport networks also promote corridor effects, accentuating the linkages
between the major urban centres which generate business flows. The EU HST
network, strongly favoured in the TETN for inter-urban passenger transport
(particularly on city-pairs of less than 500 kms), is most likely to enhance
accessibility to mobility within - and to - the Centre Capitals - Alpine Arc axis, while
offering some links to more peripheral places; it has relatively little to offer in terms
of links between peripheries; even if the projected TGV-Sud linking Spain to Northern
Italy is completed (Guti6rrez et al., 1996).
Despite these similarities, however, air transport network characteristics are
theoretically more complex and flexible compared to the HST system. Hub-bypass
air routes - albeit restricted in number - are likely to be much more effective in terms
of time than the classic rail services which feed the HST network. Again air transport
6canservice the hierarchyof coresthatexist within the EU with greaterequalityof
accessthanis trueof theHST networkwhichfavourstheCentreCapitals-Alpine Arc
axis. Furthermore, national cores within the individual Member States are likely to
capture the bulk of regional traffic, airlines can also provide rapid connections, for a
greater number of places, to the competing intercontinental 'mainport' hubs located in
the Centre Capitals Region.
A recognition that the question of accessibility cannot be reduced to a simple
geographical dichotomy of core and periphery is not to deny the spatial polarisation
of economic and social welfare that exists in capitalist states (Dunford, 1993). There
is little prospect that such inequalities are amenable to market solution alone, a
conclusion recognised explicitly in the regional policies adapted by the EU and its
Member State governments. The improvement of transport infrastructure is a
principal strategy of regional development policy, reflecting the assumption that
relative inaccessibility and greater distance costs act as one determinant of relatively
poor peripheral economic performances. In the EU, for example, 25 per cent of the
population live in the largely peripheral Objective 1 regions in which GDP/capita is
less than 75 per cent of the Community average. None the less, despite the capital
expenditure on the TETN, there is no axiomatic cause-effect relationship between
improvements in transport infrastructure and regional economic performance. The
consensus is that infrastructure access is a necessary, although not sufficient,
condition for regional growth and the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).
In a review of the evidence, Vickerman (1994) argues that returns on private
investment at any given location are enhanced by the quality of the infrastructure
which is thus a key determinant of a region's economic potential; economic and
infrastructural development go hand-in-hand (CEC, 1994c).
This conclusion is supported by Chisholm's analysis of Britain and Ireland
(1995), which concludes that their location on the edge of Europe is no intrinsic
economic handicap. Geographically peripheral regions may be disadvantaged but it
is deterministic to argue that this is necessarily so, a number - especially those
possessing fairly well-developed socio-economic infrastructures - having attracted
significant FDI. Chisholm claims that the scheduled air transport industry in the UK
has reacted to what is effectively a spatial decentralisation of wealth by becoming
more dispersed in terms of its operations. Although this latter process is partly
attributable to shortages of airport capacity in the London region, it is also apparent
that expansion of regional services and airports was one repercussion of the controlled
liberalisation of the UK's domestic airline market, which occurred under the aegis of
the CAA prior to the implementation of the Third Package (Graham, 1990; 1994).
This regulatory regime encouraged and indeed protected smaller airlines developing
services between provincial cities and also into the lesser London Area airports, most
notably Stansted. Thus it appears that irrespective of location in terms of core and
periphery, a region's dynamism is the result of the interaction of a whole raft of other
features including: a big, well-equipped city with a strong image; highly educated
population; indigenous small businesses; market access; suitable social climate; and a
supportive and proactive regional authority. Territorial competitiveness also demands
a good infrastructure because although this will 'not provide growth .... the reverse is
also true' (Cuadrado-Roura, 1994, p. 17); there is no possibility of economic growth
without sufficient infrastructural systems. One caveat, however, to this more relaxed
interpretation of loc_ition is that the existence of physical infrastucture networks does
not necessarily off-set psychological perceptions of peripherality, the unarticulated
reasons that might well be implicated in business location and investment decision-
making.
Liberalisation, regionalisation and the demand for air transport
Liberalisation and market entry
The preceding discussion has served to demonstrate that the factors impacting on the
patterning and volume of demand within the EU's air transport network are more
complex than might at first be thought. It is perhaps most convincing to view air
transport as one enabling factor in regional development, overlapping with other
transport modes and their networks to enhance or diminish territorial competitiveness.
The function of the TETN is largely to integrate and maximise the cumulative effects
of these networks. Potentially the single greatest weakness in DGVII's policy on air
transport results from the failure to place the liberalisation measures within this wider
context, which determines demand and also constrains the possibilities for
competition. The insistence that air transport be treated in a uni-modal fashion
ignores the multi-modal complementarity of the EU's transport network and may well
be one reason for what Caves (1994, p.30) refers to as the 'regulatory capture' of
transport planning by the rail lobby. Thus the only major aviation investment within
the TETN is the reconstruction of Milan Malpensa, which will replace Linate as
Northern Italy's principal airport during 1998. The HST system is publicly funded
and is thus regarded as unfair competition to an airline industry that relies on private
investment, albeit while frequently using public-sector infrastructure. However, the
more important equity issue may be that investment in HST systems are unlikely to
contribute as much to cohesion as, for example, an enhanced road network or
improvements in classic train networks within the disadvantaged regions.
Therefore, it can be argued that the emphasis on liberalisation of a single
mode and the unchallenged, unqualified dependence on market forces alone has
diminished the importance of air transport in the TETN which is - if nothing else - a
major exercise in spatial planning. Arguably, this reflects another form of 'regulatory
capture' in which DGVII has moved too close to the laissez-faire ethos of most of the
major players and sectional interests in the air transport industry. Aviation policy is
for airlines; HST strategies are located in a much broader socio-economic realm. The
ideological determinism of aviation policy is compounded by evidence that
liberalisation has only limited powers in altering patterns of demand, which are
largely fixed by factors that have nothing directly to do with air transport.
Competition will increase volume of demand - particularly if there are low-cost
entrants - but largely within the pre-existing geographical parameters, thereby
enhancing the congestion problems already characteristic of the air transport
infrastructure in the most advantaged regions.
Given these important caveats, several studies have shown that consumers are
realising advantages from enhanced airline competition, but only when an airport - (or
perhaps) city-pairing is served by at least three carriers engaged in head-to-head
competition (British Midland Airways, 1996: CAA, 1993; 1995). These benefits
include lower and more flexible fares, improved frequencies, enhanced service levels
and more extensive connection possibilities. The same analyses suggest that in the
event of a route being served by only two carriers, these will operate as a duopoly. In
1996, however, of 520 airport-pairings within the EU, only 31 (6 per cent) were
served by more than two airlines (although these did incorporate the densest routes).
Almost two-thirds of airport-pairings (64 per cent) were operated as monopolies,
although this total includes a large number of low-density routes unlikely to support
competition (CEC, 1996). Nevertheless, as Table 3 indicates, the gradual
implementation of the Third Package since 1993 has had very little aggregate impact
on the extent of competition. Where this does occur, there have been tariff
reductions, especially on economy-class tickets, but elsewhere, fares have risen to an
extent adjudged sufficiently excessive for DGVII to threaten regulatory intervention.
It is inevitable that consumer benefits related to fares are largely confined to the
densest and most competitive airport- and city-pairs. The period since 1993 has also
been characterised by a wave of market entry, mostly by small airlines or charter
carriers converting their products into scheduled services. It is estimated that 80 new
airlines began services between 1993-96 but DGVII has also identified 60 companies
(not necessarily the same) which failed during the same period (CEC, 1996, ii-iii).
Entrants into the scheduled EU passenger air transport market can follow one
of three strategies. First, by far the most difficult option is to compete head-to-head
with incumbents on airport- or city-pairings, market entry being essentially
conditional on a sufficient density of traffic to support competition although there is
evidence that this will in turn help grow the market. Examples include many of the
domestic and European routes operated by London Heathrow-based British Midland
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Norwegiancarrier,BraathensSAFE,whichcompeteswith SAS ona numberof city-
pairs and AOM French Airlines, which challengesGroupe Air France on some
domestic services.
Secondly, some carriers have followed the aggressive US-style low cost/'low-
no frills' concept, originally pioneered by Southwest Airlines, and now adopted by a
plethora of US market entrants. (The ValuJet analogy was hastily abandoned
following the Florida DC-9 crash in 1996.) Carriers such as Dublin-based Ryanair,
Virgin Express at Brussels and easyJet at Luton may compete with major airlines on
inter-state city-pairings but often use lesser airports close to major cities. For
example, Ryanair depends heavily on Stansted and Luton (for London), while also
serving lightly-used airports such as Prestwick (for Glasgow), Bournemouth (for
south-east England) and Charleroi (for Brussels). Such airlines, essentially low-fare,
point-to-point operators, dependent on low costs and high capacity, may effectively
be competing with more conventional transport modes - classic rail, ferry and long-
distance coach - as much as incumbent airlines. Their expansion demonstrates that
price can create markets, albeit largely located within the regions already most
densely served by existing carriers. However, Ryanair - if it can sustain its present
hectic expansion - has significantly enhanced Ireland's air transport linkages,
especially with the UK. The carrier is also set to exploit the cabotage provisions of
the liberalisation legislation by developing routes unrelated to Ireland.
Finally, by far most prolific mode of market entry under the liberalisation
regime is to identify a market niche serving a particular airport and/or region. Some
carriers have established credible operations by monopolising under-utilised airports.
Examples include Maersk Air at Billund, the KLM subsidiary, Air UK, at London
Stansted and Jersey European Airways at (confusingly) Belfast City. Again, low-
density, short-haul regional traffic is an attractive market segment for air transport,
particularly if it avoids HST competition (Caves, 1994). Many of these routes are too
thin to support more than one carrier and they may also be high-cost, reflecting their
dependence on a limited business market. The European Regions Airline Association
(ERA) adopts functional criteria to define its member carriers, which essentially
operate three types of route: a regional city-hub connection; a non-hub domestic city-
pairing; a non-hub inter-state route. It is the latter two categories which can be
described as hub-bypass routes. Regional airlines require spatially-defined niche
markets, preferably sheltered from competition by geography and/or demand. They
account for the majority of EU city-pair air services but their routes - largely aimed at
high-yield business passengers - are generally monopolies, characterised by high
fares, the higher costs of operating smaller aircraft (typically between 19-70 seats)
and load factors averaging little more than 50 per cent. However, business markets
benefit from the enhanced regional accessibility created by this particular
manifestation of liberalisation, albeit at a cost. The more extensive provision of hub-
bypass routes between regional cities, whether within a state or the EU as a whole, is
constrained by a lack of demand and the intense competition facing regional airlines
from terrestrial transport modes. Ireland, however, by virtue of being an island, is one
exception, liberalisation having helped promote an increasingly dense mesh of routes
serving regional cities in Britain.
Regionalisation and the spatial patterning of demand
In assessing the geographical pattern of demand, it should be remembered that air
transport simultaneously caters for transfer and point-to-point traffic, both within the
SEM but also - it must be strongly emphasised - the individual Member State
transport networks. Although the TETN will integrate and harmonise these more
effectively, national flows and networks still remain dominant, their configuration
largely dictated by existing patterns of economic development, population and
urbanisation. The essentially fixed nature of the pattern - if not the volume - of
demand can be demonstrated by integrating data on airport passenger throughput into
the macro-regions discussed above. As part of the TETN, the EC has attempted to
delineate a trans-European airport network, forged from the array of disparate
9national systems of the individual Member States (CEC, 1994d). Although
essentiallya statementof intent rather thana policy aimed at rationalisingairport
usage,thisstrategydefinesahierarchicaltriadof networkcomponents:
• 'Communityconnectingpoints'(> 5mpassengers/annum)unitetheEUnetworkto
therestof theworld;
• 'regionalconnectingpoints'(lm - 5mpassengers/annum)link differentregionsof
the EU and accessthe international services provided by the Community
connectingpoints;
• 'Accessibility points' (250,000 - lm passengers/annum)join more remote
locationsto thehigher-orderairports.
In terms of analysis,however, this schemeis rather too generalisedto provide a
sufficiently discriminatingregionalisationof airports. The presentanalysisdivides
EU airportsinto a seven-foldclassification,definedboth by function andpassenger
throughput(Figure2; Table4).
The principal intercontinentalhubsandairport systemsareall locatedin the
CentreCapitalsmacro-region,thecontinuousurbancore thatcontains25 percentof
the EU's population. The five airport systems(including Brusselswhich is more
important as the centre of the EU than an intercontinentalhub) generatea dense
weaveof domesticandfeederconnectionsto othercities throughoutthecontinentof
Europe. No lessthan45 percentof passengersat Frankfurt aretransferringflights,
comparedwith 40percentatAmsterdamand30percentat LondonHeathrow,which
is the most importantintercontinentalhub. The London airport system(Heathrow,
Gatwick, Stansted,Luton and City) handlesthe largestnumberof passengersand
supportsthehighestnumberof connections,althoughAmsterdamSchipholis thebest
connectedsingleairport (Table5). Thereis,however,surprisingly limited potential
for inter-city air transportwithin this regionbecauseof road,HST andevenclassic
traincompetition. Moreover,thehubsalsocreateshadoweffectsthatresultin more
distantcities enjoying superioraccessin termsof time thando closerlocations. Of
the 94 agglomerationsof >300,000populationin the EUR12 (thepre-1995Union),
45 do not haveanairport handlingin excessof 1.5m passengers(1995figures);no
lessthan25of theseare locatedwithin theCentreCapitalsRegion. However,all are
includedin thetop40agglomerationsfor HSTaccess(Guti6rrezet al., 1996).
The airports serving free-standing metropolitan regions are variously located
in the Continental Diagonal, Alpine Arc, North Sea Region, Scandinavia and the
Mediterranean. They serve to extend and intensify the tight core of hubs into an
essentially Y-shaped axis that stretches from Rome in the south to Manchester in the
north-west and Helsinki in the north-east; Madrid is the solitary outlier to this pattern.
These airports may act as the cores of networks serving domestic and EU
destinations, few agglomerations of >300,000 population in this wider central axis not
being served by their own airports. The metropolitan airports are also effectively
interconnected with each other and to the Centre Capitals hubs. This reflects the
corridors of business traffic within the most dynamic regions of the EU but also the
substantial leisure and conference traffic generated by the largest cities, many of
which are tourism attractions in their own right. Finally, all the airports in this
category (Hamburg and Barcelona excepted) support some direct intercontinental
services, Rome, Milan, Madrid Copenhagen and Zurich being particularly important
in this regard.
The major regional airports handling between 3.0 and 6.5 million passengers
per annum are located in much the same economic regions, serving to intensify the Y-
shaped pattern while barely altering its geographical integrity; the inclusion of
Glasgow and Edinburgh extends it northwards a little while Lyon, Marseilte and
Toulouse widen it slightly westwards. These airports are relatively well-connected, if
less to each other than to the core hubs and metropolitan regions. They can support
some hub-bypass routes and are likely to generate dense domestic city-pairs unless
there is HST competition. However, it is very difficult for these airports to sustain
any developed intercontinental services; the only exceptions largely stem from the
fragmentation of trans-Atlantic services resulting from liberalisation of the various
Member State bilaterals with the United States and the widespread use of long-haul
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twin-jets. Otherwise,theaccessibilityadvantagesof themajorregionalairportsmore
generally accrue from competitive, duplicated feeder connections to the
intercontinentalhubs. For example,in additionto Paris,Niceis currentlyconnected-
on anat leastoncedaily basis- to no lessthan14otherEuropeancitiesofferingsome
form of accessto long-haulair services.
In total, theseinitial threecategoriesof airportessentiallydefinetheprimary
patterning of demand within the EU. It is fixed by the distribution of cities,
populationdensityandwealthandis unlikely to changesignificantly. Theremaining
categoriesareeitherperipheralto this distributionor serveto intensify it furtherby
occupyingthe intersticesbetweenthe largerairports. Thethreeairportsservingthe
relatively isolated (from therest of theEU) peripheralcorecities - Athens, Dublin
and Lisbon - act as centres for local feeder traffic generated by the peripheral
peripheries and islands. They have very limited intercontinental linkages defined
either by the geographies of empire (Lisbon) or emigration, but support reasonable - if
often low-frequency - services to most of the major airports in the European core.
Dublin, however, is particularly dependent on linkages across London, reflecting a
demographic hinterland too limited to support more direct services. Although islands
are hypothetically the most isolated locations (and may have only limited scheduled
air services linking them to the national capital), a number of island airports - the two
most important being Palma de Mallorca and Gran Canaria - support dense leisure-
oriented services. In development terms, however, these are entirely focused on in-
bound tourism and have no other business function.
Although airports serving secondary regional cities continue to intensify the
dominance of the north-south Y-axis, their locations are also more diverse, being
scattered throughout the Mediterranean, Atlantic Arc, Continental Diagonal and New
L_inder. Traffic is largely domestic with some intra-EU - mostly hub-feed - routes;
only rarely are these airports connected to each other. Finally, local airports are
located everywhere although there is a preponderance of locations that are at some
distance from national cores. As their services are largely domestic, they are very
rarely linked to each other but - as with KLM/Air UK feeder services between several
British local airports and Amsterdam - may occasionally access hubs outside their
home states.
The impact of liberalisation on the spatiaI pattern of demand
Thus, despite the evidence of market entry, a curiously static picture is beginning to
emerge, one that supports the hypothesis that the effectiveness of the more
competitive regime imposed by liberalisation is itself constrained by other socio-
economic processes. The preceding discussion implies that the most valuable
linkages, especially for the smaller regional and local airports, are those to a hub
because that maximises potential connections. Effectively, liberalisation has allowed
the major carriers located in the Centre Capitals hubs and - to a lesser extent - at some
of the metropolitan region airports to further consolidate and refine their formerly
nationally-oriented networks into trans-European hub-feed systems. Increasingly,
they use their own lower-cost subsidiaries, such as KLM CityHopper or Lufthansa
CityLine, for these purposes, together with regional airline affiliates and franchisees
(low[er]-cost carriers offering the branded service of the major airline). The
operations of regional carriers are increasingly being integrated into the networks of
the largest companies, it now being difficult to find an example of a fully independent
regional airline of any substance. DGVII views such developments as evidence of
another form of competition - that between overlapping networks across the entire EU
and this may indeed prove to be one of the most profound outcomes of the
implementation of the Single Aviation Market. This trend is being accentuated by the
TETN, which designates the most important airports as high-speed inter-modal
interchanges served by HSTs. Major non-capital cities such as Lyon, Nice and
Barcelona - already well-connected - are thus increasingly more effectively linked -
perhaps by several modes - to a succession of 'mainport' hubs; others, however,
remain dependent on the primary link to the national capital for any connecting
services. This is particularly true in southern Europe where weaker economies and
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the continued hegemonyof nationalcarrierscombine to limit the demandfor air
transport.
In order to assessfurther the interaction between this manifestationof
competitionand the patterningof demand,changesin hub connectionsduring the
implementationof the Third Packagebetween1993and 1997were recordedfor a
sampleof airports drawn from the variouscategoriesand regionsdiscussedabove
(Table6). A clearpatternemergesfrom this data,onethat confirms theessentially
staticspatialpatternof air transportdemand.Surprisingly,perhaps,althoughit does
confirm the feelingsof manycommentatorsthat the completionof liberalisationin
1997is unlikely to producemanyfurthersubstantialserviceinnovations,themajors
having moved already to take advantageof the legislative changes,there were
relatively few changesin thepatternof accessto hubsoutsidethehomestate. The
principal trendhasbeeneitheraretention or evenincrease- in theimportanceof the
national capital, saving Lyon where the Paris route has been underminedby
competitionfrom TGV Sud-Est. Indeed, across the sample - Lyon excepted - almost
all the increases in hub connections can be attributed to additional frequencies serving
national capitals.
Clearly this trend directly reflects the competition which has followed
domestic liberalisation in Spain, France and - to a lesser extent - Italy. In Spain, for
example, the leisure carriers, Spanair and Air Europa, have entered the domestic
market in competition with the Iberia group, while French domestic trunk routes,
especially those between Paris, Marseille, Nice and Toulouse, are viciously contested
by Groupe Air France, AOM and the (soon-to-be-merged) BA subsidiaries, Air
Libert6 and TAT European Airlines. However, the growth in domestic air traffic
should not be attributed solely to competition but to the interaction of liberalisation
with EU spatial planning strategies which - since 1989 - have seen substantial
infrastructural investment (including regional airports), particularly in Objective 1
regions. In the Atlantic Arc, for example, cities are now much better connected to
their national capitals than was formerly the case. This may represent an important
gain in accessibility because the key problem for many disadvantaged regions lies in
deficient internal transport Systems, rather than inter-reg]onaI networks (CEC, 1994c).
The increasing volume of air services linking major regional cities to their respective
capitals, also reflects the enduring importance of national markets within the Single
Aviation Market. Much of this traffic will be point-to-point, reflecting the continuing
national orientation of business linkages, but it is also the case that language,
familiarity, travel agency practices and costs may all combine to favour domestic
hubs for connections.
As observed above, low-density, short-haul is another market opportunity that
has been encouraged by liberalisation. Table 7 includes a comparison between 1993
and 1997 of the services offered by a sample of regional airports. Once again, in
general terms, the relatively static pattern exhibited by the other data is repeated. The
feeder systems to the Centre Capitals hubs are already in place and are unlikely to
change much in terms of pattern - although the airlines might as the majors seek ways
of lowering costs. Apart from Lyon, Barcelona and Nice, there were only minor
increases in the number of routes although there is some evidence of additional
frequencies. The most dramatic exception to this was at Clermont-Ferrand,
developed as a hub by the French carrier, R6gional Airlines, to connect Bordeaux,
Nantes and several lesser western French cities to a variety of destinations including
Basle, Geneva, Turin and Milan. Clermont-Ferrand apart, domestic connections
remained static, an inertia that again points to the finite geographical limits on
markets, irrespective of liberalisation.
Although R6gional Airlines has underlined the possibilities for hub-and-spoke
operations - not a strategy as yet widely emulated by other regional carriers - Table 7
suggests that, in general terms, the most promising regional markets are developing
only where a number of strong cities are located within a specific geographic region
at some distance from the Central Capitals Region. This geographical configuration
is necessary to generate sufficient business traffic to support inter-state hub-bypass
routes. The string of cities along the Latin Rim axis of the western Mediterranean
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forms onesuchopportunity. As Figure3 demonstrates,a sampleof 9 airportsshows
a sustainedincreasefrom 30 non-stopweekdayservicesfrom 30 in 1993to 80 in
1997. The expansionhasnot beenevenly spread,the principal beneficiaries,not
surprisingly,beingthethreelargestairports- Milan (LinateandMalpensa),Barcelona
andNice. Much of this growthin servicecanbeattributedto theestablishmentof an
east-west hub at Nice by the largest French regional carrier, Air Littoral
(supplementedby a north-southdomestic hub at Montpellier). This initiative
providesagoodexampleof thewaysin which air transportcaninteractwith regional
developmentpolicies and wider spatial planning in the EU becausethe mode is
clearly enhancingintra-regionalaccessibility,particularlyin termsof time,albeit to a
restrictedbusinessmarket. However,the demandgeneratedby the evenly-spaced
distribution of strong cities along the Latin Rim is a patternnot easily replicated
elsewherein the EU. For example,air servicesbetweenthe major cities of the
Atlantic Arc display a muchweakerpatternof growth (Table 8). Excepting the
addition of low-frequencyconnectionsbetweenBordeaux,Bilbao, PortoandLisbon,
the routepatternhasremainedlargelystaticanddomestic(or quasi-domesticin the
caseof Republicof Ireland-UK services). The contrast between the Latin Rim and
the Atlantic Arc points to one of air transport's principal limitations in supporting
regional development. While point-to-point access to the national capital and some
other major cities can be readily enhanced, the development of access to a network
not focused on a national capital or Centre Capitals hub, requires a high threshold
urban population.
Conclusions
As the evidence of the Latin Rim demonstrates, liberalisation does help produce
significant benefits for airlines - and by implication, regional development policies -
because it allows them to grow operations and run them more efficiently, albeit often
in collaboration with regional authorities or governments which, for example, are
providing necessary intrastructural investment and incentives to start new routes.
However, liberalisation in itself cannot ensure such outcomes because it is
constrained by other factors - the geography of population, production, urbanisation
and wealth - which are entirely external to air transport but create the spatial
patterning of demand for the mode and restrain its potential volume. Consequently,
as argued here, despite the evidence of growth in particular - especially regional and
domestic - markets, there is a very considerable degree of inertia in the patterning of
demand for air transport within the EU. The volume will increase but necessarily
largely within existing geographical parameters.
Despite the ambiguities of the evidence and the difficulties in defining
accessibility, transport infrastructure - including airline services - is clearly necessary
for regional development. To reiterate, there is no possibility of economic growth
without sufficient infrastructural systems. However, transport infrastructure requires
heavy sunk costs and it is unlikely that these will be borne by the private sector.
Thus, duplication of modes may be wasteful, which underscores the necessity of
viewing transport, nor merely as a succession of independent modes and networks,
but as an integrated complex of networks. Furthermore, the relationship between
transport and economic development works the other way. The primary influence on
the patterning of demand for air transport is not liberalisation but spatial disparities in
economic development.
This implies that the preoccupation with liberalisation per se may not
necessarily be to the wider or even long-term advantage of the EU air transport
industry. It encourages the decidedly unhealthy mindset that regards air transport as a
closed system and which produces projected growth figures that are not sustainable,
given airport capacity restrictions. Even if these constraints were to be overcome -
and there is no evidence of the political will to so do one would have to question the
financial, environmental and welfare costs of an unconstrained competitive air
transport market. Inevitably, because air transport imposes its costs upon those who
may not be directly using the mode, the European airline industry - together with
other transport modes - will have to accept constraints on competition. It is doing this
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on its own behalf anywaythroughthe plethoraof alliances, franchisesand code-
shares found throughout the EU. After all, to quote Sir Michael Bishop,
'Liberalisationmeansfreedomto makemoney,not burn it' (The Observer, 11 May
1997).
These qualifications of the effects of liberalisation raise significant questions
concerning the EU's air transport strategy. It must be recognised that this is markedly
ideological in its commitment to the free market; cabotage, for example, is essentially
a political rather than practical statement. The difficulty is that in a transport context
of multi-modal complementarity and inter-modal competition within the overall
parameters of the TETN, DGVII's air transport policy has failed in demonstrating any
clearly articulated role for the mode. Furthermore, this ensures that it can be
somewhat marginal - even the mode of last resort - within the wider spatial planning
policy initiatives aimed at cohesion and convergence. Assuming sufficient demand,
air transport does have a role to play in these strategies, most notably in connecting
peripheral cities to Centre Capitals airport hubs and other business centres. However,
it is doubly disadvantaged by the apparent duality of regulatory capture identified
here - that of the TETN by the HST lobby and DGVII's Air Transport Policy Section's
commitment to liberalisation at the expense of all else. At the precise historical
moment when the pendulum to liberalisation and the free market seems to have
swung as far as it is going, the EU air transport industry and its regulator have jointly
distanced themselves from the policy initiatives most likely to influence the spatial
patterning of wealth in the EU.
In essence, it is not surprising that the TETN allocates priority to roads and
HSTs. Airline competition can clearly produce benefits for consumers and suppliers
but the inter-linked concepts of an integrated regional planning and the TETN require
continuity of provision of service. Apart from the PSO provisions and wider EU law
already shown as inadequate due to the extreme slowness in processing complaints
- there is no mechanism within air transport policy to protect the maintenance of the
benefits of competition. The free market is not necessarily the most appropriate
mechanism to achieve this aim, given that the very function of unconstrained
competition in a capitalist economy is the eradication of competitors and the
establishment quasi-monopolies over supply and market areas. Thus it is not a
question of deregulation but of re-regulation, the replacement of the unnecessarily
anti-competitive, protectionist devices of the past by a more flexible form of
regulation which recognises that - in terms of regional development - air transport has
social equity as well as economic dimensions. It is ironic too that the primary factor
impacting on demand and market opportunities in EU air transport - the public
transport mode most oriented towards free-market ideas - is the success of
interventionist spatial planning aimed at inducing socio-economic convergence within
the Union.
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Table 1. The three EC air transport liberalisation packages.
1 Implemented from ili.88 Allowed multiple designation, fifth-freedom
2 Implemented from 1.11.90
rights, automatic approval of discount fares;
double disapproval rule applied to full fares in
Second Package.
3 • Implemented from 1.1.93 - final implementation 1.4.97
Permits
• free pricing on all fares
• full access to all routes including cabotage
• abandonment of distinction between charter and scheduled carriers
• Protection for routes designated as public service obligations
• EC retention of right to intervene against excessive fares, predatory pricing and
seat dumping
Source: Graham, 1995.
Table 2. EUR12 Macro-Regions.
Region Land Area %age EUR 12
population 1991
GDP/capita (1991
in PPS, EUR12= 100)
Centre Capitals 11.2 25.9 116
Alpine Arc 12.6 15.9 122
Continental Diagonal 18.8 6.0 87
New L_inder 4.7 4.6 33
Latin Rim 12.9 11.0 91
Cent. Mediterranean 9.8 8.4 62
Atlantic Arc 21.1 13.5 80
North Sea 8.4 13.4 99
Source: CEC, 1994b.
Table 3. Effects of the Third Package on competition; Community routes (airport to
airport)
Routes Jan. 1992 Jan. 1993 Jan. 1994 Jan. 1995
No. % No. % No. % No. %
Jan. 1996
No. %
Total 510 - 488 482 - 522 518 -
Monopoly 283 56 296 61 318 66 342 66 329 64
2 carriers 208 40 182 37 150 31 154 29 158 30
> 2 carriers 19 4 10 2 14 3 26 5 31 6
Source: CEC, 1996.
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Table 4. Classification of EUR15 airports (plus Switzerland and Norway) by regional
function.
Category Passenger throughput Number
(1995) (million pax)
Intercontinental hubs
Airports serving free-standing
metropolitan regions
Major regional airports
Airports serving peripheral core cities
Airports serving leisure destinations
Secondary regional airports
Local airports
12.0 - 83.0 6
7.0 - 22.0 15
3.0- 6.5 13
6.0- 10.5 3
1.0- 15.0 13
1.0 - 3.0 36
Less than 1.0 90
Source: Airports reporting to ACI, Geneva, 1997.
Table 5. Intercontinental hubs (daily non-stop connections).
Airport system Passengers 1995
(million)
EU destinations
(plus Switzerland
and Norway), Jan. 1997
Domestic
destinations
Jan. 1997
London _ 83.3 74 14
Paris 2 55.1 55 45
Frankfurt 38.2 46 15
Amsterdam 25.4 68 4
Brussels 12.6 56 -
1 Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Luton and City
2 Charles de Gaulle (Roissy) and Orly
Source: OAG Flight Planner.
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Table6. Connectionsto hubs,1993-7.
City 1993
Total %agehome Total
hub
1995
%agehome
hub
Total
1997
%agehome Inc
hub 1993-7
Lyon 30 33 32 78 40 30 33
Toulouse 28 68 32 75 64 78 129
Leipzig 10 40 9 66 8 75 (-20)
Barcelona 66 48 78 56 108 56 64
Nice 51 55 55 56 61 59 20
Thessaloniki 3 2 2
Naples 7 29 9 44 12 58 71
Catania 8 100 9 100 9 100 12
Belfast 19 89 27 96 26 96 37
Sevilla 10 80 8 88 5 100 (-50)
Newcastle 18 78 20 70 21 67 17
Source:OAG Flight Planner.
Table7. Regionalservices,1993-7
City EU Connections(plusSwitzerland,Norway)
1993 1997
DomesticConnections
1993 1997
Lille 1 0
Rotterdam 3 7
Lyon 11 15
Toulouse 7 9
Leipzig-Halle 5 2
Barcelona 26 31
Nice 15 20
Thessaloniki 6 6
Naples 4 5
Catania 0 0
Belfast 2 1
Santiagode 0 2
Compostela
Zaragoza 0 0
Billund 7 12
Newcastle 5 8
Venice 12 12
Verona 3 4
Clermont- 2 4
Ferrand
11 12
1
24 23
11 12
15 13
23 25
16 20
1 1
10 10
8 10
16 17
3 6
1 2
1 1
6 9
6 6
4 4
6 14
Source:OAG FlightPlanner.
Table8. Atlantic Arc airports,1993-97.
t_
Glasgow - - 3
Dublin 3 6
Cardiff 3 3 1
Nantes - -
Bordeaux - -
Bilbao
Porto
Lisbon
Total 6 9 4
Source:OAG Flight Planner.
_2 Z
6 3 3 -
1 1 -
1 -
2
7 4 4 2
t'_ £.2
.... 6 9
.... 4 7
.... 4 4
2 3 - - 2 3
- - 1 - - 1 2 5
- 1 - 1 - 2 0 4
- - 1 - 13 15 3 16
1 1 2 13 15 - 13 18
3 2 5 0 4 13 16 13 18 44 :66
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Introduction:
In April 1997, the liberalization of air transport within the
European Union enters its final phase, in which carriers will be
free to operate between all airports within the Union, and
particularly on routes within Member-States. This change is
potentially as radical in its implications as airline deregulation
was in the US, although it mainly entails the opening of new
markets to all airlines, rather than the removal of general
regulatory controls on routes and pricing as was the case in the
US.
This paper examines, using the air transport case, the
complicated interaction between deregulation (in fact, variable and
asymmetrical deregulation across several markets), economic
(represented by the establishment of the Single
Market), and corporate strategy (expressed in the responses of
European carriers to the challenges facing many service
industries).
A major difficulty in writing such a paper is that it involves
connecting debates that are usually conducted in isolation from
each other.
Deregulation is usually discussed in relation to its domestic
implications, rather than to its implications for international
trade. Although discussion of deregulation sometimes involves
looking at the responses of an industry, such discussion typically
does not lead to a more detailed examination of particular firms,
and therefore does not deal with the problem of why firms react
differently to regulatory changes. Moreover, argument about
deregulation usually stops at the shoreline: it does not concern
itself much with the consequences of deregulation for international
trade. This is frustrating in the case of the airline industry
(and many others) because they have stakes in several markets, and
changes in the regulatory regime in one market may create
opportunities or problems for their operations in others.
Arguments about economic integration commonly involve (at
least in the case of the EU) much commentary on the meaning and
implications of legal texts and cases. Otherwise, they typically
involve assertions of a macroeconomic sort concerning the broader
gains in efficiency (and consumer choice) arising from the
establishment of an enlarged, single market. Again, scholars (and,
indeed, many policy-makers) do not seem to be very interested in
how public policy affects the behavior of firms - specifically, how
economic integration (accompanied by deregulation and sometimes
privatization) changes the parameters of corporate strategizing,
alters the competitive balance between firms, and reshapes their
views about the development and marketing of goods and services.
Again, this broad approach leads to neglect of the interesting
issue of differences in the responses of individual firms facing a
similar set of threats and opportunities.
Such lack of interest is strange in view of the liberal
ideology informing the hopes for and justification of economic
integration. A policy intended to liberate the market might be
expected to stimulate an interest in how business is responding,
since the success of the policy is in the hands of firms and their
customers. Psychologically speaking, it is as if there is an
unconscious residue of "public sector" thinking in EU policy-
making: Brussels has legislated a free market and so the only
remaining issue is to ensure that private businesses "implement"
the free market properly. It is as if firms are surrogate public
agencies.
Writing about corporate strategy and competitiveness does seem
to recognize the likely impact of deregulation (including
differential deregulation). However, there is a disciplinary and
professional gap between the constituencies of writers on public
policy and those of writers on business strategy that leads to the
latter mainly addressing themselves to the "internal" issues of
corporate strategy - internal to particular industries and firms.
There is less of a constituency (or perhaps there is an under-
served constituency) for more analytic writing on how the processes
of deregulation and economic integration affect each other and
interact with specific processes of corporate strategy-making and
implementation.
In trying to make a connection between deregulation, economic
integration and corporate strategy, the basic questions seem to be:
- at 9 "macro" level:
(a) How does economic integration affect corporate strategy
and the constraints and incentives facing particular industries?
(b) How does deregulation (or "liberalization") affect the
shaping of corporate strategy, the role, powers and problems of
government, and relations between government and business?
(c) How do corporate strategy and its consequences feed back
into public arguments about the wisdom and future course of
integration and deregulation?
- at a sectoral level:
(d) How is the establishment of a single market affecting the
parameters of corporate strategy and the pursuit of competitive
advantage in the European air transport industry?
(e) How does the liberalization of operations and marketing
provided for by the Third Package affect the parameters of
corporate strategy for European airlines?
(f) What kinds of public policy issues are likely to arise as
the industry responds to integration and liberalization?
- _t _ firm-sp_Gific level:
(g) How are particular firms (and types of firm) in the
industry affected by the establishment of a single market? To what
extent and in what ways does the latter create opportunities for
some firms and obstacles for others?
(h) How does liberalization affect the "life chances" of
particular firms (and types of firms) differentially? How does it
increase the opportunities for some firms, while intensifying and
multiplying the problems facing others?
One paper cannot deal with all of these questions. This paper
deals mainly with the question of how the establishment of the
Single Market and liberalization of air transport markets are
affecting the parameters of corporate strategizing and, especially,
how they are causing a differentiation between firms. Some firms
are expanding their ambitions, while others are retrenching and
withdrawing. But all are being forced to consider how they will
survive and where they will fit in an integrated and liberalized
market.
Air transport as a regul_d service industry:
The absurdity of divorcing discussion of public policy from
discussion of corporate strategy is especially clear in the case of
air transport. It is an industry that has been highly regulated
(both domestically and internationally) since policy-makers first
conceived the notion of "air space" and contemplated its possible
uses. It is also (therefore) an industry in which influencing,
accommodating to, bypassing, and abolishing regulatory regimes play
a significant part in corporate strategy. Therefore defining the
nature of the sector also involves describing the nature and impact
of regulation.
Air transport is a service industry because when you buy a
seat from an airline, you cannot (or shouldn't) remove the seat
when leaving the plane. The industry is not one of those service
industries that can export its services abroad: it is one that
requires a high degree of interaction between customer and service
provider (you have to go to the plane to use the seat). I To the
extent that it "exports" and trades, it must do so by providing the
service abroad - through actual establishment in each foreign
market. Cross-border transactions occur in the form of aircraft
crossing frontiers and (financially) in the form of investments
required to sustain the offering of services abroad and remittance
of revenue generated by the sale of services abroad. To the extent
that "trade" occurs, it takes the form of foreign exchange
transactions rather than that of the dispatch of a commodity.
Thus, liberalization of this kind of service trade hinges not
on the process of trading itself, but rather (as Dicken points out)
on "the conditions under which providers of services are permitted
to establish an actual direct or indirect presence in a specific
national market." Liberalization "is really about foreign direct
investment and the other modes of international involvement which
firms may use." 2 The choice (and control) of location is crucial
for competition, as is the degree of freedom allowed for mobility
between locations.
International air transport has been closely regulated since
its creation, with tight restrictions applied by states to the
choice of locations (which airlines may offer international service
from their airports) and to mobility (to and from what points
abroad airlines may offer service). Multinational enterprises
(MNEs) have been very slow to develop in this sector because of
legal restrictions on foreign equity ownership in national carriers
and because of restrictions on the operation of foreign carriers on
domestic routes (cabotage).
Thus KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, for example, cannot currently
own more than 25% of the voting stock of its US partner
(Northwest). Moreover, even under the US-Netherlands "open skies"
agreement, though KLM can fly from any Dutch city to any city in
the US, it may not pick up passengers in, say, Detroit and fly them
* For a classification of services according to the degree
of goods content and the level of customer contact, see
S.Vandermerwe and M.Chadwick, "The internationalization of
services," The Service Industries Journal, 9, 1989, 79-93.
2 Peter Dicken, Globa_ Shift. The Internationalization of
Economic Activity (London: Paul Chapman, 1992), 355. See also
M.Gibbs, "Continuing the international debate on services,"
Journal of World Trade Law, 19, 1985, 199-218.
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to Memphis. 3 Moreover, it cannot even pick up passengers in
Detroit and carry them to a foreign country other than the
Netherlands without an explicit "fifth freedom" agreement between
the US government, the Dutch government and the government of the
relevant third country. And this under an "open skies" agreement
denounced as excessively liberal by some US labor unions and
airlines!
International air transport is thus both "location-
constrained" and "nationality-constrained. ''4 It is "location-
constrained" by the nature of the service it provides (requiring
sustained interaction between providers and consumers of the
service). Indeed, the choice of locations is even more restricted
than in comparable industries because of air transport's technical
dependence on a limited number of high-cost facilities shared with
other firms (airports). While, as in other industries,
"clustering" is strategically advantageous (allowing passengers to
switch between carriers and providing some sharing of costs), it is
also largely imposed by the costs of airport development and the
technical requirements of operation. 5
3 It may, however, fly passengers originating outside the US
on to Memphis as part of a continuing international service.
4 One categorization of services distinguishes between:-
(a) those which have a product distinguishable from the
process producing it and which can therefore be exported;
(b) those which are "location-bound" due to the
impossibility of separating consumption from the process of
production (haircutting being an example) and which therefore
require a presence abroad for purposes of "export"; and
(c) those "mixed services" in which some locational
substitution is possible.
(J.J.Boddewyn, Marsha B.Halbrich and A.C. Perry, "Service
multinational: conceptualization, measurement and theory,"
Journal of International Business Studies, 17, 3 (Fall 1986), 41-
58). Clearly air transport falls into the second category.
5 A parallel would be if all banks were required by a city
or state to offer services in a designated area, resulting in
intense competition for office space and parking. A problem of
air transport is therefore that, whether or not the provision of
the service itself is a case of "natural monopoly", the provision
of its infrastructure almost certainly is such a case.
It is intriguing (if currently fruitless) to speculate about
how competition and corporate strategies in this sector would
6
International air transport is also (at present) "nationality-
constrained" in respect of operation abroad, through the tying of
traffic rights to the nationality of airlines and through
restrictions on operation on domestic routes in foreign countries.
Even the offering of international service remains dependent on the
provisions of bilateral agreements between the countries concerned.
For foreign carriers, access to concentrations of traffic in
domestic markets abroad depends on alliances with airlines
permitted to operate in those markets.
Economic integration and liberalization in th_ _U:
European airlines face serious challenges (and have some
interesting new opportunities) as a result of the creation of a
single market within the EU. But they also have to cope with a
changing regulatory environment on routes between the EU and other
states and with the effects of deregulation within other major
domestic markets (notably within the US).
Liberalization within the EU differs from the deregulatory
process in the US in that it envisages the creation of multiple
opportunities within what were previously domestic markets. In the
US case, the object of deregulation was to expand access by a broad
range of carriers (including new carriers) to an existing national
market. The European process is (in American terms) more analogous
to a situation in which intra-state carriers with varying stakes in
inter-state commerce (and, indeed, in foreign trade) find
themselves presented with the right to operate in all other intra-
state markets, and to operate at will in all inter-state markets
and eventually to operate abroad from any city in any state. 6
European liberalization thus involves the simultaneous
integration of many markets, whereas American deregulation focussed
on increasing the operational flexibility (and number) of carriers
change if the aerospace industry developed a high-capacity,
vertical-take-off-and-landing airliner. Such a machine would
still face serious environmental problems and would require
ground-handling facilities, but basic maintenance could be
conducted at other sites. Perhaps airships still have a future.
6 The qualification "eventually" is used because, while the
EU's Third Package gives all EU "Community carriers" the right of
establishment Cconnoting the right to offer service) in any
Member-State, the existence of bilateral agreements between
Member-States and third countries (e.g., Canada) effectively
limits the right to take off from a European airport and to land
at the desired foreign destination. Once (or if) the EU itself
supplants Member-State governments as the European signatory of
bilateral or multilateral agreements, this apparent conflict of
laws should disappear.
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within a market that was already a single market. The values and
expectations of the two processes are essentially the same, but the
barriers differ. The American process had to overcome restrictions
on entry created by a prior, national regulatory regime: the
European process has to overcome barriers presented by the
existence of multiple national jurisdictions and their attendant
regulatory regimes.
CQrporate strategy and the pursui t of competitive advantage:
European airlines thus now face:
(i) a fluid regulatory environment, with different rules
applying in different markets (their national but now open markets,
the EU market, and external markets);
(2) invasion of their national markets by other EU carriers;
(3) more intense competition in intra-EU markets; and
(4) a wider range of competitors in their long-distance
markets, notably American carriers with lower costs and higher
productivity due to the battles of deregulation in the US.
What are the sources of competitive advantage for service
firms in such a situation? What special obstacles and advantages
face airlines in general (and European airlines in particular) in
adopting strategies to secure competitive advantage?
Three factors seem to be fundamental in shaping the choices
now facing European airlines and in shaping the strategies they
adopt, while a fourth is of diminishing (but not yet negligible)
importance.
One factor is established market stakes - the mixture of
services in domestic, intra-European, and long-haul markets that
airlines have developed, sometimes over many decades and often as
a result of government decisions on the division of traffic or
strategic and imperial commitments. Market share and market size
are likely to determine how important this factor is and whether a
carrier tries to change the mixture. The second and third factors
(commonly adduced in writing about service industries) are
location-specific advantage (LSA) and firm-specific advantag_
(FSA) v These factors may modify the relative value of market
stakes and the ability of airlines to survive or maintain market
7 John Dunning, International Production and the
Multinational Enterpris_ (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981), cited
in Peter Enderwick,"Some Economics of Service-Sector
Multinational Enterprises" in Enderwick, ed., Multinational
Service Firms (London: Routledge, 1989), 17.
share in the face of competition.
The fourth factor (which, though not discussed in detail
below, may affect the incidence of the other three) is state aid in
its various, and variably transparent, forms. While the EU
Commission is officially dedicated to creating "a level playing
field" by controlling and eventually eliminating subsidies, the
flesh has been notably stronger than the spirit in practising this
kind of virtue. Despite an accelerating trend toward
privatisation, a number of national carriers are still effectively
state-owned and can get government support when they make the
Augustinian plea that they want to be free of subsidies but not
yet. The governments concerned say that, for their part, they
favor full market competition, but not until their carriers have
had a chance to prepare themselves for competition. Moreover,
direct subsidies, while particularly effective in outraging rival
airlines, are of diminishing importance and easily targeted,
compared with subtler non-tariff barriers, exemplified by
differential access to and pricing for ground services and runway
slots.
The following sections examine the first three factors. The
last part of the paper explores ways in which economic integration
and liberalisation are likely to affect the impact of these factors
on corporate strategy, leading to a typology of carriers and
strategies. _ .............
(a) Market s_ak_s: European airlines have historically had
larger stakes in .......long-haul routes than their American
counterparts." Although the great majority of the 156 European
airlines offering scheduled services in 1996 were exclusively
involved in operating on domestic and intra-European routes, the
major carriers have (in varying degrees) considerable exposure on
international routes. They do, however, differ significantly in
the proportions of their revenues derived from the three kinds of
service (see Table I). At one extreme are carriers like SAS and
Iberia that derive less than 30% of their revenue from services
outside Europe (and in fact carry over 45% of all their passengers
on domestic services). At the other are carriers like KLM and
British Airways (BA) that get over 55% of their revenues from long-
distance routes (KLM in fact has no domestic routes). _
" In 1990, long-range flights accounted for over 68% of the
Revenue Passenger KiIometers flown by EU airlines, compared with
34.3% for US carriers (Commission of the European Communities,
Air Transpor_ _@l_t_oD_ with Third Countries, Communication from
the Commission to the Council, COM(92) 434 final, Brussels, 21
October 1992, 12, and Table E, 55).
9 Sabena in Belgium and Luxair in Luxembourg similarly lack
domestic routes.
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The weight of the market stake factor (in any rationally-
conceived strategy) presumably depends on both market share and
market size. EU airlines in fact differ significantly in the
degree of competition they face in each kind of market. I°
TABLE i: DERIVATION OF REVENUES (%) (1992):
v_@/__qig_9_: EUROPEAN EXTRA-EUROPEAN (ATLANTIC)
KLM 28.9 65.3 (33.9)
BRITISH 42.2 57.8 (30.7)
AIRWAYS
SWISSAIR 47.6 52.4 (24.9)
AIR FRANCE 50.1 49.9 (16.7)
EU AVERAGE: 50.7 49.3 (18.4)
LUFTHANSA 52.8 47.5 (20.6)
ALITALIA 55.6 44.4 (16.6)
IBERIA 70.1 29.9 (25.6)
SAS 80.9 19.1 (10.2)
Source: Lehmann Brothers, European Airlines: A Turbulent D_ca_e, 14
September 1993.
An airline might have a considerable investment in the long-
haul market (relative to its involvement in other markets), yetnot
be a major player in that market or in particular segments of it
1o For example, while the larger national markets are
increasingly contested, in six EU Member-States the dominant
national carrier accounted in 1996 for over three-quarters of all
available seats (see Appendix 1 for figures on dominance of
domestic and intra-Community routes by flag carriers). In four
states (Austria, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Greece) the
national carrier still enjoys a monopoly of domestic services,
though (as in the Dutch case) the market concerned may be very
small (Commission of the European Communities, Impact Of th@
Third Packaue of Air Transport Liberalization Measures,
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament, COM(96)514 final, 22 Oct 1996, i0).
I0
(such as the North Atlantic). 11 It might, alternatively, have a
major share in a market that is quite small (such as the Irish
domestic market).
Both situations would raise questions about the advisability
of keeping the current distribution of market stakes. To be a small
player in a larger market obviously invites elimination, while
being a major player in a small market is likely to restrict
growth, absent opportunities to penetrate other markets. Survival
in one situation and persistence in the other are sometimes due to
particular advantages conferred by one of the other factors
examined here - location-specific or firm-specific advantage - or
by regulatory protection. 12
Variation in market stake also entails variable exposure to
different regulatory regimes. The strategizing of airlines such as
KLM and BA (and, where the North Atlantic is concerned, Lufthansa
and Swissair) has to be sensitive to the provisions of bilaterals
and to limits on access to major non-EU markets, especially the US
market. More than their more European-oriented competitors, such
carriers need alliances with US carriers which can provide the
passenger "feed" that, because of restrictions on foreign ownership
and cabotage, they cannot generate by setting up their own
subsidiaries in the US (or, indeed, almost anywhere else outside
the EU).
The price for obtaining official US support for such alliances
is, however, acceptance of an "open skies" bilateral, which implies
more intense competition from US carriers. The enthusiasm of EU
governments and airlines for such agreements has varied inversely
with the size of their domestic markets and their airports" shares
of transatlantic traffic. The Netherlands was very willing in 1992
to accept an open skies agreement since (as American critics
angrily pointed out) it offered Dutch airlines the right to fly to
any city in the US, while offering access to only one international
11A well-known (though rather distinct) example is
Icelandair's role in the North Atlantic market. Though air
transport is quite important within Iceland, the country's
population is only 300,000 and does not therefore provide the
basis for a large domestic system. Icelandair's European network
is designed specifically to collect and distribute traffic from
the carrier's North American routes, on which it has a monopoly.
But Icelandair is in competition with other North Atlantic
carriers and carries a very small proportion of all traffic.
This case exemplifies the perennial problems of determining what
is the relevant market for purposes of assessing competition.
12 Such as cabotage in domestic markets or a rule requiring
nationals or public servants of a country to use its
international carrier.
Ii
j-/
airport in a country with a population of only 15 million. I_ Once
the alliance between Northwest and KLM took effect, KLM also had
the opportunity to collect traffic from cities it did not directly
serve through Northwest's hubs.
Germany, France and the UK, all with populations of well over
50 million and the highest shares of transatlantic traffic, have
been much more resistant than the smaller European states to the
open skies formula. 14 On the one hand, they are tempted by the
prospect of greater access to the US market through alliance with
a US carrier and the operational and financial benefits of
accompanying anti-trust immunity that only the US government can
provide. On the other hand, while wishing to hold onto their more
lucrative, long-distance traffic, they cannot afford to surrender
or share intra-European traffic, since it helps to sustain the
long-haul services. Equally, they are not enthusiastic about
encouraging more competition at hubs which already attract the
largest numbers of transatlantic and connecting long-haul
passengers passing through Europe.
The diplomatic problems of governments and the strategic
problems of "their" airlines are intimately connected. All the
major carriers in France, the UK and Germany have formed alliances
with US carriers, but only one carrier (Deutsche Lufthansa) has
obtained US anti-trust approval for the alliance concerned. _5 The
reason for the disparity is that only the German government has so
far concluded an open skies agreement with the US, and such an
agreement is a condition for the US granting anti-trust immunity to
alliances with non-US carriers. Airlines such as BA or Air France
must protect - and if possible expand - their share of their
•3 The Netherlands has two flourishing secondary
international carriers - Martinair and Transavia - apart from KLM
(though the latter has large equity holdings in both).
14 Apart from the Netherlands, six EU Member-States
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, and Sweden) now
have open skies agreements with the US, as have Iceland, Norway,
and Switzerland.
•s BA's alliance with USAir ended on March 29th 1997 and its
alliance with American has yet to receive official approval in
either the US or the UK. Virgin Atlantic, BA's British rival on
international services, has a "blocked space" agreement with
Delta. Lufthansa has an alliance with United, while Air France
has recently concluded a marketing agreement with Continental and
Delta. It may be noted that, with the demise of the BA-USAir
alliance, none of the current agreements among the major carriers
(apart from KLM-Northwest) involves any equity holding. Delta's
alliance with Swissair, Sabena and Austrian does involve a very
small exchange of equity between the airlines concerned.
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national markets (both the internal and external markets) and their
share of intra-EU traffic: the very size of all these markets make
them highly attractive to American carriers, to other European
airlines and to domestic start-up carriers. 16
The declared purpose of the US in concluding open skies
agreements with other European states is precisely to wear down the
British and the French, threatening their carriers with a diversion
of trade, through passengers switching to other European airports
where open skies has led to lower fares, more seats and greater
competition. This strategy has worked quite well, at least in the
case of the Dutch agreement. _v
(b) Location,specific advantage:
Because of the nature of the industry, location is
particularly important for airlines. An airline may benefit from
having a centrally-located base ("central" in relation to its own
regional market - say, Europe - or to adjoining regional markets -
say, the Caribbean and central America for airlines based in the
southern US). It may also suffer from being a "peripheral
isolate."
•6 For purposes of self-defence (and to enlarge their
"feed"), they can, of course, decide to set up or acquire
subsidiaries or allies in neighboring EU Member-States.
17 The number of transatlantic passengers flying through
Schiphol airport, Amsterdam, increased by 74% over a five-year
period, reaching 2,400,000 in 1994: in 1995, Amsterdam overtook
Paris Charles de Gaulle as the fourth largest European
transatlantic gateway (Perry Flint, "If you can't beat 'em.." Air
Transport World, May 1996, 41; Joan M.Feldman, "Some call it
oligopoly," Air Transport_ World, May 1996, 46). The share of the
US-Netherlands market in overall transatlantic service went up
from 5.6% in 1978 to 7.7% in 1993 and continued to rise in 1994
and 1995 (Harold Shenton, "Codesharing only part of the big
picture," _vmark Aviation Economist, May 1995, 2). This
expansion also helped the US airports used by KLM-Northwest. In
1993 (the first year after the conclusion of the Dutch open skies
agreement), Detroit and Minneapolis had increases in
international traffic of 11% and 14% respectively, set against a
national average of 4.9% (Harold Shenton, "Tracking the 1993
trends," Avmark Aviation Economist, August 1994, 14). Northwest-
KLM began a new service between Amsterdam and Minneapolis in
April 1994 with an initial 1,942 seats available each week. By
mid-summer, capacity had been increased to 9,758 in response to
demand and in August a second daily flight was added on the route
("Northwest, KLM add Amsterdam flights," Aviation Week and Space
_q_h/IQ/_, 29 August 1994, 30).
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Given the history of domestic protectionism, an obvious
strategy is to consolidate a domestic base, represented in control
of a key airport and/or a domestic network. But "locational
advantage" depends not just on the strength of a presence in a
market, but also on the size of that market and its position
relative to other markets. Because of their dependence on location
and the regulatory obstacles to their establishment abroad,
airlines actually resemble states in classical realist theory.
Their managements have to accommodate their ambitions to the
geopolitical realities of their situation. Unless this situation
happens to be accompanied by a very substantial domestic market
(no-one describes the US as "isolated"), even a well-managed
airline can be trapped in a geopolitical corner. I"
Location thus provides one variable relevant to identifying
the parameters within which airline managements choose strategies.
On this basis we can distinguish between:-
(i) those European countries that offer _a_ge and central
markets (France, Germany, the UK);
(2) those that offer small but central markets (Belgium,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland;
(3) those that offer large but peripheral markets (Spain,
Italy); and
(4) those that offer small and Peripher_l markets (Austria,
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Sweden). 19
The significance of location differs according to whether we
are examining intra-European markets or long-distance markets.
Within the former, airlines will be free after April 1997 to
establish themselves wherever they wish within the territory of the
EU. Thus in principle, Finnair (for example) could decide to set
up a network within France and Germany. It could, as far as the
rules applied by Brussels are concerned, cut through the
i. Thus a KLM official recently explained his company's
decision to form an alliance with Kenya Airways rather than with
the rather larger South African Airways (SAA) by remarking:
We would never have done such a deal with SAA. Hub-to-
hub flying with a catchment area at both ends, such as
Amsterdam-Detroit with Northwest, is very profitable.
Beyond South Africa is water.
(Joan M.Feldman, "Potential realized," Air Transport World,
December 1996, 45).
19 Four of which have open skies agreements with the US.
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limitations imposed by being based in Helsinki and become a
Finnish-owned airline operating entirely outside Finland.
But such a strategy would be risky. It would entail abandoning
all the advantages accruing to a long-established domestic monopoly
airline in its home country. It would also involve taking a chance
on establishing a competitive niche on foreign territory, where the
relevant home-country carriers could benefit from those same
advantages. Further, it might be unpopular with Finnish politicians
and voters who might argue that as a state-owned carrier, Finnair's
first obligation is to provide services to and within Finland.
In relation to long-distance routes, the nationality
constraints of the bilateral system would prevent even
consideration of such a strategy. Bilateral agreements require
governments to designate carriers of their own nationality to
operate on specified routes: routes between Finland and the US are
controlled by agreements between the Finnish and US governments.
Since the same principle applies to routes between, say, France and
the US, it would be extremely difficult for Finnair to get the
required authority to operate between Paris and New York.
This asymmetry in regulation has an important strategic
implication. The coexistence of a completely open market within
Europe and a nationality-constrained market between Europe and
third countries (such as Canada) means that those airlines with
large markets and/or central locations may be able to use the
freedom of the EU single market to draw traffic away from carriers
based on the periphery. Although the US has "open skies"
agreements with Finland and other EU states, Finnair is still
restricted under this agreement to the rather thin US-Finland
market, and it suffers all the associated disadvantages of low
frequencies and high costs.
Finnish and US passengers, however, have the choice of flying
through a variety of US and, most importantly, European cities. At
first sight, this does not give an advantage to one carrier or
carriers based in any one country over others. Finnair could in
principle create a hub in Helsinki (as Icelandair has in Reykjavik)
and, through lower fares or special service features, draw in
passengers from other EU countries for long-range services. But the
attractions would have to be substantial to get passengers from
France or the UK to travel the extra distance to Helsinki, and the
incentives would have to include low intra-EU fares and frequent
flights between Helsinki and other EU cities. Otherwise, larger
carriers in western Europe would reap the advantages of central
location and larger domestic markets, creating economies of scale
that would enable them to offer lower fares and more frequent
services on transatlantic and other long-distance routes.
This case exemplifies a more general problem of economic
integration within the EU. It happens that the geographical center
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of the EU is also the area with the largest population: in the year
2000, France, Germany and the Benelux countries alone will account
for 164 million of the EU's total population of 344 million; Italy,
Spain and the UK will account for another 160 million; while the
remaining six, geographically more peripheral states will together
account for only 26 million. 2° To the extent that establishment
in a large national market or populous EU region provides the basis
for more competitive firms (firms that can harvest economies of
scope and scale), integration may occur at a cost to the airlines
(and other firms) based on the periphery of the single market.
Their strategies are therefore likely to be defensive in character
or certainly quite different from those of their more fortunately-
located rivals. What their choices may be is discussed in the
concluding section of the paper.
(c) Firm-specific advantage:
To counter locational disadvantages or to distinguish itself
competitively, a firm may have or seek a special reputation or
market niche. According to Michael Porter, such firm-specific
advantage usually derives from cost leadership (being the lowest-
cost producer) or product differentiation (establishing a
particular reputation for quality or design). It may also derive
from securing a niche in a particular region or in a product for
which the market is limited. 21
In the air transport industry, cost differentiation takes the
form of concentrating on different kinds of traffic. The most
basic distinction is between passengers and cargo. This is
pertinent even in a consideration of passenger transportation since
European carriers vary significantly in the degree to which they
derive revenue from the two sources, and fleets (and even
individual aircraft types) can be reconfigured to allow for
different mixtures of cargo and passenger traffic. 22
20 Figures from John Cole and Francis Cole, The Geography of
the European Community (London: Routledge, 1993), 16-17.
2_ Michael Porter, Competition in Global Industries (Boston:
Harvard Business School Press, 1986), cited in P.W.Daniels,
Service Industries in the Wor_4 Economy (Oxford: Blackwell,
1993), 43.
22 Rarely-discussed though they are, the differences between
EU carriers in respect of dedicated cargo equipment are
significant. Forty-six per cent of both KLM's and Lufthansa's
traffic in 1992 consisted in carrying cargo, compared to only
27.6% of BA's traffic. Twenty-three of KLM's 29 Boeing 747s are
so-called "combis" - aircraft configured to carry both passengers
and freight in divided main deck holds. In trading in Airbus 310s
for Boeing 767s, KLM obtained an extra 15 tons' worth of cargo
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Within the passenger market, the main distinction is between
carriers appealing to different types of passenger. At one extreme
are relatively high-fare carriers (such as SAS and swissair) that
have established a reputation as airlines used mainly by business
travellers. At the other extreme are those (such as Southwest in
the US and Easyjet in Europe) that make their appeal mainly on the
basis of lower fares. This distinction does not necessarily or
simply reflect company strategy: most airlines strive to attract
business travellers, but some succeed more than others. Also, some
business travellers (or their employers) will choose lower-cost
carriers despite the inconveniences that may be associated with
flying on such airlines.
Other bases for competitive advantage may include frequency
(and directness) of service, quality of service (including - not
least - seat size and pitch), on-time performance, and (informally)
safety reputation. Two other FSAs - inward and onward flight
connections - are partly derived from location: airports located
centrally and/or in large markets are likely to have more
connecting services. In a more localised sense, ease and speed of
ground connections may also be a source of competitive advantage,
especially where (as in much of Europe) surface transport is a
major competitor with air transport. 23 Airlines do not(interestingly enough) compete against each on the basis of speed,
though this is a vital factor in competition against other modes of
transport within Europe.
In answering the crucial question - how will firm specific
advantage be affected by and developed in an integrated,
liberalized market - it is important to consider what factors (in
addition to market stakes and locational advantage) will affect the
choice and feasibility of strategies. One basic factor is a
carrier's costs. In both the US and Europe, the actual revenue
yield per seat has been declining steadily, partly due to increased
competition and its effect on fares. Deregulation in the US did
produce market segmentation: some airlines chose (or were forced)
to pursue a mass market, which (with lower fares) entailed
continual reduction of costs, especially labor costs. A few chose
to cater solely to first-class or executive passengers, offering a
capacity per flight, while it doubled cargo capacity in replacing
DCI0s with (the same manufacturer's) MD-II (Douglas W.Nelms, "The
new wave - Dutch style," Air Transport World, August 1996, 53,
56).
23 The intense struggle over access to London Heathrow
reflects a belief that the former offers decisive advantages over
Gatwick in respect of both air and ground connections. Several
European airports (and airlines) are trying to improve their
competitive edge by improving air-rail links, which may even
involve remote check-in facilities for luggage.
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small number of flights and only on routes with heavy traffic.
Most airlines tried to balance appeal to business travellers with
filling the rest of the aircraft with passengers mostly travelling
on a variety of discount fares.
The European situation differs from the deregulated US market
in at least five respects. First, business and official travellers
are a larger proportion of all passengers than in the US This is
partly because of the higher average cost of air travel, but it is
also, secondly, because shorter inter-city distances (and better
rail service) make surface travel a preferred alternative for
passengers (such as many so-called "VFR travellers") with less
money and more time. 24
Thirdly, much mass recreational air travel in Europe (and
between Europe and North America) is handled by non-scheduled
charter carriers, many of which operate substantial fleets on
routes quite different from those of the scheduled airlines. In
the US, the major carriers and the non-scheduled carriers compete
directly for all non-business traffic. Fourthly, though all
airlines face major fixed costs, European airlines face higher fuel
and landing charges than their American counterparts, while labor
costs have historically been higher than in the US. Fifthly, new
entrants face even greater runway and air traffic control
congestion than in the US
Strategic convergence and d_v_rgence:
Despite differences in markets, competition from other modes,
and regulatory history, the responses of European carriers to
liberalization and the advent of the single market have for some
time shown similarities to those of US airlines to deregulation.
But liberalization is also leading to strategies that suggest both
a divergence from American experience and - more importantly - a
differentiation among European carriers that has important
implications for the eventual pattern of control and competition.
The broadest similarity to American experience is the almost
universal attempt to increase productivity, to cut costs and to
shed non-core businesses. Cost-cutting has meant both holding down
salaries and stabilizing or reducing labor forces. Airlines are
also seeking to achieve economies by standardizing fleets and
(through alliances) sharing operational and marketing costs
(referred to in economic writing on services as "economies of
agglomeration" and "economies of common governance"). Thus the
alliance between Sabena, Swissair and Austrian Airlines has led to
standardization of fleets, joint ordering of new aircraft, and
24 "VFR" stands for "visiting friends and relatives" (also,
confusingly, for "visual flight rules").
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sharing of capacity on transatlantic services. 25
Alliances are also achieving economies of scope, as in the
cases of Lufthansa's arrangements for redistribution of routes with
SAS and, more recently, Air France's arrangement to share routes
with Alitalia and to establish "a wide-ranging business agreement
designed to lower operating costs and increase competitiveness. "26
Finally, there is evidence of a trend toward vertical integration,
in the form of acquiring or allying with regional carriers, which
will become (indeed, already largely are) feeders to the majors at
their hubs. 2_ Such a trend would follow American experience, which
saw a dramatic reduction in the number of independent regional
carriers in the first decade of deregulation.
Such moves do evoke some of the more ironic outcomes of
American deregulation. A marketing and operational alliance of two
state-owned carriers evokes not only the ancien r_gime in European
civil aviation (when international services were monopolised by
state carriers operating a common schedule and even pooling
revenue) but also the re-emergence of oligopoly in the US in the
mid-eighties. As in the US, the success of liberalization in
Europe rides on the theory of "contestable markets," which assumes
that entry costs in the industry are sufficiently low to prompt and
sustain competition once monopolies or oligopolies emerge and begin
to extract rents from their control of markets. A key factor here
will be the ability of challengers (whether start-up airlines or
the surviving, competing major carriers) to gain adequate access to
airport slots.
An equally striking difference from American experience (so
far) is the lack of equity buy-outs, at least amonq major carriers.
The only serious raid so far has been by a non-EU carrier
(swissair), taking a 49.5% interest in Sabena. State ownership is
clearly the major barrier to a consolidation like that which
occurred in the US in the nineteen-eighties, but the continuing
privatization of European airlines will increase opportunities for
equity purchase. Indeed, substantial cross-border acquisition by
major carriers has already occurred, but in the form of buying
equity in rivals of national airlines in neighboring countries.
25 Pierre Sparaco, "Swissair pursues 'entrepreneurial
freedom'", Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6 January 1997,
33; "Newsbreaks", Aviation Week and Space Technology, 23/30
December 1996, 9.
2_ Pierre Sparaco, "Alitalia, Air France pursue new business
links," AviatiQn Week and Space Technology,_ i0 February 1997, 32.
2v Remarks by Mike Ambrose, president of the European
Regions [sic] Airlines Association, at panel organized by the
Transportation Research Board, Washington, D.C., 15 January 1997.
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BA, the most aggressive cross-border investor, has subsidiaries in
France and Germany, while SAS and KLM both have substantial
interests in British independent carriers. 2"
The advent of the single market offers the potential for much
greater cross-border operation, including the establishment of hubs
by European airlines in Member-States other than their own and the
operation of services within the territories of other Member-
States. Such cabotage flights have already begun, subject to
certain restrictions. 2_ The other side of such opportunity is
necessarily the threat of invasion by "foreign" carriers, as well
as that of start-up carriers (essentially the same challenge as
that confronting American airlines in the late seventies, but in a
different territorial context).
Writers on service industries often argue that deregulation is
the spur to much internationalization of business. 3° It
destabilizes the strategic setting of domestic business and opens
the door to takeovers and other kinds of direct investment by
2. BA controls TAT (and since November 1996) Air Liberte in
France and Deutsche BA in Germany. SAS has a 25% interest in the
Airlines of Britain Group, which until very recently included
British Midland, a major rival to BA on both domestic and
European routes. (British Midland, which controls more slots at
Heathrow than any carrier other than BA, is currently negotiating
over an alliance with Lufthansa - a serious challenge to BA's
dominance of the UK by the German carrier). KLM has a 15%
holding in Air UK and uses this connection to feed traffic from
British airports into its Amsterdam international hub.
29 Until April 1997, "Community carriers" are allowed to
carry domestic traffic up to 50% of an aircraft's capacity on
flights that involve an international leg. For example,
Lufthansa might operate a service from Frankfurt to Paris,
continuing to Marseille. On the last leg of the journey, it
would be permitted to fill up to half of the seats with
passengers boarding in Paris.
30 Thus Daniels writes:
In order to sustain growth and profit expectations, it
is now necessary to gain access to new markets.
Services that have thrived on traditional home markets
can no longer afford to do so, either because those
markets are saturated and there is no scope for further
product innovation or because of the effects of
deregulation on the competitiveness of service firms in
other geographical markets.
(Daniels, Service Industries in the World Economy, 43)
2O
foreign firms. A natural, prudent and even necessary response for
all established firms is to strike first - to move aggressively
into foreign markets, partly to capture new business, partly to
deter rivals, and partly to insure against loss of domestic market
share.
But managements may in fact respond in different ways. While
it is beyond question that deregulation (and, in this case,
economic integration) creates a dynamic environment and offers
compelling arguments for an international strategy, the
circumstances and stakes of firms (in this case, airlines) are in
fact quite different. It is one thing to "create a level playing
field"; quite another to ensure (much less to insist) that the
players are all the same age, the same size, and have the same
experience. Since they are patently not the same, their responses
are likely to differ. And since they enter the game with distinct
advantages and disadvantages, the game is as likely to accentuate
those differences as to reduce them.
To illustrate the variety of situations and possible responses
to them, I set out, relative to Table 2, a rough typology of
airlines, combining the factors discussed above. I then outline
a range of current and potential strategies in response to
liberalization and the EU single market.
Looking only at the main national carriers, it is clear that
their revenues, their market stakes, the sizes of their markets,
and their locations differ substantially. They can be grouped in
several ways, but if we follow the classification used above, we
might divide them as follows:
i) Large market/central location'*: Lufthansa, BA, Air France;
2) _mall market/central location: KLM, Sabena, Swissair,
Luxair;
3) Large market/peripheral location: Alitalia, Iberia
4) Sma_l market/peripheral location: Austrian, SAS, TAP, Aer
Lingus, Olympic, Finnair.
To make sense of strategic differences within each category,
it is helpful to subdivide further, and again quite arbitrarily,
according to market stakes and _Qtal revenue. These factors
distinguish carriers who are more preoccupied with long-haul
services from those more concerned with domestic or intra-European
31 Locations within 400 miles of Brussels are here
classified as "central", those more than 400 miles from Brussels
as "peripheral."
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TAB_ 2: FACTORS IN A_RLINE STRATEGY
CARRIER: MARKET STAKES DOMESTIC LOCATION: RPKs 32
(Country) (% of total POPULATION: (distance flown
[Revenue, traffic [1991]) (xmn) from (1995)
1995,$mn] Brussels, (x mn)
Domestic EU Non-EU miles)
LUFTHANSA 36.0 43.5 20.5 81.2 200 59,916
(Germany) (Frankfurt)
[ 9,774]
BA 21.8 49.3 28.9 59.1 200 100,489
(U.K.) (London)
[10,124]
ALITALIA 39.3 43.4 20.3 58.6 740 31,748
(Italy) (Rome)
[ 4,645]
AIR FRANCE 20.9 49.4 29.7 57.9 160 49,605
(France) (Paris)
[ 7,956]
IBERIA 52.0 37.3 10.7 40.7 825 23,813
(Spain) (Madrid)
[ 3,385]
K.L.M. 0.7 44.5 48.5 15.3 ii0 44,574
(Netherl (Amsterdam)
-ands)
[ 5,094]
S.A.S. 44.3 48.7 6.1 13.733 475 18,773
(Scand (Copenhagen)
-inavia)
[ 3,863]
T.A.P. 25.7 53.4 20.9 10.7 1,060 7,716
(Portugal) (Lisbon)
[ 1,099]
OLYMPIC 64.1 24.6 11.3 10.2 1,280 8,082
(Greece) (Athens)
[ 943]
32 Revenue Passenger Kilometers - a measure of the number
of passengers carried multiplied by total distances travelled.
33 Denmark and Sweden only.
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CARRIER:
(Country)
[Revenue,
1995,$mn]
SABENA
(Belgium)
[ 2,041]
MAR_ STAKES
(% of total
traffic [1991])
DOMESTIC
RQI_2iT/D_:
(x ran)
Domestic EU Non-EU
0.0 67.4 32.6
[uOCATION: RPKs
(distance flown
from (19957
Brussels, (x mn)
miles)
AUSTRIAN
(Austria)
[ 1,063]
9.9 0 8,620
(Brussels)
N.A. N.A. N.A. 7.7 575 4,915
(Vienna)
N.A. N.A. 6.8 300 20,302
(Zurich)
[SWISSAIR] N.A.
(Switzerland)
[ 3,452]
FINNAIR N.A. N.A. N.A. 5.0 975 10,434
(Finland) (Helsinki)
[ 892]
AER LINGUS I0.I 68.2 21.7 3.5 475
(Ireland) (Dublin)
[ i,ii0]
5,259
LUXAIR N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.4 ii0 380
Sources: Commission of the European Communities, Air Transport
Relations with Third Countries. Communication from the Commission
to the council, C0M(92) 434 final, Brussels, 21 October 1992, 12,
and Table E, 51; "Aerospace Source Book," Aviation Week and Space
Technology, 13 January 1997, 271-306; "World Airline Report," Air
Transport World, June 1996, 43, 46.
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services, and those with larger stakes from the minor players.
more refined classification emerges, thus:
A
i) Large market/central location:
(a) Largest - smallest long-haul stake: BA, Air France,
Lufthansa;
(b) Largest - smallest total revenue: BA, Lufthansa, Air
France;
2) Small market/central loc@t_on:
(a) Largest - smallest long-haul stake: KLM,
Sabena, Luxair34;
(b) Largest - smallest total revenue: KLM,
Sabena, Luxair;
Swissair,
Swissair,
3) Large market/peripheral iQcation:
(a) Largest - smallest long-haul stake: Alitalia, Iberia;
(b) Largest - smallest total revenue: Alitalia, Iberia;
4) Small market/peripheral location:
(a) Largest - smallest lODg-haul sta_@: Aer Lingus, TAP,
Olympic, Austrian, SAS, Finnair35;
(b) Largest - smallest total revenue: SAS, Aer Lingus, TAP,
Austrian, Olympic, Finnair.
We can now characterize more fully each group and, bringing in
the factor of firm-specific advantage, examine briefly common and
individual strategic dilemmas and responses.
34 Swissair ranking derived from graph on Available Tonne
Kilometers in Lehmann Brothers, European Airlines: A T_rb_t
Decade, 14 September 1993, 6.
35 Austrian and Finnair rankings derived from graph on
Available Tonne Kilometers in Lehmann Brothers, European
Airlines: A Turbulent Deca_o, 14 September 1993, 6.
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Group 1 f!arge market/central location) (BA, Air France and
Lufthansa):
This group comprises the national carriers which have the
largest domestic traffic bases and the largest total revenues, and
which dominate hubs that are centrally-located and offer extensive
long-range and intra-EU connections. All three have major stakes
spread across the domestic, intra-EU and long-haul markets, with BA
having the larger long-haul stake.
Strategically, these airlines are attractive prospects for
alliances with major non-EU carriers, and all three in fact have
marketing alliances with leading American airlines. They also need
such alliances in order to maintain their competitiveness in the
transatlantic market, which is an important source of profit for
all three carriers.
Despite the sizeable resources of these airlines, they also
face serious strategic dilemmas. The size of their domestic
markets makes them attractive targets for other carriers. BA has
been facing substantial competition for some years within the
British market and has responded by absorbing some of its rivals
and converting others into franchisees. It is also moving
aggressively into the German and French markets. Lufthansa is
vulnerable because of its high costs and high domestic fares.
Air France, also involved in cost-cutting, is pursuing an
essentially defensive strategy quite different from BA's
expansionism. It has depended on the French government to get EU
approval for a very large injection of state capital (which,
according to its rivals, has been exploited to enable Air France to
offer bargain-basement fares on its European and long-haul
services). 36 It has made few moves to set up subsidiaries outside
3_ The French government's generosity to Air France has not
necessarily been reciprocated. In a remarkable speech to the
Saint-Simon Foundation earlier this year, Christian Blanc,
chairman of Air France, attacked "interference" by the French
government in the management of French business, particularly in
the public sector. Blanc complained:
It is constantly judge and party to the case. It
interferes in everything, seeking compromises
everywhere to minimize risks but having absolutely no
overall strategy.
("Europe Report," Air Transport World, February 1997, 14).
These remarks may have been stimulated by earlier reports that
the transport minister was pressing Air France to buy new long-
range planes from Airbus A340s rather than from Boeing (David
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France and has, indeed, retreated from two earlier outside
investments. 37 Instead, it has (as noted above) begun to develop
a marketing relationship with another financially-challenged state
carrier, Alitalia. It has, very belatedly, established a code-
sharing relationship with two American carriers and is apparently
banking on this relationship to improve its finances. But France
has consistently rejected the concept of an open skies agreement
with the US and will probably continue to do so until Air France's
finances and competitive position have improved.
As this comparison suggests, the fourth variable identified
above - the availability or otherwise of state aid - is relevant to
understanding strategic differences between these three carriers.
BA, as a privatized carrier, can call on some diplomatic assistance
in protecting its long-haul market, but within the EU market it
functions without state support (and is a persistent critic of
subsidies). Lufthansa is a carrier in course of a privatization
that was prepared for this process and for the rigors of the
deregulated, single market by government pressure and assistance in
cementing its relationship with a US carrier. Air France is a
state-owned carrier whose strategy has depended on government
assistance in protecting its domestic (and long-haul) markets and
in restructuring itself to survive the single market. 3"
Each of the carriers in this group enjoys some firm-specific
advantages. Lufthansa, though apparently not well-regarded for its
service within Germany, has striven to establish an international
reputation for reliability and safety. BA has concentrated on
establishing a superior reputation for customer service, with
distinctive "brands" of cabin service (which, indeed, it franchises
to partners in the UK and abroad). Both BA and Air France have the
advantage of long associations with African and Asian countries
which were formerly British and French colonies. 39
Despite their marked differences, all three carriers in this
group are likely to become dominant on their own or as partners
Owen, "State clips Air France's wings," F_nancial Times, 9-10
November 1996).
37 Early in the nineties, Air France invested in the Czech
airline CSA (in an attempt to create a hub for eastern European
traffic) and in Sabena, but has abandoned both investments. It
retains shares in six North and sub-Saharan African and Middle
Eastern airlines.
3, All three carriers also face competition from national
railway systems - two state-owned, the third privatized.
39 A form of association intriguingly - and perhaps rightly
- described in some market surveys as "cultural affinity."
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within the EU market, and all have the potential to be major
partners in global enterprise alliances. Achievement of this
potential means retaining market share at their domestic hubs,
strengthening their European networks so as to provide traffic feed
(and onward connections) for long-haul routes, and enlarging their
access to major overseas markets (notably in the US and Asia).
The dilemma for them is that, as suggested above, the
protection of local markets is l_keiy to upset non-EU governments
and airlines. Also, alliances involving these carriers are
certain to provoke questions about the danger of oligopoly from
other airlines and from many governments. This dilemma makes for
some fine calculations of the costs and benefits of market opening
(and of related corporate alliances), as the current debates over
the American-BA alliance demonstrate.
Group2_ fsmall market/central location) (KLM, Swissair,
Sabena, and Luxair):
This group comprises carriers that, while restricted by a
small domestic market, have good central locations. This
combination of constraint and opportunity may lead to radically
different strategies, all (necessarily) involving external
services.
One strategy is to remain a highly-localized regional carrier,
as has Luxair. Despite the centrality of the Grand Duchy (and its
prominence in the EU), its local market is too small to attract
outside carriers (except for occasional low-cost transatlantic
carriers) and the national carrier can therefore depend on a degree
of control approaching monopoly, albeit in a very small market.
Another strategy - that pursued for many years by KLM (and in
principle available to Luxair) - is to exploit location so as to
draw in traffic from neighboring states to feed a long-haul
network. KLM has no domestic network of any significance and has
a domestic market of only 15 million. Yet it has a revenue higher
than those of Alitalia and Iberia, both based in countries with
populations of over 40 million. Moreover, with a smaller fleet
than either, it flew in 1995 thirteen million more Revenue
Passenger Kilometers than Alitalia and nearly double those flown by
Iberia. It also derives a higher percentage of its revenue from
long-haul flights than any other EU national carrier (indeed, at
48%, its long-haul stake is proportionately equal to those of BA
and Lufthansa combined).
This strategy has led KLM into a particularly close (if
stormy) relationship with a US carrier and has led the Netherlands
government to be a strong advocate of free trade in international
aviation. Commercially, the strategy has been highly successful,
but it does entail particular vulnerabilities and risks. It
requires a strong intra-EU network to sustain traffic for its long-
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haul services: KLM has recently acknowledged that it is weak in
this respect and it will certainly find itself facing more
competition on EU routes.
Moreover, the strategy entails great dependence on non-EU
partners, such as Northwest. This relationship may conflict with
a strategy of allying with other small state carriers within the EU
for purposes of strengthening the European network and for mutual
defense against the BAs and Lufthansas. Such a conflict destroyed
the proposed "Alcazar" alliance between KLM, SAS, Swissair, and
Austrian in 1993, when KLM insisted that Northwest be the US
partner for the new alliance in the face of its partners preference
for Delta. KLM has failed to find a European partner and it
recognizes the need to do so. But the same problem could arise
again, especially since nearly all the other EU carriers are now
allied with carriers other than Northwest. 4° Moreover, KLM's
strategy of (indeed, its dependence on) attracting passengers from
neighboring states may have diminished its appeal as an alliance
partner.
A third strategy logically open to smaller countries with
central locations is that of alliance with each other, complemented
by a shared relationship with one or more major non-EU carrier.
This has, in fact, been the route taken by Sabena, in company with
Austrian and Swissair (itself technically a non-EU carrier), all of
the group having Delta as a US partner. Swissair has in effect
bought into the EU market by purchasing a 49.5% interest in Sabena
and is emerging as the controlling partner. The alliance offers a
range of purchasing and operational economies to the members
(including fleet standardization). Furthermore, with three well-
separated hubs, it creates a broad and complementary network across
Europe, giving access to markets in north-western Europe (through
Brussels), eastern Europe (through Vienna), and central Europe and
Italy (through Zurich). 4. The alliance also represents a
significant bloc for purposes of negotiating with non-EU partners
(and suppliers) and provides Delta and other overseas partners with
entry to three distinct European markets.
Group 3 (large market/peripheral location)
Iberia):
(Alitalia and
This group consists of two state-owned airlines, both of which
40 This may explain recent reports that KLM is engaged in
talks with Iberia, which has no close ties to a transatlantic
partner.
,i Swissair and Delta are reportedly gaining a substantial
number of transatlantic passengers from northern Italy, because
of customers' dissatisfaction with Alitalia's long-haul services
and fares.
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have dominated significant domestic markets that are attractive to
start-up domestic carriers and to other national carriers. '2 Both
have experienced considerable financial problems and have received
large amounts of state aid to restructure in anticipation of the
advent of the single market. Both have relatively small stakes in
long-haul routes and somewhat peripheral positions within the
single market. While having large domestic populations and
considerable assets for foreign tourism, neither has yet sought or
concluded an open skies agreement with the US and their relations
with US carriers have been intermittent and fairly recent.
Alitalia and Iberia have a doubly disadvantageous position,
in that their hubs are away from the center of the European market
while not being close to a connecting market. Earlier in the
nineties, Alitalia bought equity in the Hungarian airline Malev,
hoping (like Air France) to develop a market in eastern Europe. But
Alitalia's management has, until recently, been skeptical of
alliances with other carriers. In any case, it is not clear how,
or why, an Italian-eastern European combination would work. Italy
might seem a natural point for connections to north Africa and the
Middle East, but other and larger airlines already have connections
to these areas, and Alitalia is not in a financial position to
provide real competition through low fares.
Moreover, Alitalia suffers another, more local geopolitical
problem. Rome is remote from the main industrial areas of Italy,
but the northern airports are for various reasons inadequate as
alternative hubs.
Meanwhile, Alitalia is facing erosion of its domestic markets
not only by new low-cost carriers such as Air One and Meridiana but
also by other EU carriers (such as BA and Lufthansa) who have
already begun to operate cabotage services within Italy.
In the long-haul market, Alitalia (or another Italian carrier)
should be able to develop an FSA on the basis of Italy's tourist
market and the considerable Italian emigrant communities in North
and South America, but it has failed to do so. In fact, while
Alitalia has a marketing agreement with Continental, Italy still
has a very restrictive bilateral agreement with the US, the result
of which is high fares and limited capacity.
Iberia's response to its locational problem has been to
exploit its nationality and Spain's connections with Central and
4= At least in the case of the Italian market, the appeal
may lie in the fact that Italy, despite its population, has a
rather underdeveloped air transport market. The arrival of new
carriers will test whether there is a large unrealized potential:
the dramatic expansion of traffic on several routes suggests that
there is.
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South America to build a set of alliances in those regions, rather
than to compete on North Atlantic routes. It bought equity in
Chilean, Venezuelan and Argentinian airlines and established a hub
in Miami, basing shorter-range aircraft there to provide
connections to cities on the networks served by its affiliates.
While this strategy was applauded in some quarters as "very
exciting" and "[making] cultural sense", its implementation has
suffered from the financial problems of the Argentinian and
Venezuelan carriers, the second of which has recently entered
bankruptcy. 43
f
The combination of large markets and peripheral location makes
both Alitalia and Iberia vulnerable to attack once the single
market is complete, without enjoying obvious compensating
advantages as long-haul carriers. As state-owned airlines, neither
is immediately liable to being bought up (though Iberia is due to
be privatized), but both face serious domestic competition. While
their strategic choices are limited, alliances with other EU
carriers seem likely in both cases and Spain (at least) is now in
discussions with the US about an open skies agreement.
Group 4 (small market/p@ripheral location) (Austrian, SAS,
TAP, Aer Lingus, Olympic and Finnair):
This group consists of smaller carriers, with small domestic
markets and hubs that are peripheral within the European market.
None has (or at least has so far identified) an adjoining market
that would enable it to compensate for its peripheral position
within the EU All derive their main revenues from domestic and
intra-EU traffic: at least two (SAS and Finnair) have actually cut
back their long-haul services, while a third (Aer Lingus) has
completely reorganized its long-haul operations.
As noted in the discussion of Finnair above, the future of
such "peripheral isolates" is especially problematic, given the
dynamics of the single market and the advantages it lends to those
with central location, large domestic markets, and relatively deep
pockets. The threat to these carriers is not one of a buyout by a
foreign carrier: all are state-owned or have at least fifty per
cent state ownership of equity. The danger is rather that they
will be unable to grow or that they will become junior partners to
larger carriers. More immediately, they may suffer erosion of
their domestic and external traffic as a result of the
43 The Iberia initiative was described as "potentially ..
very exciting" and "a plan that makes cultural sense" in the
widely-circulated Lehmann Brothers assessment, EuropeaD Airlines:
A Turbulent Decade. As The Financial Times recently reported, a
number of major Spanish service businesses have taken similar
initiatives in Latin America: see David White, "Return of the
conqueror," Financial Times, 5 March 1997, 13.
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establishment of new domestic carriers or intervention by other EU
carriers. Such erosion has already begun in the cases of Austria,
Denmark, Ireland, Portugal, and (to a lesser extent) Sweden."
Leaving aside the question of what outcome would best serve
consumers in these countries, we can identify several current and
possible strategies for carriers in this group. One is alliance
with other carriers in smaller countries - the step already taken
by Austrian. But Austrian has the advantage of a fairly central
location, and one close to eastern and south-eastern European
markets. Apart from economies from joint marketing and
acquisition, it is not clear what the rationale of a network
composed of such a dispersed set of peripheral carriers would be or
how it would help to attract passengers.
Another strategy (as in the cases of Alitalia and Iberia) is
to identify an adjacent non-EU market or to build on special
cultural or economic connections with more remote areas. Finnair
has exploited its locational advantage relative to Russia and the
CIS. TAP has such a "cultural" FSA in relation to Brazil and the
ex-Portuguese colonies in southern Africa and is now trying to
develop stronger connections with carriers in these regions.
A third strategy (and that which seems to be gaining favor) is
to ally with a larger, more centrally-located carrier. The most
important example of this strategy is the alliance between, on the
one hand, SAS (and now Finnair) and, on the other, Lufthansa. SAS
has sold off its larger jumbo jets and surrendered much of its
long-haul traffic to Lufthansa, whose Frankfurt hub has now become
the center for the alliance's North Atlantic services. While
Copenhagen has become a hub for flights to North-East Asia, SAS's
role is now mainly that of a collector and distributor of traffic
in the Nordic countries and the Baltic. Moreover, the issue of
competing loyalties to US carriers has been resolved by SAS giving
44 According to the European Commission, the main Austrian
independent (Lauda Air) now offers capacity equal to 28% of that
offered by Austrian (compared to only 5% in 1993); Maersk offers
capacity equal to 31% of SAS's on routes to and within Denmark
and Transwede some 16% of SAS's capacity on routes within Sweden;
and Portugalia offers capacity equal to 29% of TAP's. The oldest
and most successful challenge within this group is probably that
of Ryanair in Ireland. Starting in the late eighties, Ryanair
now has a capacity 60% that of Aer Lingus's. It offers low-fare
services on a number of routes between Ireland and other Member-
States and competes directly on the busy Dublin-London route (on
which Aer Lingus depends for 40% of its revenue) (Commission of
the European Communities, Impact of the Third Package of Air
Transport Liberalization Measures, Communication from the
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(96)514
final, 22 Oct 1996, 18).
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up its alliance with Continental and joining the Lufthansa-United
combination. Within Europe, SAS also had to give up its membership
of Swissair/Austrian alliance.
Not surprisingly, both the creation and the terms of this
alliance have caused some controversy. Apart from its possible
implications for competition, the character of the alliance has
been a politically sensitive issue in that it does involve demoting
the Scandinavian carrier to the status of "junior partner" to the
German airline. 4S Recognizing the political delicacy of an
apparent German takeover, the negotiators of the alliance did agree
that no equity would change hands. But in operational terms SAS
accepted a complete integration of its activities with those of
Lufthansa: it remains an independent carrier but one without
external allies other than those of its German partner.
Does such a future await the other peripheral EU carriers?
Apart from some code-sharing agreements, Aer Lingus, Olympic and
TAP have not yet taken steps publicly towards alliances with either
EU or North American airlines.
They could pursue a fourth option - the more passive and
defensive one of retrenchment and consolidation. This strategy may
be feasible as far as their domestic markets are concerned. As
noted above, independent carriers have begun to challenge the
national flag carriers on domestic routes in Austria, Denmark,
Portugal, and Sweden (but not so far in Finland and Greece).
However, it seems unlikely that other EU carriers will make the
same effort to penetrate these markets that they are evidently
intending to make in Italy, Spain and France and on intra-EU
routes. The populations concerned are fairly small, and distances
between cities are in several cases too short to make air transport
an effective challenger to rail or road transport.
The more serious problem will be on international routes
within the EU. By definition, countries with smaller markets
cannot sustain large networks and therefore external routes are
necessary to support most carriers. Less obviously, higher fares
can be (and are) charged on international routes than on domestic
routes of comparable length, partly because airlines do not have to
meet the same competition from railways that they encounter on
domestic services. 46 It will be on these routes that small country
45 The term "junior partner" is used in several articles on
the alliance: see, for example, Hilary Barnes, "Lufthansa, SAS to
merge routes," Financial Times, 12 May 1995.
4_ For striking evidence of the higher fares for
international services, see Commission of the European
Communities, _mpaGt of the Third Package of Air Transport
LiberalizatiQD Measures, 6. In early 1996, for example, the fare
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carriers will meet increasing competition (such as SAS has recently
met from the discount carrier Virgin Express). A simple defensive
strategy will not be adequate in such circumstances.
.Airlines in this category may, then, have to choose between
some equally uncomfortable options. The most comfortable is
alliance with other carriers simiiarly placed. But this raises the
question of what it is that they are sharing and how such an
alliance will improve their individual and collective competitive
positions. They may, secondly, choose to live independently and
reduce their exposure (and ambitions). But such a strategy will
probably require reorganization and stringent cost-cutting in order
to meet competition from domestic and low-cost EU competitors,
unless a particular niche can be created and defended. "7 Or,
thirdly, they may decide to ally with a stronger EU partner,
sacrificing at least some independence for the protection, the
savings and the greater resources to be gained by being a member -
albeit a junior member - of a global alliance.
The liberalization of air transport within the EU, the pursuit
of economic integration in this sector, and the continuing pressure
to privatize state carriers have created a situation that is
stressful for airline managers and government officials, intriguing
for passengers and corporate clients, and fascinating for observers
of the industry. It offers another test of the EU's public
philosophy about the general benefits of a single, liberalized
market, as well as a testing of the instruments it applies to
ensure a ,,level playing field." Finally, it provides an
opportunity for comparison with similar processes outside the EU,
notably experiences of dereguiation _n the US and elsewhere.
The argument of this paper is, however, that there is no close
analogy elsewhere. Such an analogy would apply if, say, airline
deregulation in the US had been combine d with the creation of an
expanded version of the North American Free Trade Area, to include
for a flight from Venice to Strasbourg in France was 190 ECUs,
compared to 95 ECUs for a domestic flight at similar level of
service from Venice to Rome - both journeys being about 290
miles. Between Madrid and Oporto in Portugal, the fare was
roughly 215 ECUs, compared with a fare of 107 ECUs for a domestic
flight, over the same distance, from Madrid to Malaga ....
4_ In SAS's case, a decision was taken to concentrate (more
exactly, to continue to concentrate) on business travellers. This
decision in turn led to selling off the larger wide-body
aircraft, since they could not be filled with business passengers
and would therefore be unprofitable (Perry Flint, "There's no
place like home," Air Transport World, November 1995, 49).
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many of the states of Central and South America (to a total of
fifteen), with a common market in aviation established across the
entire area from northern Canada to the borders of Brazil. It would
be an even closer analogy if all the major carriers in the
countries concerned (including at least one in the US) were
currently or recently state-owned and were at various stages of
privatization. Only such a fantasy can convey the complexity and
the novelty of the process now underway within the European airline
industry.
For academic observers, the creation of the single air
transport market (and parallel processes in other sectors, such as
telecommunications and financial services) offers an unusual (and
so far largely unrecognized) opportunity to juxtapose concepts and
arguments relating to deregulation with concepts and claims
relating to economic integration. Moreover, it requires us to
examine the interaction of these essentially "domestic" processes
with those of international trade and to ask, among other
questions, how such interaction affects claims for free trade or
protection. Should, for example, the fact that firms are being
forced to undergo a transition that opens their markets both to
domestic competitors and to competitors from neighboring states
constitute a special ground for denying the claims to market access
made by third parties such as the US?
Asking such questions forces us also to recognize that the
stakes of businesses, the main actors in the drama of liberal
integrationism, stretch across national borders and other
jurisdictions. This, in turn, means that we cannot understand the
processes at work within the EU, or evaluate the philosophy guiding
it, without examining closely the strategies that businesses adopt
in attempting to survive and prosper within the single market.
This, in turn again, means examining not only the idiosyncrasies of
particular sectors, but the circumstances of particular firms and
of sectors in particular countries.
Pace the European Commission, the levelness of playing fields
is not usually much of a preoccupation in most sports. The real
issue is what experience and skills the team has and how good its
coach and manager are. It may be enough for the referee to study
and memorize the rule book, and even occasionally to read sections
of it to captive spectators. But those who want to understand the
game had better talk to some players and managers, and this seems
to be an activity to which some EU officials are remarkably
indifferent. In which case, they may be surprised and even
embarrassed by some of the results - and they are certainly missing
most of the fun.
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APPENDIX I
FI_G CARRIER DOMINANCE ON DOMESTIC AND INTRA-CO_4UNITY ROUTES.
MEMBER-STATE/CARRIER
Flights by flag.G_rrier as % of all
flights by carriers registered in
Member-State
MEMBER-STATE/CARRIER:
(Alitalia/ATI):
DOMESTIC ROUTES
78.5
_NTRA-COMMUNITY ROUTES
87.3
(Iberia): [64.0]" [93.8] '9
GERMANY (Lufthansa): 60.4
FRANC_ (Air Inter): 51.3
PORTUGAL (TAP): 47.9
79.7
78.4
83.5
DENMARK (SAS): 33.7 78.2
U.K. (BA): 26.7 58.9
--Source: civil Aviation Authority (U.K.), Airline Competition in
_be Single European Market (London: C.A.A., 1993), CAP 623, 79-93.
'" Percentage of passengers flown.
49 Percentage of passengers flown.
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